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Abstract
Web search engines (WSEs) are tools that allow users to locate specific information
on the Internet. One of the objectives of WSEs is to return the results that best
match the interests of each user. For this purpose, WSEs collect and analyze
users’ search history in order to build profiles. Consequently, a profiled user who
submits a certain query will receive the results which are more interesting for her
in the first positions.
Although they offer a very useful service, they also represent a threat for their
users’ privacy. Profiles are built from past queries and other related data that may
contain private and personal information. In order to avoid this privacy threat, it
is necessary to provide privacy-preserving mechanisms that protect users.
Nowadays, there exist several solutions that intend to provide privacy in this
field. One of the goals of this work is to survey the current solutions, analyzing
their differences and remarking the advantages and disadvantages of each ap-
proach. Then, based on the current state of the art, we present new proposals that
protect users’ privacy. More specifically, this dissertation proposes three different
privacy-preserving multi-party protocols for web search. A multi-party protocol
for web search arranges users into groups where they exchange their queries. This
serves as an obfuscation method to hide the real queries of each user.
The first multi-party protocol that we propose focuses on reducing the query
delay. This is the time that every group member has to wait in order to receive the
query results.
The second proposed multi-party protocol improves current literature because
it is resilient against internal attacks, outperforming similar proposals in terms of
computation and communication.
The third proposal is a P2P protocol, where users are grouped according tho
their preferences. This allows to obfuscate users’ profiles but conserving their
general interests. Consequently, the WSE is able to better rank the results of their
queries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the main issues faced in this dissertation. After that, it briefly
describes our contributions to the field. Finally, the structure and organization of this
thesis are defined.
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Structure of this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
We start with the motivation in §1.1, followed by the main contributions per-
formed in §1.2, and the organization of this PhD dissertation in §1.3.
1.1 Motivation
The volume of information available on the Internet grows every day. The number
of web pages is estimated to nearly double every three-year period, according to
the study presented in [Netc 12]. For example, 620,132,319 websites were counted
in September 2012, a 27.81% more than in September 2011.
For this reason, in recent years, the problem of acurately retrieve information
from the Internet has received a lot of attention. Web search engines (WSEs) are
tools which allow users to find specific information through the use of keywords.
When a user submits a query, the WSE searches for the required information
among the billions of indexed web pages, and returns the search results in the
form of ranked documents.
During this process, the WSE automatically records the submitted query and
some related information, which are often called query logs. For example, Google’s
Privacy Center [Goog 13] states that their query logs include the user’s query, IP
address, browser type, browser language, date and time of the request and a
reference to one or more cookies that may uniquely identify the user’s browser.
1
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Once recorded, query logs are processed and analyzed in order to build user
profiles that represent distinctive features about users’ search behaviour and infor-
mation needs. Then, user profiles are employed for different purposes. One of them
is called personalized search. This technique improves the WSE’s performance by
presenting the search results ranked according to the user’s interests. As stated in
[iPro 08], 68% of WSE users click a search result within the first page of results,
and 92% of them click a result within the first three pages of search results. Con-
sequently, in order to be successful, WSEs try to show the links which are more
relevant for a particular user in the first result pages.
Nevertheless, many complications may arise when discerning users’ interests.
An example of this happens when looking up the word “Mercury”. This term can
refer to the planet Mercury or to an element in the periodic table. The concept
disambiguation is the process of identifying the correct sense when a certain word
has different senses. In the WSE scenario, the query disambiguation process re-
quires the WSE to know the user’s interests and the query context, which can be
obtained from the user profile [Daou 09].
Although WSEs play an important role in the use of the Internet, they can also
raise concerns regarding the privacy of the users. The different logs stored by
a WSE contain sensitive data that can be combined to disclose information of a
certain individual. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [Univ 48], article
12, states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation”. It also recognises
the right of everyone of being protected against such interferences or attacks.
The current practice of most WSEs that log and analyze queries, represents a
threat for the privacy of the users. For example, selling profiles to third parties
(e.g., advertisers, media, etc.) significantly increases the economical benefits of
the WSE [E St 10]. This kind of activity is a threat for users’ privacy because
the disclosed data may contain Personally Identifiable Information (PII). In the
Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information [Nati 10],
PII is defined as any information about an individual maintained by an agency,
including:
1. Any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s
identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth,
mother’s maiden name, or biometric records.
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2. Any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as
medical, educational, financial, and employment information.
When user profiles contain PII, and they are disclosed to third parties, users’
privacy is seriously threatened. The survey conducted in [Anto 10] establishes
a baseline of Internet users’ privacy concerns. The survey results show that the
respondents’ top concern is information transfer, including disclosure of their pat-
terns and the trading/selling of PII to third parties.
Although this information is not generally directly linked to the user’s name,
it is still possible to pseudo-identify a certain individual:
• The IP address of the computer which is used to submit the queries pseudo-
identifies the owner. Nevertheless, the use of dynamic IP addresses makes
identification difficult.
• Browser cookies identify uniquely the browser of the user [Ye 09].
• Browser search bars assign a unique ID to the browser of the user. This ID
can be used for identification purposes.
• Another kind of pseudo-identifier called browser fingerprinting is studied in
[Ecke 10]. In this work, it is shown that browsers reveal much information
about the version and configuration information to websites, which can be
used as a fingerprint to track an individual. Specifically, they propose an
algorithm that unequivocally identifies the browser of a certain user with a
probability of 99.1%.
These pseudo-identifiers represent a unique user and they are linked to all the
information gathered from her. This situation poses a serious threat to the users
because their associated pseudo-identifiers may reveal their real identity in several
scenarios:
1. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) can connect the IP address linked to a bunch
of queries with the complete name of the user who submitted them.
2. Let us assume a user who logs in an account associated to the WSE and
submits queries (e.g., a Google user logged in Gmail). The WSE is able to
connect these queries with that account. This account probably contains the
real name of the user who owns it.
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3. Let us imagine a user who submits a query about personal information
which identifies him uniquely: her name, national ID, etc. This kind of
queries are called vanity queries [Jone 08], and they easily link the user’s
pseudo-identifier with her real identity.
4. Even though a single query might not reveal the real identity of a certain
user, the aggregation of several queries might cause this situation.
In practice, points three and four (queries about personal information and
aggregation of queries) have been shown to be effective in identifying users. An
example of this is the AOL scandal, where 20 million queries made by 658,000
users were publicly disclosed [M Ba 05]: Thelma Arnold, user of the AOL’s WSE,
was identified by her searches submitted over a three-month period. All these
queries were hidden behind a pseudonym (in this case it was the number 4417749).
This number was assigned to protect the searchers’ anonymity. However, the
aggregation of hundreds of queries, some of them containing personal information
(e.g., her own name, the city where she lives, etc.), was enough to identify and
profile her.
The AOL scandal is a practical example of the risks of unprotected web search
and query log disclosure, but it is not the only one. According to [Coop 08], there
are four categories of privacy risks caused by query logging:
1. Accidental or malicious disclosure
Disclosure of data that contains private information is an obvious risk of
query logging. Even for a WSE that does not intentionally disclose query
logs, there exists a risk of accidental disclosure. This might be the result
of security flaws or mistakes related to a purposeful controlled disclosure.
For example, in 2006 AOL released a file with twenty million searches gen-
erated by its users [M Ba 05]. This incident had serious consequences since
personally identifiable information was present in many of the queries.
Individuals also face threats from malicious disclosure. In such cases, an
attacker or a dishonest employee or researcher purposely discloses data that
was meant to be kept private or that may cause harm to others in some way.
2. Compelled disclosure to third parties
Query logs may be subject to a subpoena as a part of civil litigation between
individuals or organizations. For example, a seach engine company may be
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compelled to disclose queries related to an individual involved in a legal
case as part of the evidence provided to the court. In these situations, search
engines risk their reliability in front of their users if they comply. If they
do not comply, they may face potentially long and costly litigations by the
requesting entity.
This kind of privacy risk attracted a lot of attention in 2006, when the U.S.
Department of Justice issued subpoenas to AOL, Google, Microsoft and Ya-
hoo as part of its litigation of an Internet child safety law [K Ha 06]. The
Department of Justice requested several months of query logs to use as evi-
dence that Internet filters were not adequately protecting children from adult
content. This requested was largely viewed as massively overbroad and not
extrictly necessary to the case [M Ra 06]. Google refused to comply with
the subpoena and submitted a smaller set of information than what the re-
quested intended. However, the other search engines agreed to disclose what
the Department of Justice was originally requesting.
3. Disclosure to the government
The arrival of the Internet entailed a great supply of stored data that may
be of interest to the government. Government authorities often have valid,
compelling and urgent needs to examine query logs. However, the deliver
of this sort of information should be carefully considered in order to avoid
surveillance that is overbroad, unjustified or erroneous.
Regrettably, countries such as the U.S.A or other countries in Europe. have
laws that have not been updated with technological advances. Therefore,
these laws are sometimes ambiguous, allowing the government to access the
information under weak pretexts.
4. Misuse of user profiles
The retention of query logs may allow the creation of detailed profiles about
the interests, preferences and behaviors of the users. These profiles may be
particularly appealing for marketing purposes, both internal to the search
engine (e.g., sponsored links), and as data sets provided to third parties.
They may also be used as a tool to calibrate price discrimination, where a
marketer charges each consumer the maximum price that she is determined
to pay for the same item.
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In addition to these risks, [Coop 08] also remarks the potential for logs to be er-
roneously linked to the wrong individuals (e.g., linking the logs from a computer
employed by multiple users to the same person). Similarly to identity fraud, as-
sociating queries about diseases, sexual orientation, politics, etc. to someone who
did not generate them may have serious negative consequences for the affected
user.
1.2 Contributions
As a response to the privacy concerns, there are some Privacy Enhancing Technolo-
gies (PETs) in the literature whose objective is to protect users’ privacy in front of
WSEs. The solutions can be addressed from two different points:
• Server-side. The WSE wants to share or outsource the collected query logs
without putting users’ privacy at risk. There are several methodologies in
the literature that study how to anonymize these logs, such as Privacy Pre-
serving Data mining (PPD) or Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC).
• Client-side. This type of mechanisms assume that WSEs have no interest
in protecting users’ privacy or do not trust WSEs to correctly protect users’
privacy. Techniques inside this category allow users to obfuscate the infor-
mation that WSEs know about them.
This dissertation only focuses on the second point, the client-side techniques.
We assume that once the personal data are gathered, users can do nothing to pre-
vent WSEs from putting their privacy at risk. Therefore, we study the mechanisms
that users can employ to protect their privacy before the personal data is gathered
and analyzed.
One of the objectives of this document is to present a survey on the current
client-side technologies that allow private web search. This includes the classi-
fication and analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the different kinds of
approaches.
This work also contributes to private web search by offering new proposals.
Based on the study of current literature, we identify some points of improvement
and present three new schemes:
• The first proposal analyzes an existing protocol, the UUP protocol [Cast 09],
and modifies it in order to obtain a lower time of response. The resulting
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protocol obtains the lowest query delay in the literature of multi-party pri-
vate web search.
• The second proposal is also based on the UUP protocol, but in this case it
improves the level of security . The new protocol resist the presence of users
who do not behave properly (i.e., adversaries), and offers a shorter response
time than similar proposals in the literature with the same level of security.
• The third proposal is a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) protocol that groups users accord-
ing to their preferences. Inside each group, users exchange their queries
before submitting them to the WSE.
1.3 Structure of this document
Chapter 2 surveys and classifies the different existing proposals that provide pri-
vacy in WSEs. Each proposal is described and its main advantages and disadvan-
tages are discussed.
Chapter 3 gives some background about cryptographic techniques employed
in subsequent chapters. Our contributions to the field are described in Chapter 4,
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Finally, Chapter 7 includes the conclusions of the work. In addition, the main
lines of future research are described.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
The work contained in this chapter analyzes the different mechanisms that users can em-
ploy in order to protect their privacy in front of WSEs. It includes a novel approach to
classify current client-side proposals, as well as a study on how they work, their advan-
tages and their disadvantages. Furthermore, we propose a common evaluation framework
composed by eight properties (extracted from the reviewed literature) that affect users’ ex-
perience when protecting their privacy from the WSE. We then compare all the reviewed
systems according to this common evaluation framework in order to determine which pro-
posals enhance users’ experience.
Contents
2.1 Client-side Privacy Enhancing Technologies for Web Search . . 10
2.1.1 Collaborative Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Non-collaborative Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.1 Common Evaluation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2.2 Analysis of the properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3 Conclusions of the state of the art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Section 2.1 proposes a model for classifying the different privacy enhancing
technologies applied to web search that can be found in the literature, and ana-
lyzes every proposal inside each category, studying their advantages and disad-
vantages. In Section 2.2 we compare these technologies and discuss some prop-
erties that affect users’ experience. Finally, Section 6.6 provides some concluding
remarks about the state of the art.
9
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2.1 Client-side Privacy Enhancing Technologies for Web
Search
This section surveys the current Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) that allow
private web search from the client-side perspective. This includes the classification
and analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the different kinds of approaches.
According to [Oliv 03] and [Oliv 04], PETs can be classified into four cate-
gories (Private Communication, Anonymity, Personal Control, and Organizational Safe-
guards). In the work presented in [Bran 11], this classification is applied to privacy-
preserving web search schemes:
• Private Communication. This category consists of technologies that allow a
user to communicate content only to the specified recipient(s), regardless of
who is listening.
• Anonymity. Pfitzmann and Koehntopp [Pfit 01] define anonymity as “the
state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects”. The anonyimity
schemes are mainly based on Chaum’s mix networks [Chau 81] or based
on the notion of a proxy. Consequently, these schemes often require the
colaboration of an external entity.
• Personal Control. The idea of the schemes inside this category is to allow
users to ensure that their personal information is only used in a manner that
corresponds to their privacy policies. These privacy policies can be defined
and modified by each user.
• Organizational Safeguards. This category is similar to Personal Control, al-
though it focuses on the organization side, and not the client side. The
Organizational Safeguards refer to the use of technology to ensure that the
organization complies with its privacy policy as well as with the preferences
of the users.
These four categories comprise all the existing methods to protect users’ pri-
vacy in front of WSE. However, for our purposes, this classification covers a too
wide range of proposals (e.g., organizational safeguards only apply to the server side,
which is out of the scope of this dissertation). For this reason, we have extracted
some ideas from the work done in [Oliv 03] and [Oliv 04] and we have constructed
a new classification that is specifically designed for client-side approaches.
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Figure 2.1: Classification of Web Search Privacy Enhancing Technologies that work
on the client side
Figure 2.1 shows our proposal for classifying client-side technologies that pro-
tect users’ privacy in front of WSE. At the highest level, we classify approaches
according to their needs of collaboration with the WSE. On one hand, collaborative
approaches require a certain level of cooperation from the WSE. Note that these
techniques are not considered server-side because users actively participate in the
process. Furthermore, an important characteristic of collaborative approaches is
that when the WSE does not cooperate, the user immediately detects it. This
does not happen with server-side approaches, since they are asynchronous and
transparent to the user. On the other hand, non-collaborative approaches protect
users’ privacy without any help from the WSE, and do not require any change
in the server side (the WSE). Regarding the original classification from [Oliv 03]
and [Oliv 04], personal control and private communication would be included inside
collaborative approaches, while non-collaborative approaches would correspond
to anonymity, divided into sub-categories anonymous channels and obfuscation tech-
niques. Next, we describe the categories and subcategories from Figure 2.1 in a
higher detail, as well as the main schemes in the literature that fall into each of
them.
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2.1.1 Collaborative Approaches
As stated above, in collaborative approaches users and WSEs work together in
order to protect users’ privacy. Inside this category, three other subcategories can
be found: Private Information Retrieval, P3P, and Context-based Retrieval. Each
of these subcategories is subsequently described.
Private Information Retrieval
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) schemes allow a user to retrieve information
from a database privately, i.e., without the server learning what information was
retrieved. With a PIR scheme a user can search the documents stored in the
database, and thus recover the documents of interest on their own. Therefore,
the problem of submitting a query to a WSE while preserving the user’s privacy
can be seen as a PIR problem.
The first PIR protocol was presented in [Chor 97] and [Chor 98]. These scheme
is based on several servers which hold the same database and cannot communicate
between them. This is not applicable to our study, since in the WSE scenario there
is only one server. Even in the case of a WSE with several servers, it is not realistic
to assume that servers cannot communicate between them.
A more appropriate scheme for the WSE scenario is single-database PIR. The
first reference was presented in [Kush 97] (see [Ostr 07] for a detailed survey on
single-database PIR protocols). This schemes are specific for scenarios with only
one server that holds the database. However, according to [Cast 09], in practice
they suffer from some fundamental problems that still make them unsuitable for
WSEs:
1. PIR schemes are not suited for large databases. In the PIR literature, the
database is usually modeled as a vector. The user wishes to retrieve the
value of the i-th component of the vector while keeping the index i hidden
from the server which holds the database.
Let us assume that the database contains n items. A PIR protocol will try to
guarantee maximum server uncertainty on the index i of the record retrieved
by the user. This is done by accessing all records in the database. Note that
if a certain user only accesses a part, it will be easier for the server to know
the real interests of this user. The cost of accessing all records represents a
computational complexity of O(n).
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2. When accessing the records in the database, it is assumed that the user
knows their physical location. In WSE, this situation is not realistic be-
cause the database is not managed by the user. In [Chor 97], the authors
propose the use of a mechanism which maps individual keywords to physi-
cal addresses. According to that, the user can submit a query consisting on
a keyword and no modification in the structure of the database is needed.
However, this model cannot be applied to our scenario, since WSE do not
map keywords to physical addresses.
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)
Another methodology to protect privacy with the collaboration of WSEs is the
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). It was created by the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) to make it easier for website visitors to obtain information
about the privacy policies of the sites that they visit. It is a framework that al-
lows users to automate the protection of their privacy by expressing their privacy
preferences. When a user encounters a website that does not conform to these
preferences, a special software alerts the user or takes other actions such as block-
ing cookies.
The work presented in [Cran 06] proposes an application of P3P to WSEs. The
basic idea is that when a search term is entered, the WSE retrieves the P3P policies
for all the query results. Then it compares them to the privacy preferences that the
user has previously defined. According to this comparison, the WSE re-ranks the
results, and those matching the user’s preferences are presented first. This method
is analyzed in [Tsai 09], using 15,000 search queries from 460 participants over a
10-month period. Results show that by displaying privacy information together
with search results, users are more likely to visit websites that provide privacy
indicators and, among them, those who have higher levels of privacy.
Related to P3P, a policy-based system called Do-Not-Track was originally pro-
posed in 2009 by researchers Christopher Soghoian, Sid Stamm, and Dan Kamin-
sky, as explained in [C So 12]. It has been later studied in works like [Maye 11],
[Beck 12], and [Tene 12], and it is currently being standardized by the World Wide
Web Consortium (W3C). The Do-Not-Track (DNT) is a HTTP header field that
requests the web application to not track an individual user. Similarly to P3P, it
relies on the web application compliance in order to be effective.
This kind of schemes has been widely criticized in the literature. For exam-
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ple, [Hoch 02] suggests that industry efforts for self-regulation prevent the U.S.
from passing a comprehensive privacy law, leaving users in a weaker alternative.
In [Reay 09], the authors collect all available P3P documents from the 100,000
most popular Web sites and analyze their adherence to legal mandates. Results
show that websites do not generally even claim to follow all the privacy-protection
mandates in their legal jurisdiction, including European Union nations, Canada,
Australia, and websites in the USA Safe Harbor program. Additionally, there is
no mechanism by which users can verify that the website complies its own posted
privacy policy. Other critics [Elec 00] claim that P3P is hard to implement, lacks
enforcement provisions, and will never have enough adopters.
On the other hand, works like [Cran 12] suggest that even if these kinds of
mechanisms are not enough to protect privacy, they are complementary to privacy
regulation. Once users are sure that their information is protected at least at a
baseline level, P3P policies have the potential to provide meaningful control over
secondary data uses and sharing. However, [Cran 12] also remarks that some other
enforcement mechanisms are needed to ensure that users’ choices are respected.
Context-based Retrieval
As previously justified, personalized search improves the quality of service pro-
vided by the WSE by decreasing search ambiguity and returning results that are
more likely to match a particular user’s interests. However, allowing WSEs to
store query logs on its servers has many already described privacy issues. Con-
sequently, there are some alternatives in the literature that suggest to store the
search history or the user profile on the client’s machine.
For example, the User-Centered Adaptive Information Retrieval (UCAIR)
project [Shen 05] aims at developping a new kind of WSE capable of optimiz-
ing the search results according to each individual’s interests. In order to do this,
they collect and exploit available user context from submitted queries and clicked
results. More specifically, the proposed system has three connected modules with
different functions:
1. The user modeling module, which captures user’s search context and history
information, including the submitted queries and any clicked search results.
2. The query modification module, which selectively improves the query for-
mulation according to the interests represented in the previous module.
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3. The result re-ranking module, which re-ranks search results before they are
presented to the user.
The combination of these three modules allows to represent users’ interests
and re-rank search results according to these interests. This alternative is consid-
ered inside the collaborative approach category since WSE and users participate
together during the search process in order to obtain the final results: the WSE re-
ceives the query and returns the results, and these are re-ranked in the client-side.
Based on a similar idea, the protocol presented in [Xu 07] allows the user to
choose the content and degree of detail of the profile information that is exposed
to the WSE. The protocol is responsible for building the profile of the user in the
client side and then, the user determines the content from this profile that will be
revealed to the WSE when a query is submitted. In this case, the collaboration be-
tween the WSE and the user is needed in the sense that the WSE must be prepared
to receive a profile together with the query, and personalize the results according
to that profile and not according to the profile stored in the server side.
In order to build the profile sent to the WSE, the system has a user interface
where the user selects three different parameters:
1. The personal data sources that can be employed to build her profile (e.g.,
browser history, emails, documents, etc.).
2. A threshold parameter (minDetail) that indicates the level of detail that will
be revealed to the WSE.
3. A parameter α that represents the weight assigned to the relationship be-
tween the user profile and the query results (i.e., the extent to which the
results returned by the WSE should consider or ignore the user profile).
The most challenging aspect of these methods is how to infer the user profile
based on the user’s ongoing behavior, and how to represent it accurately. Recent
studies like [Leun 12] [Kram 13] build on the same idea of using context to per-
sonalize results. These works adjust some parameters of the stored profiles, such
as conceptual relationships and concept features. The idea is the same, but they
are able to control the exposed user information more accurately and maintain
better ranking quality than [Shen 05] or [Xu 07].
Nevertheless, there are still some disadvantages of this kind of alternatives:
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• Performing the re-ranking at the client side may not be as effective as doing
it at the server side. As pointed out in [Ucai 05], the client has no global
index for all websites and hence, the general retrieval function cannot be
probably controlled at the client side.
• Sending a part of the profile to the WSE together with the query may allow
the WSE to build a correct user profile after several executions. Moreover,
in order to decide which part of the profile is sent to the WSE, the user is
frequently required to adjust some parameters. This means that the user has
to actively participate in the process and have some expert knowledge about
it.
2.1.2 Non-collaborative Approaches
Collaborative Approaches assume that the WSE cooperate with the user in execut-
ing the protocol. Nevertheless, in some scenarios this assumption is not realistic
because the WSE has no motivation to protect the privacy of the users and limit
its profiling ability. Accordingly, there are other kinds of techniques, named non-
collaborative approaches, which allow users to be the only responsible for their
privacy. These schemes do not expect any collaboration from the WSE.
Non-collaborative approaches can be further classified into two subcategories:
obfuscation techniques and anonymous channels. The former is based on the gener-
ation of enough noise to distort the user profile that the WSE stores. The latter
focuses on creating an anonymous channel between the user and the WSE. Next,
both subcategories are detailed.
Obfuscation Techniques
Obfuscation techniques are based on introducing additional random “cover” traf-
fic, intended to obscure the true communication pattern between sender and re-
ceiver. The property that actual messages sent by a subject are indistinguishable
from random noise is known as unobservability.
There are several works based on this solution that have been implemented in
the literature. These works can be further classified regarding the number of users
that participate in the protocol between standalone and distributed. The former
approach allows that one user alone protects her privacy in front of the WSE. The
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latter requires that a group of users work together in order to protect the privacy
of each member of the group.
Standalone Systems Standalone schemes are based on generating a stream of
synthetic queries that are used to hide the real queries of the user. Synthetic
queries are submitted together with the real queries, obfuscating the profile that
the WSE owns of an individual. There are two different approaches in standalone
systems, depending on the way that synthetic queries are generated. If the syn-
thetic queries are somehow semantically related to the real queries, the obfuscated
profile will still be usable and the WSE will be able to personalize the results. If
the synthetic queries are semantically unrelated to the real queries, the profile will
be heterogenous and the personalization will be less accurate. Note that this does
not mean that one altenative is better than the other, since in the second case the
WSE will know less details about the user’s interests, which increases her level of
privacy. Different users may have different perceptions of the value of their own
privacy and hence, they may be interested in different kinds of approaches. Next,
some of the most renowned standalone systems in the area are classified accord-
ing to the sematical relation between the synthetic queries and the real queries
generated by the user.
1. Synthetic queries semantically unrelated to real queries.
The most notable example of these systems is TrackMeNot (TMN) [Trac 13].
TMN is a Firefox plugin designed to achieve privacy in web search by obfus-
cating the queries of the users. This is done by using a stream of machine-
generated queries that act as a decoy and which hide the real queries. The
idea is that providing enough “noise” around the true search patterns of
the user, will make it very difficult to distinguish the queries made by TMN
from those actually made by humans.
The synthetic queries are picked from a variety of sources that provide terms.
At the beginning, an initial “seed list” is generated using RSS feeds. During
the executions, the queries are pulled from this list and submitted to the
WSE. The list is dynamic, so it is updated with new RSS feeds periodically.
The user can customize many parameters that affect TrackMeNot behavior.
For example, she can select the WSE (e.g. AOL, Bing, Yahoo, Google, etc.) to
which the queries will be submitted. She can also specify the frequency of
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the queries submission, as well as choosing the website with RSS feeds from
which the seeds are picked.
One of the problems of TrackMeNot is that it sumbits random queries to
the WSEs when the activity of the users is low. This is done to prevent the
system from affecting the normal work of the users. Nevertheless, this can
be a threat for users’ privacy: for each user, the WSE is able to divide all
her queries depending on whether or not they have been submitted during
working hours (according to the time-zone of the user). Probably, all the
queries submitted out of the working hours have been sent by TrackMeNot.
The period of time between two different queries can also be used to the
same purpose: it can be assumed that when the users are working, they do
not submit only one query but several in a short period of time. This gap
between queries can be used to deduce whether or not a certain query has
been submitted by TrackMeNot.
Additionally, TrackMeNot queries are semantically unrelated in most cases.
This means that while users normally submit sequential queries on the
same subject, TrackMeNot queries have different subjects randomly cho-
sen. The WSE can use the timing and semantic features to distinguish and
detect TrackMeNot queries. In fact, works like [Chow 09], [Pedd 10], and
[Al R 12] show that it is possible to distinguish real queries from synthetic
queries. These works are based on the idea that machine-generated queries
do not have the same features as human-generated queries. For example,
[Pedd 10] develops a classifier which is very accurate in identifying Track-
MeNot queries. The authors use a dataset of 3 months of user queries from
the available AOL search logs. Then, they apply two different categories of
machine learning algorithms:
(a) Clustering algorithms: These algorithms group the elements of the
dataset into clusters, where the elements of the same group share some
common features. The authors tested the performance of three cluster-
ing algorithms: SimpleKMeans, Farthest First and EMClusterer.
(b) Classification algorithms: These algorithms are based on labels. They
need a learning phase made over a training set of queries. In this train-
ing set, each element has its own label. After the learning phase, the
algorithm is able to label the elements on a new test set.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CLIENT-SIDE PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES IN WEB SEARCH. 
Cristina Romero Tris 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1658-2014
2.1. CLIENT-SIDE PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES FOR WEB
SEARCH 19
In this case, the authors test the performance of six classification al-
gorithms: Logistic (Regression), Alternating Decision Trees (ADTree),
Naive Bayes, Random Forest, Random Tree and ZeroR.
The results obtained using these algorithms were very accurate in identifying
the TrackMeNot queries. In fact, the mean of misclassification rate was only
0.02%.
GooPIR [Domi 09b] is another application based on a query obfuscation pro-
tocol. It submits fake words to the WSE together with the authentic query.
This system is based on a concept called “h(k)-private information retrieval”,
where k is a non-negative integer representing the number of queries that a
user submits (one real query and k− 1 synthetic queries), and h(·) is a func-
tion such that h(k) ≥ 0. Their protocol provides h(k)-private information
retrieval because any intruder views the query of a user, denoted as q0, as a
random variable (Q0) whose Shannon’s entropy is h(Q0) ≥ h(k). Informally,
this means that the intruder can see the query as a variable (Q0) that can take
several values. Among them, the intruder cannot unequivocally determine
which was the exact query (q0) submitted by the user.
GooPIR uses a Thesaurus to obtain the words which are mixed with the real
queries. Thesaurus provides the keywords along with their relative frequen-
cies. Keyword frequencies can be obtained based on the appearances in a
text collection (e.g. newspapers) or from the frequency output when the
keyword is looked up in a WSE. These frequencies are used to determine the
words that can be submitted together with the real query. Keywords with
similar frequency to the query frequency provide a higher entropy.
Unlike TrackMeNot, there is no current proposal that proves that GooPIR
queries can be differentiated from real queries. However, [Bals 12] points out
that GooPIR does not provide perfect query indistinguishability when vari-
ous sets of queries are taken into account. For example, let us consider k = 3
and a user who generates the query “pizza”. Then, GooPIR will submit it
together with two other synthetic queries (e.g., “mouse”, “pizza”, “plastic”).
Then, let us consider that consecutively afterwards (“spaghetti”, “muscles”,
“school”) and (“hockey”, “risotto”, “purple”) are submitted. Then, an at-
tacker (e.g., the WSE) can find a correlation in the combination of terms
and remark the user’s interest in italian cuisine, assigning to her profile the
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CLIENT-SIDE PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES IN WEB SEARCH. 
Cristina Romero Tris 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1658-2014
20 CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
queries “pizza”, “spaghetti” and “risotto”, and discarding the rest.
Moreover, another important drawback of GooPIR is that it uses a Thesaurus
in order to decide which words can be added to the search. According to
that, GooPIR can only submit words. Full sentences are not addressed (note
that sentences cannot be formed by random words).
Plausibly Deniable Search (PDS) [Muru 09] is similar to GooPIR in the sense
that k − 1 fake queries are submitted together with the real query. One of
the differences is that PDS subsitutes the real query by a canonical query (i.e.,
the real query without grammar errors or typos). This prevents the WSE to
identify the real query by the human-writing mistakes that it may include.
Then, the system uses a Latent Semantic Indexing-based approach [Deer 90]
to generate the k − 1 synthetic queries in such a way that the final set of k
queries relate to different topics. Consequently, all the k queries have the
same probability of being the query generated by the user (i.e., they are
equally plausible).
In order to prevent the correlation attack appliable to GooPIR, PDS ensures
that two semantically related queries are obfuscated by synthetic queries
that are also semantically related. As an example of this, let us consider
that the query “pizza” mapped to “italian cuisine” was obfuscated with
queries about “pop songs” and “computer networks”. Then, the next query
about “italian cuisine” (e.g., spaghetti) will also be obfuscated with synthetic
queries from the “pop songs” and “computer network” categories, prevent-
ing an attacker to identify a unique common subject in the submitted queries.
However, as described in [Bals 12], the problem of this system is that it as-
sumes that the adversary will map the queries into the same categories as
PDS. For example, let us consider the query “baby food” that PDS maps into
“nutrition”, and the query “gynaecologist” mapped into “health”. Since the
queries do not belong to the same category, the synthetic queries will not be
semantically related. However, an adversary that maps both queries to the
category “pregnancy” will still be able to find correlations in the submitted
queries and hence, discard the synthetic queries.
2. Synthetic queries semantically related to real queries.
The general idea under this proposal is again the use of synthetic queries
that are submitted together with the real queries of the user. The novelty
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of the approach regarding TrackMeNot, GooPIR or PDS, is that it considers
similarities between the topics of synthetic and real queries.
For example, the scheme presented in [Viej 12a] uses the Open Directory
Project (ODP) [ODP 13] hierarchy to infer the real interests of the user and
limit the semantic distance between fake and real queries. In order to do
this, every time that a user wants to submit a real query q, the following
steps are executed:
• The system searches the real category Cr in the ODP hierarchy that
includes q.
• It retrieves some fake categories C1f ,C
2
f , . . . ,C
m
f related to Cr, e.g., more
specific or more general categories, another child of the same parent
category, etc.
• Some terms from each fake category Cif are picked and submitted to
the WSE together with q.
The performance of the proposed scheme is evaluated using real queries ex-
tracted from the AOL’s dataset [M Ba 05]. Results show that WSEs cannot
distinguish synthetic queries from real queries, and that although the pro-
files of the users are obfuscated, the search results that the WSE returns are
similar to the results that the user obtains with a non-obfuscated profile. Re-
garding the performance, the synthetic query generation time is less than
700 ms.
The problem of this scheme is that it does not address queries with multi-
ple words. If a query is formed by several words or terms, they are treated
individually and their categories are separately retrieved from the ODP hier-
archy. For example, the query “white pages” would be splitted into “white”
and “pages”, and the corresponding ODP categories would not reflect the
real meaning of the query.
In order to solve this problem, the work presented in [Sanc 13] applies a
linguistic analysis preprocessing to the query before the ODP categories are
retrieved. The use of Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques (i.e.,
Sentence Detection, Tokenization, Part-of-speech tagging, etc.) allows to in-
terpret complex queries and find the proper category in the ODP hierarchy.
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Accordingly, the synthetic queries are more accurately generated and the
semantics are better preserved than in [Viej 12a].
A slightly different idea is presented in [Aram 12], where the authors de-
sign a system called QueryScrambler. The objective of the QueryScrambler
scheme is to retrieve the web results related to a query from the WSE, with-
out revealing the query and the actual interests of the users. Therefore, the
main difference regarding [Viej 12a] and [Sanc 13] is that the real query is
never submitted. Instead, given a query, a set of scrambled queries that
correspond approximately to the same interest are generated. These scram-
bled queries are submitted to the WSE who returns the results. Then, these
results are reconstructed by a process called descrambling, which attempts
to produce a ranking similar to the one that the real query would have ob-
tained. In order to obtain the set of scrambled queries, the method employs
an ontology called WordNet. For each query term, a set of related terms is
generated following again the hypernymy and hyponymy relations in the
ontology.
In order to perform the descrambling, two methods are proposed: fusion
and local re-indexing. The fusion method considers the number of times
that an item appears in the results that belong to the scrambled queries. The
local re-indexing consists in submitting the real query to a local engine that
returns results only appearing in the union of scrambled results.
The method is evaluated by running an offline experiment. The results in-
dicate that the QueryScrambler gets up to 25% of the top-50 target results.
The disadvantage of the QueryScrambler is that it does not protect the user
from adversaries that know the method. These adversaries could potentially
reverse the procedure in order to get the real interests. As a minor disad-
vantage, the method is not able to generate scrambled queries from adverbs
or adjectives, since WordNet does not accept them. Additionally, it requires
that the user participates in the process for disambiguation, i.e., the user
must select the proper term that matches her interests among a set of pro-
posed terms.
A novel approach for generating synthetic queries is presented in [Viej 13].
In this work, the authors argue that past queries do not always effectively
reflect users’ interests, and they give several reasons for this. For example,
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one of them is that users may circumstantially submit queries related to a
certain topic which is quite far from their real interests, adding an erroneous
bias to the generated profile. Another reason is that there is no pattern that
defines the structure of a query and, hence, it can be quite challenging to
extract accurate interests from these kinds of data.
Therefore, this work proposes: (1) to build user profiles using information
from their social network accounts (e.g., Twitter) instead of from their past
searches; and (2) to employ the profiles in order to generate synthetic queries
related to users’ interests. For this purpose, the scheme profiles users using
their published tweets (i.e., text-based posts up to 140 characters published
in the social network Twitter [Twit 13]). The profiles are built using the
method proposed in [Viej 12b], which again applies NLP techniques (i.e.,
Sentence Detection, Tokenization, Part-of-speech tagging, etc.) to extract the
important terms from the tweets. In a second step, the system evaluates
which are the dominant and dominated categories in the profile according
to their occurrence/co-occurrence frequency. Then, these categories are used
as the contents of the synthetic queries to be submitted to the WSE.
Nevertheless, this system is still at an early development stage: a preliminar
design is given, but more evaluations are needed in order to prove that social
networks are a better source of information than past searches. Additionally,
the authors assume that users have a social network and regularly publish
comments about their personal interests, which may not always be true.
Distributed Systems As previously mentioned, distributed schemes require the
collaboration of a group of users that work together in order to protect their pri-
vacy. Schemes in the literature that fall into this category are next described.
Crowds [Reit 98] is a system where users try to hide their actions within the
actions of many others. The system puts users into a large group (the crowd)
where they submit requests on behalf of other members. Users in the system
are represented by processes called “jondos”. Jondos are assigned to a “crowd”
with other jondos by an administrative process called a “blender”. The blender
is also responsible for informing new jondos of other members of the crowd and
for informing to all the jondos when a user joins/leaves the crowd. Besides, every
node has a direct link with each node of the network (the topology is a complete
graph). The communication through the link is encrypted using a key only known
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by the two jondos (point-to-point cryptography).
When a user wants to make a request, she establishes a random path through
the network. For this purpose, she randomly picks another jondo and forwards the
request to it. That jondo then flips a coin with a forwarding probability p f > 0.5.
Depending on the outcome of the coin flip, the jondo either selects another random
jondo to which the request will be forwarded, or it forwards the request to the
intended web server (the WSE). In this way, some node eventually submits the
query to the WSE. Then, the results are forwarded towards the original node
following the reversed path that the query used.
The security of the system relies on the fact that when a jondo receives a re-
quest, it does not know if the sender was the original requester or if it was for-
warding the request for another jondo. Note that there is a tradeoff between the
forwarding probability p f and the length of the path and, hence, the query delay.
The more jondos that the query visits, the higher is the query delay and the lower
is the performance for the user.
• The central node represents a bottleneck in the overall system performance.
• The use of point-to-point encryption and a complete graph require that each
node stores as many symmetric keys as nodes are in the network. In addi-
tion, each hop requires one encryption and one decryption. This introduces
a certain overhead to the system.
• In the same way as in anonymity networks, Crowd only protects the trans-
port of the data. Users are responsible for hiding their private information.
• Personalization is only possible if the members of the crowd share the same
interests.
• This scheme is weak against the predecessor attack [Wrig 04]: To attack
Crowds, a number of attackers may simply join the crowd and wait for paths
to be reformed. Each attacker can log its predecessor after each path refor-
mation. Let us consider a user U who wants to submit several queries. Due
to the random distribution of the queries among all the nodes of the net-
work, U will forward almost all her queries to the rest of the users. As a
result, several reformations will happen and U will appear in all of them.
Therefore, the attackers will log U much more often than any other node.
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After a large number of path reformations, it will become clear that U is the
user who is generating the queries.
In [Cast 09], the useless user profile (UUP) protocol is proposed. This scheme
follows an approach quite similar to Crowds: each user who wants to submit a
query will not send her own query but a query of another user instead. As a result
of this behaviour, the WSE cannot generate a real profile of a certain individual.
Regarding privacy concerns, the relevant point is that the users do not knowwhich
query belongs to each user. This is achieved by using cryptographic tools. The
system requires two components: a central node and a client application. The
central node listens to client requests. After receiving n requests, it creates a
new group and sends the IP addresses and port numbers to each group member.
Then, the group members establish network connections between them and start
to communicate without the interaction of the central node. At the end, each
user is randomly assigned one query generated by a group member. Then, she
submits the query to the WSE and broadcasts the results. As a result, every group
member receives the search results for the query that she generated. The scheme
was tested in real conditions and results show that it provides an overhead of 5.2
seconds with a group of three users and a key length of 1024 bits.
The work presented in [Lind 10] builts upon the UUP protocol. In this case,
the authors argue that the UUP protocol is not secure against dishonest internal
users. Therefore, they propose a new protocol resilient against internal attackers.
However, in order to do this, they employ double encryptions, which significantly
increases the computation time.
Additionally, the common shortcomings of both proposals ([Cast 09],
[Lind 10]) are the following:
• The groups of users must be created. This also introduces a significant delay.
• It requires a large number of users in order to provide an acceptable response
time.
• Groups of users are formed at random, hence the profiles are distorted with
queries that may be completely different to the real interests of their owners.
According to that, personalized search is not provided, thus the quality of
the search results is likely to be low.
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The scheme presented in [Viej 10] employs the connections inside social net-
works to distort the user profiles. In this way, a certain user that wants to submit
a query can send it directly to the WSE or forward it to a neighbour (a friend
in the social network). A neighbour that receives a query has the same options:
submit it to the WSE or forward it to one of her neighbours. Eventually, someone
submits the query to the WSE and the results are sent back to the original user
by following the inverse path that the query employed. In order to balance the
load and maintain privacy, two functions are defined in the system. The first func-
tion Φ determines if a user should submit a query or forward it to a neighbour
and, in the second case, it determines to which neighbour it should be forwarded.
The objective of Φ is to equally distribute the queries so that the WSE cannot
link a query to the real user who generated it. The second function α works as
a reputation-based scheme, evaluating the selfishness of each user and punishing
selfish users. This process is similar to the one introduced by Crowds. Never-
theless, in [Viej 10], a certain user is only connected with a limited set of users
(her friends in the social network). Another interesting point of this proposal is
that the groups of users are already generated and supported by an existing social
network (e.g., Facebook). Besides, users who share the same group are assumed
to be friends in real life. This increases the homogeneity of the group in terms of
shared interests. Therefore, this scheme generates distorted profiles that still allow
the users to get a proper service from the WSE. In addition to that, this scheme
improves former solutions in terms of query delay. This proposal presents some
shortcomings which are next summarized:
• The authors assume that none of the users who collaborate in a query sub-
mission will swap the correct answer from the WSE for a fake one. Some
approaches to cover this point are given but it is not properly addressed.
• In case of submitting illegal queries, the authors propose a liability mecha-
nism that enables the final sender to prove to a third party (a governmental
authority) that she has not generated a certain query. This liability mech-
anism is based on using digital signatures and it requires the users to use
their own resources in keeping certificates related to past forwarded queries.
• It achieves a query delay of 3918 ms. This time is fairly better than the
one achieved by other proposals in the literature but it is still significant in
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comparison with directly submitting a query to the WSE (in 2010 this cost
was close to 400 ms according to [Viej 10]).
The scheme presented in [Erol 11b] proposes a P2P protocol that exploits social
networks in order to protect the privacy of the users of WSEs. The paper presents
a new version of the protocol presented in [Viej 10] with some improvements.
Firstly, the authors redesign function Φ in order to increase the level of privacy
obtained by the users. In the new version, this function equitably distributes the
queries in a path of length two. This means that it considers not only the direct
neighbours but also the neighbours of her neighbours. Consequently, the source
of a query is better hidden than in [Viej 10], since it is hidden among a group with
a path length of two. Additionally, the scheme is tested using real data extracted
from the AOL dataset. The results show that query delay is 4205.4 ms, slightly
higher than in [Viej 10]. However, the level of privacy achieved is better: nearly
90% of the users expose less than 20% of their profile.
Nevertheless, distributed protocols that use static groups (e.g., social networks)
like [Viej 10] and [Erol 11b] are more vulnerable to internal adversaries. In this
scenario, attackers can exploit their knowledge about the topology, since groups
of users are formed once and they rarely change. Consider the case where the
neighbour of a user U is a dishonest party trying to keep track of her queries.
As long as the link between them exists, the attacker will receive, with a certain
probability, queries that belong to U. Furthermore, in some social networks, we
can assume that the attacker and the victim share a relationship that gives to the
attacker a certain knowledge about her victim. Therefore, in such cases, it would
be easier for the attacker to guess when the victim is forwarding a query on behalf
of another user, and when she is sending her own query.
Another example of a distributed system is the system proposed in [Domi 09a].
This scheme uses memory sectors which are shared by a group of users. These
users employ the shared memory to store and read the queries and their answers.
There is no connection between the users. Queries and answers are encrypted in
order to provide confidentiality. This proposal does not require a trusted third
party to create the groups or generate the cryptographic material. Instead of that,
a simple wiki-like collaborative environment can be used to implement a shared
memory sector. This scheme has the following drawbacks when applied to a WSE
scenario:
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• It should be capable of managing a high volume of information. However,
the memory-space requirements have not been studied by the authors.
• Users must scan their shared memory sectors at regular intervals. This re-
quirement introduces a significant overhead to the network.
• The best response time achieved by this proposal is 5.84 s. However, the
authors do not include the network delay in this time. According to that, the
final response time is expected to be clearly above 5.84 s but the exact value
is not specified.
Anonymous Channels
Schemes inside this category allow the user to send queries to a WSE in a man-
ner that they cannot be linked to her real identity (i.e., the WSE ignores the true
source of the query). The general assumption of these systems is that if the WSE
does not know the true identity associated to a query, then it cannot construct
any profile, and privacy is fully protected. As previously mentioned, this may
significantly affect the quality of the service, since the WSE can provide no result
personalization.
The approaches that fall into this category are based in the inicial concept of
Chaum’s mix network [Chau 81]. The general idea of mix networks is to hide
the correspondence between the input and the output messages of a node using
cryptography. The survey presented in [Dane 09] gives a detailed explanation
of systems based on mix networks. Next, we describe some of the most impor-
tant works presented there that are appliable to WSEs, together with some recent
schemes not included in [Dane 09].
1. Proxy approach. Levine and Shields [Levi 02] define a proxy as a single server
that accepts conections from an initiator I and forwards them to the respon-
der R. The key concept is that it will deliver messages from I to R but will
not disclose to R that I is the source. Instead, R will see the proxy as the
source.
Some systems like DuckDuckGo [Duck 13], Ixquick [Ixqu 13], Start Page
[Star 13], PageWash [Page 13], Yippy [Yipp 13] work as intermediate nodes
between the user (I) and the WSE (R): they receive the terms that must be
searched, submit the queries to the WSE and show the answers to the user.
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Due to this process, the user does not store any cookie from the WSE and
the IP of the user is not known by the WSE.
These schemes are supposed to store neither the terms which have been sub-
mitted nor the cookies obtained in the process. Nevertheless, a proxy is not
the best solution to protect the privacy of the users because profiling could
be done at the proxy. Therefore, this solution requires the company that of-
fers the service not to monitor or log the traffic of the users. This means that
instead of trusting the WSE, users have to trust the proxy company.
2. Web MIXes. Web MIXes [Bert 01] is a system that provides anonymous and
unobservable real-time Internet access. Regarding similar proposals, it in-
corporates an authentication mechanism that prevents flood attacks. Addi-
tionally, it also includes a feedback system with an interface that informs
users about their current level of protection.
The Web MIXes architecture consists of three parts concatenated in order to
form an anonymous tunnel:
(a) The Java Anon Proxy (JAP). It is a program installed in the user’s com-
puter that prepares the data to be later anonymized in the network. Its
functions include user’s registration in the system and communication
between network and application layer.
(b) The MIXes. They are computers connected via the Internet forming a
logical chain. The first MIX receives data sent by the JAP. Then, every
MIX in the chain scrambles the order of data streams and changes their
coding using cryptography to make traffic correlation attacks difficult,
and sends data to the next MIX.
(c) Cache-proxy. It receives data from the last MIX. Then, it sends it to the
Internet and receives the answers from the servers (in our scenario, the
results from the WSE). The answers are sent back to the user via the
MIXes (in reverse order).
The work presented in [West 10] evaluates this protocol in front of several
kinds of adversaries. The analysis reveals a flaw in the authentication phase,
allowing an external attacker to perform a replay attack (i.e., a data transmis-
sion that is maliciously repeated or delayed). Another disadvantage of Web
MIXes is outlined in [Bohm 04], where it is argued that Web MIXes work
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in a synchronous fashion, which is not well adapted for the asynchronous
nature of widely deployed TCP/IP networks.
3. Onion routing techniques. Onion routing [Gold 99] is a technique to establish
anonymous channels that preserve the privacy of the users. The authors in
[Sain 07] propose to use the anonymous channels of onion routing to submit
queries to the WSE.
In the onion routing-based systems, there is a set of servers called onion
routers that relay traffic for users. Let R = R1, R2, . . . , Rn represent a set of n
onion routers in the network. Each onion router maintains a private key and
a public key. The public key is known by the users of the system.
At the first step, the user constructs a multiply encrypted tunnel, called
circuit, through the network. For this purpose, the user selects an ordered
sequence of onion routers in the network to use as the path of the circuit.
Then, the user randomly generates two symmetric secret keys (a forward key
KFi and a backward key KBi) for each router Ri along the path. It also defines
forward and backward cryptographic functions fi and f
−1
i , respectively. The
pair (KFi, fi) is used to encrypt data in the path from the user towards the
receiver. The pair (KBi, f
−1
i ) is applied to the data that travels from the
receiver to the initial user.
For example, if a user chooses the path Rx, Ry, Rz, she would construct the
“onion” as follows:
Ex(tx, fx,KFx, f
−1
x ,KBx, Ry,
Ey(ty, fy,KFy, f
−1
y ,KBy, Rz,
Ez(tz, fz,KFz, f
−1
z ,KBz,∅)))
Where ti is the expiration time of the message, and ∅ indicates to Rz that it
is the last router in the path.
The user sends the onion to the first router (Rx), which removes the outer-
most layer of the encryption using its private key, and learns the symmetric
keys KFx and KBx, as well as who the next router of the path (Ry) is. Each
router along the path repeats this process, until the onion reaches the end of
the path.
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Similarly, the response is sent along the reverse path of the circuit, using the
backward key KBi and the function f
−1
i .
The most renowned implementation of the onion routing technique is the
Tor Project [Tor 13]. Tor was presented as the second-generation Onion rout-
ing technique, adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory
servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical design
for location-hidden services via rendez-vous points. The novelty of Tor is
that, instead of using the ‘onion’, the client connects directly to the first
node, then it requests this node to connect to the next one, and so on. The
main advantage of Tor is its usability, also enhanced by several Firefox plu-
gins [Foxt 13, Torb 13] which allow to use Tor in a simple way.
Since it was presented, Tor has been widely studied in the literature and
adapted for several purposes. Some of the most recents works based on Tor
are [Dosh 13], [Cata 13], and [Cast 13]. For example, [Dosh 13] improves the
overhead and the overall security strength of Tor, and it also provides failure
tolerance in case that an onion router in the communication path breaks
down. On the other hand, [Cata 13] outperforms TOR by achieving forward
secrecy in a fully non-interactive way (i.e., making the circuit-building non-
interactive, achieving linear round complexity and non-interaction among
routers, users and the Key Generation Center during the periodic routers’
key update). According to the presented experimental results, this allows to
create the network of onion routers with a slimmer and faster management.
Regarding [Cast 13], it proposes a new circuit selection algorithm that allows
Tor to provide enough performance for low-latency services.
On the other hand, several attacks to Tor have also been found. For example,
as stated in [Dane 09], Tor does not attempt to offer security against even
passive global observers of a circuit. Furthermore, the work presented in
[Syve 11] analyzes some of the threats against which Tor currently offers only
limited protection. These threats happen because by using Tor, some features
of the communication are still apparent to an observer. If an adversary can
see both ends of a Tor circuit, he can trivially correlate who is talking to
whom over that circuit. This is generally known as an end-to-end correlation
attack. In the WSE scenario, these kinds of attacks seriously threaten users’
privacy, since the WSE could link a user with the query that she generated.
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Similar to Tor, the Invisible Internet Project (I2P) [I2P 13] builds an anony-
mous network layer designed to be used for anonymous communication.
The application that implements this layer is called an I2P router, and the
computer who executes it is called an I2P node. Following the onion routing
scheme, messages are wrapped with several layers of encryption, and the
network is distributed and dynamic. In [I2P 13] several advantages of I2P
over Tor can be found. For example, it is stated that unlike circuits in Tor,
tunnels in I2P are short lived, decreasing the number of samples that can be
used to perform an attack. Moreover, I2P employs unidirectional tunnels in-
stead of Tor bidirectional circuits, doubling the number of nodes an attacker
has to compromise to get the same information.
2.2 Discussion
In this section, we introduce a further analysis of the previously described client-
side privacy enhancing technologies. First of all, we define a common evaluation
framework for these systems. This framework includes properties which are used
to evaluate users’ requirements and acceptance related to any privacy-enhancing
technology for web search. Then, all the systems considered in this chapter are
studied and compared according to the properties included in the framework.
2.2.1 Common Evaluation Framework
Many different approaches can be used to evaluate and compare privacy enhanc-
ing technologies for web search. For example, systems can be evaluated according
to the method employed to obtain privacy, or to the characteristics of the profile
that the WSE obtains, or to the type of adversaries that security takes into account,
etc. However, since this dissertation focuses on the client-side perspective, in this
section we consider an approach that evaluates some points related to users’ ex-
perience and the quality of the service that they receive. This means that technical
aspects of the protocols (e.g., key lengths, required number of users, resilience
against specific attacks, etc.) are not considered in this section, since they have
already been thoroughly described in Section 2.1.
In order to delimitate which properties are considered in the framework, we
have included all the user’s requirements presented in the set of papers reviewed
in this chapter. Note that these properties are not always denoted by the same
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name, and that sometimes they are not explicitly defined in one of the papers in
the considered set, but they are remarked as desirable or employed to criticize
other works in the field.
Next, the studied properties as well as the papers where they appear are listed
and defined.
1. Performance. It appears as an important user requirement in most
papers ([Aram 12], [Bert 01], [Bohm 04], [Cast 09], [Cast 13], [Domi 09a],
[Erol 11b], [Levi 02], [Lind 10], [Reit 98], [Viej 10], [Viej 12a], [Viej 13],
[Sanc 13], [Sain 07]). In the WSE scenario, the performance is defined as
the query delay, i.e., the time spent since the user generates the query until
she receives the results. Normally, privacy-preserving systems introduce an
overhead over traditional web search. However, this delay should be reason-
able enough for the system to be widely adopted.
2. Quality of retrieved results. Another common requirement in many papers
([Aram 12], [Domi 09b], [Erol 11b], [Leun 12], [Xu 07], [Viej 10], [Viej 12a],
[Viej 13], [Shen 05], and [Sanc 13]) is to balance the trade-off between privacy
and quality of retrieved results. Many of the reviewed systems alter the user
profiles that the WSE owns at some point. This may change the ranking of
results that the WSE returns, thus making the personalization less accurate.
3. Plausible deniability. This property, applied to WSE, is defined as the lack
of sufficient evidence to prove that a query was generated by a particular
user. This property is also referred to as liability, and it appears in some
of the studied papers: [Aram 12], [Bert 01], [Levi 02], [Muru 09], [Reit 98],
[Viej 10], and [Viej 12a]. A particularity of this property is that some works
argue that it should be enhanced, while others designmechanisms to prevent
it. The works that try to prevent plausible deniability are mainly distributed
systems (see Section 2.1.2), where it is desirable that honest users can prove
to a third party that they have not generated a certain query (e.g., a query
that breaks the law) but they were only forwarding it on behalf of another
user.
4. Availability. This property means that any user can employ the system and
privately retrieve the results at any time. The papers where this property
appears are: [Bohm 04], [Erol 11b], [Hoch 02], [Reit 98], [Ye 09], [Viej 10],
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and [Viej 12a].
5. User interaction. It refers to the extent to which the user is required to par-
ticipate in the system. The user may be required to configure some parame-
ters or to explicitly select her interests through some kind of interface. The
papers that speak about this property are: [Bert 01], [Cran 06], [Erol 11b],
[Hoch 02], [Reit 98], and [Sain 07].
6. Tolerance to complex queries. Some papers like [Erol 11b], [Viej 10], and
[Sanc 13], manifest the need for accepting any kind of query that a user
may generate. Complex queries are formed by several terms or sentences.
Therefore, some works, especially those that generate synthetic queries from
real queries, may not be compliant with this property.
7. Incentives to cooperate. In systems where users interact with other enti-
ties, it may be necessary to incentivize them to cooperate, as it is remarked
in papers like [Bohm 04], [Erol 11b], [Reit 98], and [Viej 10]. Without these
incentives or rewards, selfish users may cause the system to fail in practice.
8. User storage. Some systems may require users to locally store a great
amount of information. According to papers like [Domi 09a] and [Sanc 13],
it is another property that must be considered when evaluating users’ expe-
rience.
2.2.2 Analysis of the properties
Table 2.1 shows the properties defined above for each of the papers that propose
a system to protect privacy, studied in Section 2.1. Note that, as an exception,
we have decided not to include PIR because, as previously remarked, it cannot
be applied to the WSE scenario and, hence, there is no reason to study it in this
section. Regarding the rest of proposals, the table shows that most properties are
homogeneous inside a group, i.e., systems that belong to the same category or
sub-category behave similarly regarding some properties.
For example, performance and availability are properties that decrease when
users depend on an external entity in order to submit the query and receive the
results. Distributed systems and anonymous channels are clear examples of this
situation. In both cases, forwarding the query to other entities significantly in-
creases the response time (i.e., performance decreases) and if the external entities
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Table 2.1: Client-side PETs: summary of properties.
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P3P [Cran 06] ↑ ↑ ✗ ↑ ↑ ✓ n/a ↓
Do-Not-Track [C So 12] ↑ ↑ ✗ ↑ ↑ ✓ n/a ↓
UCAIR [Shen 05] ↑ ↓ ✗ ↑ ↑ ✓ n/a ↑
[Xu 07] ↑ ↓ ✗ ↑ ↑ ✓ n/a ↑
[Leun 12] ↑ ↓ ✗ ↑ ↑ ✓ n/a ↑
[Kram 13] ↑ ↓ ✗ ↑ ↑ ✓ n/a ↑
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TrackMeNot [Trac 13] ↑ ↓ ✓ ↑ ↓ ✓ n/a ↓
GooPIR [Domi 09b] ↑ ↓ ✓ ↑ ↓ ✗ n/a ↑
PDS [Muru 09] ↑ ↓ ✓ ↑ ↓ ✓ n/a ↑
[Viej 12a] ↑ ↑ ✓ ↑ ↓ ✗ n/a ↑
[Sanc 13] ↑ ↑ ✓ ↑ ↓ ✓ n/a ↑
QueryScrambler [Aram 12] ↑ ↓ ✓ ↑ ↓ ✗ n/a ↑
[Viej 13] ↑ ↑ ✓ ↑ ↓ ✓ n/a ↑
D
is
tr
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d
Crowds [Reit 98] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↑
UUP [Cast 09] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
[Lind 10] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
[Viej 10] ↓ ↑ ✗ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↑ ↑
[Erol 11a] ↓ ↑ ✗ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↑ ↑
[Domi 09a] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
A
n
o
n
y
m
o
u
s
ch
an
n
el
s Proxies [Levi 02] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
WebMIXes [Bert 01] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
TOR [Tor 13] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
[Dosh 13] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
[Cata 13] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
[Cast 13] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
I2P [I2P 13] ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓ ✓ ↓ ↓
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are busy or suffer from technical problems (for example, a proxy that has crashed),
users cannot privately submit their queries (i.e., availability decreases).
Table 2.1 also shows that no collaborative system provides plausible deniability.
In these systems, the query is directly submitted to the WSE, there is no external
entity and no synthetic query to obfuscate it. Therefore, a user cannot deny that she
generated a particular query. On the other hand, non-collaborative systems (except
[Viej 10] and [Erol 11a]) provide plausible deniability. Obfuscation techniques add
noise to the real query: a user can deny that she generated a particular query by ar-
guing that it was a synthetic query automatically generated (standalone schemes)
or that she submitted it on behalf of another user (distributed schemes). There
are two exceptions, since [Viej 10] and [Erol 11a] employ a liability mechanism to
prevent a dishonest user to submit a query that breaks the law. In these systems,
the anonymity of a user is revocable in front of a governmental authority and, in
this case, the dishonest user lacks from plausible deniability. Finally, anonymous
channels are also considered to provide plausible deniability in front of the WSE
because a user is never linked to its query and the source cannot be found.
Collaborative systems require higher user interaction. Some of them (P3P
[Cran 06], Do-Not-Track [C So 12]) require the user to know and define the poli-
cies that should be applied in their searches. For the others (UCAIR [Shen 05],
[Xu 07], [Leun 12], [Kram 13]), the user is required to adjust some parameters
(e.g., the level of detail that will be revealed to the WSE). Some non-collaborative
systems like TrackMeNot [Trac 13], WebMIXes [Bert 01], and TOR [Tor 13] also
include a user interface. However, this interface is mainly used to provide infor-
mation about the system, but does not demand the user to actively participate in
the process.
Regarding complex queries, all the systems but GooPIR [Domi 09b], [Viej 12a]
and QueryScrambler [Aram 12] allow the user to submit any kind of query.
GooPIR [Domi 09b] uses a Thesaurus and hence, only single words are supported.
As explained in Section 2.1.2, [Viej 12a] do not work well with queries that have
multiple words. QueryScrambler [Aram 12] employs hypernymy and hyponymy
relations in WordNet, which cannot be applied either to multiple words, or to
adverbs or adjectives.
The incentives to cooperate are only appliable to systems where users forward
their query to a third party, i.e., distributed systems and anonymous channels.
Among distrubted systems, the only ones that provide mechanisms to incentivize
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their users are [Viej 10], and [Erol 11a]. In [Viej 10] and [Erol 11a], if a user does
not accept queries from her neighbours, there is an heuristic that causes her neigh-
bours to refuse her queries. Regarding anonymous channels, the users in the net-
work can volunteer as a relay. However, this is not a requirement, and no incentive
to cooperate is given.
The properties quality of the retrieved results and user storage are more hetero-
geneous inside the groups and they are therefore described for each system sepa-
rately. For example, the quality of the results for P3P [Cran 06] and Do-Not-Track
[C So 12] is the same as if the user were not using any tool, since the user profile
that the WSE owns is never modified. Additionally, they do not require a high user
storage, since P3P [Cran 06] only needs to store a file with the selected policies,
and Do-Not-Track [C So 12] is simply a HTTP header.
On the other hand, with UCAIR [Shen 05], [Xu 07], [Leun 12], and [Kram 13],
the quality of the results may often be lower. As explained in Section 2.1.1, the
re-ranking is done at the client side, and this is less effective than in the WSE side:
since the client has no global index for all websites, a general retrieval function
cannot be applied. Moreover, these systems require to store a higher amount of
information, including the user profile, the search context and history information
(e.g., the submitted queries and clicked results).
Standalone systems provide different quality of the results. With TrackMeNot
[Trac 13], GooPIR [Domi 09b], and PDS [Muru 09], users obtain distorted profiles
that do not reflect their real interests. Therefore, the WSE cannot correctly person-
alize the results, thus reducing their quality. On the contrary, [Viej 12a], [Sanc 13],
and [Viej 13] maintain the interests of the user in the distorted profile, thus al-
lowing a better personalization. QueryScrambler [Aram 12] is a particular case:
although it maintains the interests of the user in the profile, the real query is never
submitted. Consequently, the results must be re-ranked in the client side and, as
explained before, this is not as accurate as if the WSE had done it. Regarding
user storage, standalone systems require some knowledge source in order to gen-
erate the synthetic queries. If the source can be consulted online (like TrackMeNot
[Trac 13] that employs RSS feeds), the user is not required to store a great amount
of information. If the source must be downloaded to the client’s machine (like
the ODP that [Viej 12a], [Sanc 13], and [Viej 13] recommend to download, or the
Thesaurus employed by GooPIR [Domi 09b], or other Latent Semantic Indexing
used by PDS [Muru 09], or the WordNet that QueryScrambler employs), then the
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user storage increases.
In distributed systems, users submit queries generated by other group mem-
bers. If these group members share the same interests (as it is assumed by [Viej 10]
and [Erol 11a]), the profile will maintain the interests of the user, also maintaining
the quality of the retrieved results. Contrarily, if the users are randomly grouped
(as in Crowds [Reit 98], UUP [Cast 09], [Lind 10], and [Domi 09a]), the real in-
terests are mixed with other random interests, and the WSE cannot perform an
accurate personalization. Concerning the user storage in distributed systems,
[Lind 10], and [Domi 09a] do not require the user to store great amounts of data.
However, Crowds [Reit 98] requires a user to store as many symmetric keys as
nodes are in the network, which represents a significant amount of data. The sys-
tems proposed in [Viej 10] and [Erol 11a] store certificates as a proof of the query
transaction between two users (this is a part of the liability mechanism). This
means that, for each forwarded query, a user must store some information signed
with a secret key, and keep it in a safe place.
Finally, when a user employs any anonymous channel, she obtains no profile,
i.e., the WSE knows neither the user nor her interests. Therefore, no personal-
ization can be performed, and the quality of the results is reduced. As for user
storage, none of these systems specify that great amounts of data should be stored
in the client side.
Regarding the overall set of properties, Table 2.1 shows that there is no scheme
that perfectly complies with all the properties. However, the systems that better
improve the users’ experience are [Sanc 13] and [Viej 13], since they only lack of
one compliance: they need to store the ODP ontology, which represents a great
amount of data. Despite requiring a high user storage, both proposals provide
high performance, high quality of the retrieved results, plausible deniability, high
availability, low user interaction, and allowance of complex queries.
2.3 Conclusions of the state of the art
In this chapter, we have analyzed the state of the art in client-side privacy enhanc-
ing technologies for web search. First, the study presents a way to classify the
literature of this field. Then, it describes how existing proposals work and also
their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, a common evaluation framework to
evaluate and compare these proposals from the user’s experience point of view
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is presented. In particular, this framework includes eight properties considered
relevant in this research field.
The matter of privacy-preserving in web search is too vast to cover in a sin-
gle work. As this study shows, there are many privacy-preserving alternatives,
and the techniques applied in collaborative and non-collaboratives approaches
(and their subclassifications) are very different. We believe that collaborative ap-
proaches excessively rely on the WSE, and hence, we decided to focus on non-
collaborative approaches. Moreover, inside non-collaborative approaches, this dis-
sertation only focuses on distributed obfuscation techniques. The reason for this
choice is that both standalone obfuscation techniques and anonymous channels
are already at an advanced state of development, while distributed obfuscation
approaches still leave room for improvement. More specifically, regarding dis-
tributed schemes, our work focuses on the following points of improvement:
1. Response time: One of the constraints when employing a group of users that
exchange their queries is the time required until they receive the results. If
this delay is too high, users will be more reluctant to use the system.
2. Level of security: In client-side private web search, the main objective is to
preserve users’ privacy in front of the WSE. However, in distributed systems,
malicious users may also participate in the protocol. Therefore, another point
of improvement is to protect users’ privacy in front of other members of the
group.
3. Quality of the retrieved results: Section 2.1.2 describes how the semantics of the
queries employed to obfuscate a profile affect the level of personalization that
the WSE can provide the user. Therefore, one of the points of improvement
of distributed techniques is to group users that share similar interests, so
that the exchange of queries inside the group still allows a maximum of
WSE personalization.
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Chapter 3
Cryptographic Background
This chapter introduces the cryptographic background, assumptions and definitions neces-
sary to understand our contributions described in subsequent chapters.
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First of all, the n-out-of-n threshold ElGamal encryption is explained (Section
3.1). Then, a permutation network named OAS-Benes is introduced in Section 3.3.
Finally, two zero-knowledge proofs called Plaintext Equivalence Proof (PEP) and
Disjunctive Plaintext Equivalence Proof (DISPEP) are described in Section 3.4 and
Section 3.5, respectively.
3.1 n-out-of-n threshold ElGamal encryption
In cryptographic multi-party protocols, some operations must be computed jointly
by different users. In an n-out-of-n threshold ElGamal encryption [Desm 90], n
users share a public key y and the corresponding unknown secret key α is divided
into n shares αi. Using this protocol, a certain message m can be encrypted using
the public key y and the decryption can be performed only if all n users collaborate
in the decryption process. Key generation, encryption and decryption process are
next described.
41
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3.1.1 Key generation.
First, a large random prime p is generated, where p = 2q + 1 and q is a prime
number too. Also, a generator g of the multiplicative group Z∗q is chosen.
Then, each user generates a random private key αi ∈ Z
∗
q and publishes yi = g
αi .
The common public key is computed as y = ∏ni=1 yi = g
α, where α = α1+ . . .+ αn.
3.1.2 Message encryption.
Message encryption can be performed using the standard ElGamal encryption
function [ElGa 85]. Given a message m and a public key y, a random value r is
generated and the ciphertext is computed as follows:
Ey(m, r) = c = (c1, c2) = (g
r,m · yr)
3.1.3 Message decryption.
Given a message encrypted with a public key y, Ey(m, r) = (c1, c2), user Ui can
decrypt that value as follows:
Each user j 6= i publishes c1αj . Then, Ui can recover message m in the following
way:
m =
c2
c1αi(∏j 6=i c1
αj)
This decryption can be verified by each participant by performing a proof of
equality of discrete logarithms [Chau 92].
3.2 ElGamal re-masking
The re-masking operation performs some computations over an encrypted value.
In this way, its cleartext does not change but the re-masked message is not linkable
to the same message before re-masking.
Given an ElGamal ciphertext Ey(m, r), it can be re-masked by computing
[Abe 99]:
Ey(m, r) · Ey(1, r
′)
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For r′ ∈ Z∗q randomly chosen and where · stands for the component-wise scalar
product (ElGamal ciphertext can be viewed as a vector with two components). The
resulting ciphertext corresponds to the same cleartext m.
3.3 Optimized Arbitrary Size (OAS) Benes
A Benes permutation network (PN) is a directed graph with N inputs and N
outputs, denoted as PN(N). It is able to realize every possible permutation of N
elements.
A Benes PN is composed by a set of 2 x 2 switches. These switches have a
binary control signal b ∈ {0, 1} which determines the internal state and, hence,
the output. The two possible states of a 2 x 2 switch are depicted in Figure 3.1(a).
The problem with a Benes PN is that the size of the network must be a power
of 2. In order to have an Arbitrary Sized (AS) Benes network, it is necessary to
introduce a 3 x 3 network like Figure 3.1(b) shows. Using 2 x 2 switches and 3 x 3
networks recursively it is possible to construct a network of any size.
(a) States of a 2 x 2 switch (b) 3 x 3 network
Figure 3.1: Basic elements of an OAS-Benes
Optimized Arbitrary Size (OAS) Benes is an extension of AS Benes that reduces
the number of necessary switches in the network. The way of constructing the
OAS-Benes depends on the parameter N:
• If N is even, the OAS-Benes PN(N) is built recursively from two even OAS-
Benes of N2 -dimension called sub-networks. The sub-networks are not di-
rectly connected to the inputs and outputs. Instead of that, they are con-
nected to N − 1 input-output switches, as Figure 3.3 shows.
• If N is odd, the OAS-Benes PN(N) is composed by an upper
⌊
N
2
⌋
even OAS-
Benes, and a lower
⌈
N
2
⌉
odd OAS-Benes. The sub-networks are not directly
connected to the inputs and outputs. In this case, the first N − 1 inputs are
connected to
⌊
N
2
⌋
switches, and the first N− 1 outputs are connected to
⌊
N
2
⌋
switches. Figure 3.3 illustrates this construction.
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Figure 3.2: Construction of OAS-Benes for even N
Figure 3.3: Construction of OAS-Benes for odd N
According to the way that an OAS-Benes is constructed, it is possible to account
the minimum number of switches required to satisfy a permutation of N elements.
The formula to calculate the minimum number of switches is:
S(N) =


(N − 1) + 2 ∗ S(N2 ) i f N is even
2 ∗
⌊
N
2
⌋
+ S(
⌈
N
2
⌉
) + S(
⌊
N
2
⌋
) i f N is odd
Where S(1) = 0, S(2) = 1, S(3) = 3
3.3.1 Multi-party OAS-Benes.
OAS-Benes can be used to perform a joint permutation. This means that the
switches of the OAS-Benes can be distributed among a group of n users trying to
realize a permutation of N inputs. However, this must be done in such a way that
no user knows the overall permutation between the inputs and the outputs.
According to [Soo 02], a secure permutation (where no user knows the overall
permutation) requires minimally t OAS-Benes PN(N), where t depends on the
minimum number of honest users that the system requires. The t OAS-Benes
PN(N) are fairly divided in n adjacent stages. Then, stage i (for i ∈ 1, . . . , n) is
assigned to user i.
In order to obtain a secure permutation, the condition that must be satisfied
is that the honest users control, at least, S (N) switches. For example, consider
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Figure 3.4: PEP protocol
a scenario with n = 6 users, N = 8 inputs and, at least, λ = 3 honest users.
The number of switches of one OAS-Benes PN(8) is S (8) = 17. According to
[Soo 02], the λ = 3 honest users must control 17 or more switches. This means
that every user must control
⌈
17
3
⌉
= 6 switches. Therefore, the scheme needs
at least (6 switches per user × 6 users) = 36 switches that will be fairly divided
among the n users. Consequently, the system requires t =
⌈
36
17
⌉
= 3 OAS-Benes
PN(8).
We propose formula 3.1 in order to calculate the number of OAS-Benes re-
quired in a scheme with n users, N inputs, and λ honest users.
t =


n ·
⌈
S(N)
λ
⌉
S (N)


(3.1)
3.4 Plaintext Equivalence Proof (PEP)
PEP [M Ja 99] is an honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof protocol based on a vari-
ant of the Schnorr signature algorithm [Schn 91]. The purpose of this protocol is
to prove that two different ciphertexts are the encryption of the same message.
Two ElGamal ciphertexts (c1a, c2a) = (gra ,ma · yra) and (c1b, c2b) = (g
rb ,mb ·
yrb) for some ra, rb ∈ Z
∗
q are plaintext equivalent if ma = mb. Let:
• α = ra − rb
• k = H(y, g, c1a, c2a, c1b, c2b), where H (·) is a hash function.
• G = g · yk
• Y = c1ac1b · (
c2a
c2b
)k = (g · yk)α
In order to prove that (c1a, c2a) ≡ (c1b, c2b), the prover must demonstrate
knowledge of α by executing the protocol of Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.5: DISPEP protocol
3.5 Disjunctive PEP (DISPEP)
DISPEP [M Ja 99] is an extension of the PEP protocol. In this case, a prover demon-
strates that one of two different ciphertexts is a re-masked version of another ci-
phertext.
Let (c1a, c2a) = (gra ,ma · yra) and (c1b, c2b) = (g
rb ,mb · y
rb) be two different
ElGamal ciphertexts. Then, one of them is a re-masking of another ciphertext
(c1, c2) = (gr,m · yr) for some ra, rb, r ∈ Z
∗
q if ma = m or mb = m. For i ∈ {a, b},
let:
• βi = r− ri
• ki = H(y, g, c1, c2, c1i , c2i)
• Gi = g · y
ki
• Yi =
c1
c1i
· ( c2c2i )
ki = (g · yki )βi
In order to prove whether ma = m or mb = m, the prover must demonstrate
knowledge of βi by executing the protocol of Figure 3.5. Without loss of generality,
in Figure 3.5 we assume that the prover is showing ma = m.
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Chapter 4
Improving Query Delay in Private
Web Search
This chapter introduces a distributed protocol which is an improvement of the Useless
User Profile (UUP) protocol, reducing the query delay and incentivizing users to follow
the protocol in order to protect their privacy.
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We introduce the novelty of the approach in §4.1. Section 4.1.1 introduces
the protocol proposed in [Cast 09], detailing the parts of the system that the new
protocol employs later. Section 4.2 explains the new protocol. In Section 4.4 a
privacy analysis is performed. The implementation and simulation of the protocol
is reported in Section 4.5. We also compare the results obtained in the new protocol
with the results presented for the UUP protocol. Finally, Section 4.6 gives some
conclusions
4.1 Novelty of the approach
This chapter focuses on the first point of improvement (response time) described in
Section 2.3. Current multi-party schemes for private web search in the literature
significantly increase the query delay. This is the time that users have to wait in
order to obtain the search results for their queries. In this chapter, we present
a modification of the Useless User Profile (UUP) protocol. The resulting scheme
has been tested in an open environment and the results show that it achieves the
lowest query delay which has been reported in the literature. In addition to that,
it incentivizes users to follow the protocol in order to protect their privacy.
4.1.1 UUP protocol overview
The UUP protocol includes a central node that receives requests from users. When
it has n requests, it creates a new group. The users of this group build a group
key (see Section 3.1). Then, every user encrypts her query with the group key and
broadcasts it.
The set of encrypted queries is sequentially forwarded from one user to the
next until the last one.
In her turn, each user remasks and permutates the order of the encrypted
queries, and sends the result to the next user. The last user obtains and broadcasts
the set of encrypted queries that cannot be linked to the original set.
At the end, the users reveal their shares of the group key in order to decrypt
the queries. Every user submits one decrypted query to the WSE and broadcasts
the response to all the members of the group.
Note that the UUP protocol assumes that all the users follow the protocol. It
also assumes that there are no collusion between the entities that participate in the
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Figure 4.1: Partial times of the UUP protocol in an open environment with n = 3
users and l = 1024 bits.
4.1.2 Computation and communication cost of the UUP protocol
In order to test this protocol, the authors of [Cast 09] performed several simula-
tions. Different parameters were tested (i.e. number of users, key length, type
of environment –local or open–). The authors indicated that a key of 1024 bits is
computationally safe. They also argued that 3 users is the best value for the size
of the group. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the tests they made in an open
environment with n = 3 and l = 1024 bits.
However, two years have passed since [Cast 09] was tested. During this time,
the Internet bandwidth and related resources have increased. Using the time re-
sults that appear on [Cast 09] could be detrimental to the UUP protocol in later
comparisons. Therefore, it was necessary to simulate again the UUP protocol in
the present conditions. This was done by executing the same source code that the
authors of [Cast 09] used for their simulations. Figure 4.1 shows the obtained time
results. Next, the meaning of each time interval is explained:
• t0: time interval required to initialize the applet.
• t1: time interval required by Ui to connect with the central node and get a
response. This response includes the information needed to contact with the
other members of the group and the parameters to create the group key.
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• t2: time interval required by Ui to create her group key share αi.
• t3: time interval required byUi to establish a connection with the other group
members.
• t4: time interval required by Ui to broadcast her key share yi = g
αi .
• t5: time interval required by Ui to generate the group public key y using the
shares received from all group members.
• t6: time interval required by Ui to encrypt the query mi using the group
public key y.
• t7: time interval required by Ui to send the resulting ciphertext c
0
i .
• t8: time interval required by Ui to re-mask the received ciphertexts and per-
mute them.
• t9: time interval required by Ui to send the results which have been obtained
in the re-masking/permuting step.
• t10: time interval needed since user Ui sends her ciphertext c
0
i until the last
user broadcasts the ciphertexts {c1, · · · , cn}. This period includes neither the
time required to perform the re-masking/permuting step (t8) nor the time
required to send the ciphertexts to the next user (t9).
• t11: time interval required by Ui to calculate the shares which are used to
decrypt the ciphertexts.
• t12: time interval required by Ui to broadcast the shares.
• t13: time interval required by Ui to decrypt the ciphertext ci that she has
received. Note that Ui needs all the shares sent by the other group users to
perform this step.
• t14: time interval required by the WSE to return the answer to the query m
i
which has been sent by Ui.
• t15: time interval required by Ui to distribute the received answer to the other
users.
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The increase of the Internet bandwidth and related resources benefits most
of the time intervals. However, the time interval t15 has augmented significantly.
This happens because, when the authors of [Cast 09] tested their protocol, a page
of Google results took up about 50 Kilobytes. Nowadays, the size of a results page
has increased up to 150 kilobytes due to the inclusion of multimedia content.
As a result, the current query delay of the UUP protocol is higher. Although
the UUP protocol obtained a 5.2 second query delay when it was tested, recent
simulations indicate that it obtains a 6.8 second query delay at present.
4.2 Our proposal in detail
4.2.1 Weak points of the UUP protocol
Figure 4.1 shows that {t1, t3, t10, t15} are the time intervals which present the high-
est delay. Note that the most significant overhead is introduced by t15 (i.e. the
broadcast of the results obtained from the WSE).
Interval t1 refers to the connection to the central node. Interval t3 is the connec-
tion establishment between users. These two steps are inherent to a TCP connec-
tion, hence they cannot be reduced. Instead of that, the novelty of our approach is
based on two modifications:
• Restructure the steps of the protocol that have an effect upon t10.
• Remove the final broadcast phase t15.
In order to reduce t10, the new proposal modifies the way that the queries
are decrypted. In the UUP protocol, when a user U receives a list of ciphertexts,
she re-masks and permutes each ciphertext, and then forwards the result to the
next user. When the last user has re-masked and permuted the ciphertexts, she
broadcasts the results. At this point, the queries are still encrypted. Therefore, the
users have to exchange their shares, and then decrypt the ciphertexts.
Instead of this, the proposed modification consists in decrypting the queries
before the broadcast. This means that the last user broadcasts the queries in clear-
text, instead of ciphertexts. This has two advantages: (i) messages are broadcast
faster because they are shorter; and (ii) users do not need to exchange their shares
anymore.
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In order to decrypt the queries before the broadcast, a new operation called
partial decryption is used. This operation is described in Section 4.2.2. With the
proposedmodification, whenU receives a list of ciphertexts, first of all she partially
decrypts each ciphertext, and then she re-masks and permutes it. Only when all
the users have partially decrypted the list of ciphertexts, the cleartexts are obtained.
This means that when the last user receives the list of ciphertexts, they are still
encrypted. But when she partially decrypts them, she obtains the queries in clear.
The second modification consists in removing the final step of the protocol (i.e.
t15).
In the new protocol, before the broadcast phase, all users know the list of n
queries which have been generated by the group. Therefore, each user submits all
the queries (including her own query) instead of submitting only one. Regarding
performance, the main advantage is that users directly receive the answer for their
question from the WSE. Hence, they do not have to send more messages. Regard-
ing privacy, it is still protected since the WSE cannot distinguish the query that
belongs to a certain user from the group of queries which have been submitted.
In addition, with this modification users protect their privacy only if they fol-
low the protocol. In [Cast 09], a selfish user who neither decrypts the ciphertexts,
nor submits a query nor broadcasts the results can still get correct results if the
rest of members of the group follow the protocol properly. As a result, users have
no real incentive to behave honestly. On the other hand, in the new protocol, users
preserve their privacy by hiding their own queries among queries of other users.
In order to get the queries of the others, users must follow all the steps of the
protocol.
4.2.2 Cryptographic building blocks
Some cryptographic building blocks in our protocol are the same as the blocks
used in [Cast 09]. More specifically, the re-masking operation is performed using
the ElGamal re-masking technique described in Section 3.2. Regarding the encryp-
tion, the new protocol employs the n-out-of-n threshold ElGamal encryption with the
same key generation and the same message encryption (see Section 3.1). As stated
before, the message decryption is performed using a new method named message
partial decryption which is now explained:
• Message partial decryption. The ciphertext before any partial decryption is
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denoted as Ey(m, r) = (c1, c2). This ciphertext is encrypted with a public
key y = gα1+···+αn , where αi is the private key generated by user Ui. In
order to partially decrypt the ciphertext, user Ui employs her private key as
follows:
c2′ =
c2
c1αi
The result of this operation is used to build another ciphertext denoted as
Ey′(m, r) = (c1, c2
′). In this case, the ciphertext is encrypted with a public
key y′ = gα(i+1)+···+αn .
With this operation, users can individually contribute to the decryption of the
queries during the execution of the protocol. When a user partially decrypts a
ciphertext, this ciphertext is no longer encrypted with her share. Thus, with the
contribution of all the users, the ciphertexts are finally decrypted.
4.3 Protocol description
4.3.1 Group set up
The user Ui who wants to submit a query to the WSE, contacts the central node
requesting to be included in a group. The central node is listening to user re-
quests. Once it has n requests, a group {U1, . . . ,Un} is created. Then, the central
node notifies the n users that they belong to the same group. The users receive a
message with the IP addresses and the ports of the other members of the group in
order to establish a communication channel with them. After this step, users can
send messages directly to each other and the central node is no longer needed.
4.3.2 Group key generation
1. Users {U1, . . . ,Un} agree on a large prime p where p = 2q + 1 and q is a
prime too. Next, they pick an element g ∈ Z∗q of order q.
2. In order to generate the group key, each user Ui performs the following
steps:
(a) Generates a random number ai ∈ Z
∗
q .
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(b) Calculates her own share yi = g
ai mod p.
(c) Broadcasts her share yi and receives the other shares yj for j =
(1, . . . , n), j 6= i.
(d) Uses the received shares to calculate the group key:
y = ∏1≤j≤n yj = g
a1 · ga2 · . . . · gan
4.3.3 Anonymous query retrieval
1. User Ui encrypts her query mi:
(a) Ui generates a random number ri.
(b) Ui encrypts her query mi with the group key y:
c0i = Ey(mi, ri) = (g
ri ,mi · y
ri) = (c1i, c2i)
2. For i = (2, . . . , n), each user Ui sends c
0
i to the first member of the group
(U1).
3. For i = (1, . . . , n− 1), each user Ui performs the following operations:
(a) Receives the list of ciphertexts
{
ci−11 , . . . , c
i−1
n
}
.
(b) Using her share of the group key, partially decrypts the list of cipher-
texts using the algorithm described in Section 4.2.2. The resulting list
of ciphertexts is denoted as
{
ci−11
′
, . . . , ci−1n
′
}
.
(c) The list of ciphertexts
{
ci−11
′
, . . . , ci−1n
′
}
is re-masked using the re-
masking algorithm described in Section 3.2 with a key y′ = ∏nj=i+1 g
αj .
As a result, Ui obtains a re-encrypted version
{
ei−11 , . . . , e
i−1
n
}
.
(d) Permutes the order of the ciphertexts at random, obtaining a reordered
version
{
ei−1
σ(1)
, . . . , ei−1
σ(n)
}
(e) Sends the list of ciphertexts
{
ci1, . . . , c
i
n
}
=
{
ei−1
σ(1)
, . . . , ei−1
σ(n)
}
to Ui+1.
4. The last user Un performs the following operations:
(a) Receives the list of ciphertexts
{
ci−11 , . . . , c
i−1
n
}
.
(b) Using her share of the group key, partially decrypts the list of cipher-
texts using the algorithm described in Section 4.2.2. At this point, Un
owns the cleartexts of the queries.
(c) Broadcasts the queries to the rest of users {U1, . . . ,Un−1}.
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4.3.4 Query submission and retrieval
1. Each group member Ui submits the n received queries to the WSE.
2. Each user only takes the answer that corresponds to her original query.
4.4 Privacy analysis
In this section, the privacy of the system in the presence of dishonest entities is
analyzed. These entities are: a dishonest user, a dishonest central node and a
dishonest WSE.
4.4.1 Dishonest user
Similarly to [Cast 09], in order to guarantee the correctness of the process, our
protocol assumes an scenario where the users follow the protocol and there are
no collusions. Nevertheless, the work presented in [Lind 10] modifies the scenario
of [Cast 09] introducing malicious internal users. More specifically, [Lind 10] indi-
cates three attacks that malicious internal users can do in order to learn the queries
of other participants. We next detail how the proposed protocol behaves against
the three attacks and how to modify it to work in the scenario of [Lind 10]:
1. Stage-skipping attack: In this attack, the last user Un remasks and permutes
the original list of ciphertexts instead of the list received from Un−1. After
the decryption, Un knows which query belongs to each user.
This attack was a threat in the UUP protocol, but it cannot be conducted
in our protocol. This happens because our protocol employs the partial de-
cryption operation. The original list of ciphertexts is encrypted under the
group key while the list received from Un−1 is only encrypted under the key
of Un. User Un cannot remove the encryptions under the shares of the other
members of the group. Consequently, Un cannot obtain the cleartexts from
the original list of ciphertexts.
2. Input-replacement attack: In this attack, the first user U1 learns the query of
one of her partners. Initially, U1 receives the original list of ciphertexts and
removes all the ciphertexts except the one that belongs to her victim. Then,
U1 replaces the removed ciphertexts with individually remasked copies of
her victim’s ciphertext (or with encryptions of keywords chosen by U1).
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When the last user broadcasts the queries, U1 is able to identify which query
belongs to her victim.
In order to avoid this attack, we propose introducing zero-knowledge proofs
in our protocol. Every user would have to prove that her outputs correspond
to re-ordered and remasked versions of her inputs. This can be done using
zero-knowledge proofs like the ones proposed in [Bras 87].
3. Targeted public-key attack: The key generation of Section 3.1 requires that
all the users publish their shares at the same time. Otherwise, a participant
can use the knowledge of the other shares to build her own. In this attack, a
certain user Uj builds her key yj = g
αj/∏n−1i=1 yi = g
αj−α1−···−αn−1. Then, if yj
is used to build the group key, the result will be y = gαj and, hence, Uj will
know the private group key.
A solution for this attack is to broadcast previous commitments to the shares.
Before sending her share, user Ui broadcasts a commitment hi = H (yi),
where H is a one-way function. In the next step, the users exchange their
shares and check that hj = H
(
yj
)
for j = (1, . . . , n).
The last modification can be efficiently integrated in our protocol. However,
the introduction of zero-knowledge proofs causes the query delay to be, at least,
twice longer. Introducing an unaffordable query delay while the security in front
of the WSE remains the same is not acceptable for the protocol. In fact, we argue
that the attacks conducted by internal users are not a real threat in practice. Note
that, since the groups are created dynamically and randomly, there is a very small
probability that an internal attacker falls into the same group as her victim twice.
Furthermore, in order to build a complete profile of her victim, the attacker needs
to join her in the same group several times. This requirement reduces even more
the success probability of this kind of attacks.
4.4.2 Dishonest central node
The central node creates the groups of users. This entity only participates in the
initial phase of the protocol, before the users exchange any message. Since it
ignores any further communication between the users, the central node cannot
link any query to the source. Therefore, the central node is not a threat for the
privacy of the users.
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4.4.3 Dishonest web search engine
The objective of the WSE is to gather the queries of the users in order to build
their profiles. However, when the proposed protocol is executed, the WSE cannot
know if a certain query has been generated by the user who has submitted it.
This happens because when a user U executes the protocol, she submits her query
hidden among other n − 1 queries. Note that the other n − 1 queries are not
generated by a machine but by other real users. This means that the WSE cannot
employ a method such as [Chow 09] or [Pedd 10] to distinguish human queries
from automatically-generated ones. Therefore, the WSE can correctly select the
query that belongs to U with a probability of 1n . Note that, in order to build a
useful profile, it is not enough for the WSE to select correctly one query in one
execution of the protocol. Since the probability of selecting always the correct
query is very low, the result is that the WSE obtains a distorted profile of the user.
Nevertheless, this probability can increase if U submits several queries about
the same subject. In each execution of the protocol, U hides her query among a
group of n queries. These queries are generated by randomly chosen users and,
hence, they are likely to be related to different subjects. As a result, after several
executions, the WSE might be able to find the common subject in the queries
submitted by U and build her profile. This situation can be avoided by periodically
submitting queries about irrelevant subjects to U. TrackMeNot [Trac 13] follows
a similar approach using machine-generated fake queries. [Chow 09, Pedd 10]
prove that machine-generated queries can be distinguished from human queries.
To solve this problem, the proposed scheme can use the different n − 1 human
queries which are gathered at each protocol execution. These queries can be stored
in a database for later use.
4.5 Simulations
In order to evaluate the performance, the proposed protocol has been imple-
mented and tested in a practical scenario. The objective of these tests is to prove
that the query delay obtained by this protocol outperforms all the other proposals.
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4.5.1 Implementation of the protocol
The implementation of the protocol is divided in two independent parts: the cen-
tral node and the user application.
The central node is a process that is continuously listening to requests from the
users. As stated before, when the central node receives n requests, a new group
is created. The users of the new group receive a message with the information
necessary to contact their partners. In order to enhance the performance of the
protocol, this message also contains the large prime p, and the g ∈ Z∗p element.
Consequently, the Step 1 described in Section 5.3.3 can be omitted.
The user application is a Java applet accessed by an html web page. Users
employ this applet to type their query. Then, the protocol starts its execution.
After that, the applet shows the corresponding results.
4.5.2 Time measures
Several simulations were performed in order to test the implementation of the pro-
tocol. The parameter selection was done using the same configurations proposed
in [Cast 09]. This allows a later comparison between the UUP protocol and the
new scheme.
In order to minimize the query delay, the creation of the group must be quick.
According to [Cast 09], Google answers 1157 queries per second. The queries can
be modeled using a Poisson distribution. This allows to calculate the probability
of forming a group of n users in a certain amount of time. After several tests with
n = 3, n = 4, n = 5 and n = 10, the authors of [Cast 09] conclude that n = 3 is
the most realistic group size. As stated in [Cast 09], the probability of forming a
group of n = 3 users in a hundredth of a second is close to 1.
Consequently, the group size for our simulations was n = 3 users, the key
length used of the cryptographic operations was l = 1024 bits. The protocol
was executed in an open environment (computers located at different places and
connected through the Internet). Each computer executes a single user application
in each simulation. The environment is the same as for the simulations of Figure
4.1.
The protocol was executed 1000 times by each user. The average delay mea-
sures obtained for these executions are shown in Figure 4.2.
The time intervals in the chart have been adjusted so that they can be compared
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with the time intervals of the UUP protocol. Since there are different steps in the
new protocol, some time intervals disappear and some of them have been changed.
Next, the meaning of each time interval is described:
• t0 − t6: these time intervals remain the same as in the UUP protocol.
• t7: time interval required by the first member (U1) to receive the ciphertexts
c0i from Ui for i = 2 . . . n.
• t8: time interval required by Ui to partially decipher, re-mask and permute the
received ciphertexts.
• t9: time interval required by Ui to send the results which have been obtained
after partially deciphering, re-masking and permuting the ciphertexts.
• t10: time interval needed since the user Ui sends her ciphertext c
0
i until the
last user broadcasts the decrypted queries to all the group members. This
period includes neither the time required to perform the partial decipher-
ing, re-masking and permuting step (t8) nor the time required to send the
ciphertexts to the next user (t9).
• t11 − t13: the work done during these three intervals has been removed. In
the new protocol, these steps no longer exist.
• t14: time interval required by Ui to submit n queries to the WSE and receive
the answers. Each user selects the answer that corresponds to her query.
• t15: as stated in Section 4.2.1, this time interval (corresponding to the broad-
cast of the Google answers) is removed from the protocol.
4.5.3 Comparison between the two protocols
The UUP protocol obtained a query delay of 5.2 seconds [Cast 09]. As explained
in Section 4.1.2, the size of the results page returned by Google has increased
significantly in the last two years. Hence, nowadays, the expected query delay of
this scheme would be 6.8 seconds approximately. The query delay achieved by the
new protocol is 3.2 seconds. Therefore, the new proposal outperforms the results
of [Cast 09]. It also outperforms the work presented in [Viej 10], which achieves
the lowest delay (3.9 seconds) in the current literature. Note that this time was
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Figure 4.2: Partial times for the simulations made in an open environment with
n = 3 users and l = 1024 bits.
calculated using a simulated scenario. Thus, [Viej 10] should be tested in an open
environment in order to be properly compared with the new proposal.
Figure 4.2 shows the different delays obtained by the UUP protocol and the
new scheme. Next, the main changes in partial times are remarked:
1. Intervals t0− t6 are almost equal in both protocols. Note that, t4 includes the
use of a hash function to prevent chosen public key attacks.
2. Since the number of exchanged messages is lower, the delay of t7 is reduced.
During this interval, in the UUP protocol the ciphertexts were broadcast (i.e.
all the members had to send and receive n messages). In the new protocol
all the users send one message, while the first user is the only who receives
n messages.
3. The introduction of the new operation called partial decryption affects the time
intervals t8− t13. Because of this operation, the computational time required
by the operations performed during t8 has augmented. In addition, the time
that a user has to wait to obtain the queries in cleartext (t10) has also slightly
increased. On the other hand, the time intervals t11 − t13 disappear in the
new scheme.
4. In the UUP protocol users only submit one query to the WSE. In the new pro-
tocol they submit n queries. Figure 4.2 shows the delay caused by submitting
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n = 3 queries. Note that, although this delay is higher than in the UUP pro-
tocol, it is not three times higher. This happens because the n queries can be
submitted in parallel.
5. Figure 4.2 also shows that the UUP protocol has one step more than the
new protocol. The longest time interval (t15 with more than 3.5 seconds) no
longer appears in the new protocol. The removal of this delay is the most
relevant improvement within the total time of the new scheme.
4.6 Conclusions
Web search engines have been proved to be a threat for the privacy of their users.
Incidents like [M Ba 05] and [K Ha 06] show that users should not trust the com-
panies behind the WSEs. Therefore, it is necessary to give to users a mechanism
to prevent the WSEs from knowing their sensitive information.
Besides the need of privacy, another relevant issue for the users is the query
delay. This is the time that users have to wait in order to obtain the search results
for their queries. Current proposals increase significantly the query delay. This fact
prevents these schemes from being successfully deployed in real environments.
In this chapter, we present a modification of the work presented in [Cast 09].
On one hand, our system optimizes some steps of the protocol to reduce the
query delay. On the other hand, these changes incentivize every user to follow
the protocol in order to protect their privacy. The new scheme has been tested in
an open environment and the results show that it achieves the lowest query delay
which has been reported in the literature.
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Chapter 5
Distributed System for Private
Web Search with Untrusted
Partners
This chapter introduces a distributed protocol, where a group of users collaborate to protect
their privacy in front of WSEs and dishonest users, while introducing a reasonable delay.
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We introduce the novelty of the approach in §5.1, describing the security re-
quirements to be guaranteed, the involved participants and the different phases.
Section §5.2 describes the scenario and the requirements of the system. The pro-
tocol is detailed in Section §5.3. Section §5.4 analyzes the privacy of the protocol.
Section §5.5 includes the implementation of the protocol, with the results of tests
regarding its performance. Finally, Section §5.6 gives some conclusions and re-
ports some future work.
5.1 Novelty of the approach
In this chapter, we present a multi-party protocol that protects the privacy of
the users against web search engines and against dishonest internal users. Regard-
ing similar approaches, we propose a protocol which increases the level of security
of [Cast 09], and requires less computation and communication than [Lind 10].
More specifically, this work focuses on the second point of improvement (level of
security) presented in Section 2.3.
Besides the description of the presented protocol, in order to analyze its be-
haviour, this chapter includes:
• The implementation of the protocol as a Java applet with a search engine
interface.
• A test, using real data extracted from the AOL dataset, that evaluates the
privacy of 1000 users, as if the had been executing the protocol during three
months. In order to evaluate how their profiles change with the protocol,
the test includes a morpho-syntactical and a semantical analysis of the sub-
mitted queries, and the application of an existing measure called the Profile
Exposure Level (PEL) that estimates the privacy provided by the system.
• A group of tests, again employing real data from the AOL dataset, in order
to estimate the time necessary to create a group. Results for different tests
with different group sizes are presented.
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• Performance tests where the protocol is executed in a controlled environ-
ment (i.e., a local network). Results for these tests show the delay of each
interval of the protocol, aswell as the overall query delay (i.e., the total time
that a user has to wait until she receives the query results). Moreover, these
tests have been repeated for different parameter configurations in order to
estimate which are the best values for the configurable parameters proposed
in the protocol.
• Performance tests where the protocol is executed in an open environment
(i.e., the Internet). The same points as in the controlled environenment have
been analyzed. This test shows real time measures of the execution of the
protocol via the Internet.
5.2 System Model
This section describes the entities that participate in the system. It also gives an
overview of the proposed protocol and defines its requirements.
5.2.1 Entities
The protocol is executed in a scenario with three entities:
• Users. Individuals who submit queries to the WSE. We assume that in our
scenario there are honest and dishonest users. The motivation of the honest
users is to protect their own privacy. The motivation of the dishonest users
is to learn the queries of the honest users.
• Central node. It organizes the users into groups. Its main objective is to dis-
tribute the information that users need in order to contact the other members
of the group. This does not suppose a high workload and hence, we assume
that the central node is run by one or more voluntary nodes. This assump-
tion is also presumed by other systems like the Tor network [Ding 04], based
on the use of a high number of voluntary nodes, and each one with a higher
workload than the central node used in our proposal.
• Web search engine. It is the server that holds the database. We assume that it
has no motivation to protect the privacy of their users.
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5.2.2 Protocol Overview
The objective of the protocol is to create a group of users who collaborate in order
to privately submit queries to a WSE. Instead of submitting her own query, a user
U asks another member of the group to submit it and send the results back. At the
same time, U submits the query of another user of the group and sends the results
back to her. At the end, the WSE owns an obfuscated profile of each member of
the group.
The protocol requires that neither the WSE nor the users of the group can link a
query to a particular user. For this purpose, the users execute a distributed proto-
col that works as follows: a central node creates a group of n users, and provides
them with the necessary information to contact each other. Then, the required
OAS-Benes networks are built and fairly distributed among the n users. After
that, each user encrypts and broadcasts her query. The list of encrypted queries is
passed from each user to the next. In her turn, each user re-masks and permutates
the list of ciphertexts at every switch that she was assigned. As a result, no user
can link the inputs and the outputs of a particular user. Furthermore, for every
switch, she uses PEP and DISPEP protocols to prove to the rest of users that the
outputs are re-ordered and re-masked versions of the inputs.
The final result is that the users obtain a list of ciphertexts that cannot be linked
to the original list. Then, each user decrypts one different query, submits it to the
WSE and broadcasts the result.
5.2.3 Privacy and Performance Requirements
In order to guarantee the privacy of the users, the scheme must fulfill the following
requirements:
• The users cannot link any query with the user who generated it.
• The central node cannot link any query with the user who generated it.
• The WSE cannot build a reliable profile of any user.
Regarding the performance, two parameters should be minimized:
• The time required to build a group of users.
• The delay caused by the communications and the cryptographic operations.
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5.3 Protocol Description
The protocol is formed by four phases that users execute sequentially.
5.3.1 Group Setup
Every user who wants to submit a query to the WSE, sends a request to the
central node. When the central node has received n requests, it creates a group
{U1, . . . ,Un}. Then, the central node notifies the n users that they belong to the
same group. The users receive a message with the size of the group (n) and the
position that every component has been randomly assigned (i = {1, . . . , n}). Each
position is associated with the IP address and the port where the user is listening.
This information allows the users to establish a communication channel between
them. The central node is no longer needed and the rest of the protocol is P2P.
5.3.2 Permutation Network Distribution
As stated in section 3.3.1, t OAS-Benes networks are necessary to perform a secure
permutation. The number of inputs of the networks equals the number of users
N = n, which is also the same as the number of queries. Regarding the number
of honest users, the parameter is always fixed at λ = 2. The reason for this choice
requires a privacy analysis and, hence, it is later detailed in Section 5.5.4.
Knowing the parameters n, N, and λ, the users calculate the value of t using
the formula defined on Section 3.3.1. The construction of the t OAS-Benes PN(n)
is mechanical. This means that users do not need to exchange any information.
As long as they know the parameters t and n, they know the arrangement of the
switches in the t OAS-Benes PN(n). Therefore, they can fairly divide them into n
adjacent stages.
According to the positions assigned in the previous phase, user Ui is respon-
sible for the switches that correspond to the i-th stage. Each stage is formed by d
switches, where d = tn · S(n) on average.
We denote as sil the l-th switch of the i-th user for i = {1, . . . , n} and l =
{1, . . . , d}. We also define a function Φ (i, l) that, given an output of a switch, it
returns the input of the next switch that must follow. The result is given according
to the arrangement of the switches in the PNs. Figure 5.1 illustrates the operation
of this function.
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Figure 5.1: Correlation between outputs of a switch and inputs of the next
5.3.3 Group Key Generation.
1. Users {U1, . . . ,Un} agree on a large prime p where p = 2q + 1 and q is a
prime too. Next, they pick an element g ∈ Z∗q of order q.
2. In order to generate the group key, each user Ui performs the following
steps:
(a) Generates a random number ai ∈ Z
∗
q .
(b) Calculates her own share yi = g
ai mod p.
(c) Broadcasts a commitment to her share hi = H (yi), where H is a one-
way function.
(d) After receiving all the hj for j = {1, . . . , n}, j 6= i, she broadcasts yi.
(e) Checks hj = H
(
yj
)
for j = {1, . . . , n}, j 6= i.
(f) Calculates the group key using the received shares, as Equation 5.1
indicates.
y = ∏1≤j≤n yj = g
a1 · ga2 · . . . · gan (5.1)
5.3.4 Anonymous Query Retrieval
For i = {1, . . . , n}, each user Ui performs the following operations:
1. Ui generates a random value ri and uses the group key y to encrypt her
query mi, as Equation 5.1 indicates.
Ey(mi, ri) = (c1i, c2i) = c
0
i (5.2)
2. Ui sends c
0
i to the other members Uj, for ∀j 6= i.
3. For every switch sil (l = {1, . . . , d}) with two inputs denoted as c
2l−1
i−1 and c
2l
i−1
received from Ui−1 (note that the inputs for the switches of U1 are the initial
ciphertexts {c01, . . . , c
0
n}):
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(a) Ui re-masks the cryptograms c
2l−1
i−1 and c
2l
i−1. She obtains a re-encrypted
version e2l−1i−1 and e
2l
i−1 using the re-masking algorithm defined in sec-
tion 3.2.
(b) Ui randomly chooses bi,l ∈ {0, 1} to determine the state of the switch
sil as in Figure 3.1(a). According to this state, she obtains a re-ordered
version of the ciphertexts e
pi(2l−1)
i−1 and e
pi(2l)
i−1 .
(c) Ui broadcasts {cΦ(i,2l−1), cΦ(i,2l)} = {e
pi(2l−1)
i−1 , e
pi(2l)
i−1 }
(d) Assuming:
c2l−1i−1 = Ey(m1, r1), c
2l
i−1 = Ey(m2, r2)
e
pi(2l−1)
i−1 = Ey(m
′
1, r
′
1), e
pi(2l)
i−1 = Ey(m
′
2, r
′
2)
Ui must demonstrate that e
pi(2l−1)
i−1 and e
pi(2l)
i−1 are re-masked and re-
ordered versions of c2l−1i−1 and c
2l
i−1. This is equivalent to proving two
statements:
I. (m2 = m′2) ∨ (m2 = m
′
1).
This can be proved using the DISPEP protocol of Section 3.5.
II. (m1 ·m2 = m
′
1 ·m
′
2).
Ui computes c = Ey(m1 · m2, r1 + r2) and c
′ = Ey(m′1 · m
′
2, r
′
1 + r
′
2),
and uses the PEP protocol (Section 3.4) to prove that c and c′ are
plaintext equivalent.
All the other users Uj (∀j 6= i) verify the proofs.
4. Let us denote {c1, . . . , cn} as the resulting list of re-masked and re-ordered
ciphertexts. At this point, each user Ui owns those n values. Then, user Ui
decrypts the value ci that corresponds to a query m
i generated by one of the
group members. Note that due to the re-masking and permutation steps, mi
does not probably correspond to mi (the query that has been generated by
Ui).
Decryption of a certain ci requires that all n users participate by sending
their corresponding shares to user Ui. According to that, Ui receives (c1i)
αj
from Uj, for j = (1, . . . , n) and j 6= i. Then, Ui computes her own share
(c1i)
αi . Finally, Ui retrieves m
i as Equation 5.3 indicates.
mi =
c2i
c1αii (∏j 6=i c1
αj
i )
(5.3)
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5.3.5 Query submission and retrieval
At the last phase of the protocol, users receive the results for the queries that they
generated. For this purpose:
1. Ui submits the retrieved m
i to the WSE.
2. Ui receives the results from the WSE and broadcasts them to the other mem-
bers of the group.
3. At this point, each user has received n− 1 results, and hence, she owns all
the n results. From these n results, each user selects the ones that correspond
to her original query and discards the rest.
5.4 Privacy Evaluation
This section analyzes the behaviour of the protocol regarding the privacy require-
ments defined in Section 6.2.1. The system is analyzed in the presence of the three
dishonest entities that may participate in the protocol: dishonest user, dishonest
central node and dishonest web search engine.
5.4.1 Dishonest User
The ElGamal cryptosystem is semantically secure under the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman assumption [ElGa 85]. This means that a dishonest user cannot know
if two different ciphertexts will result into the same cleartext after decryption.
Therefore, every time that a ciphertext ci crosses a switch, it is re-masked and
permutated, and the attacker can only link the result to ci by guessing, with prob-
ability of success 1/2. This probability exponentially decreases for every switch
that the ciphertext crosses. In the case of an attacker that only knows the inputs
and the final outputs, the intermediate re-maskings and permutations prevent her
from finding the links between them. Hence, given a particular user, the probabil-
ity of correctly linking her with a decrypted query is 1/n.
Let us consider the case where a dishonest user successfully learns the query of
another component of the group. This means that she is able to link one input of
the permutation networks with one of the outputs. This attack may be conducted
if one of the following conditions is fulfilled.
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1. The dishonest user knows the secret group key. The attacker can decrypt a query
at any step of the protocol.
2. The dishonest user ignores the key but knows the overall permutation. Here, the
attacker waits until the ciphertexts are decrypted. Then, she can link every
query with the original ciphertexts and, hence, with their sources.
Regarding the first condition, the attacker can only recover the secret key if she
compromises the n− 1 other members of the group. The generation of the group
key is distributed among the participants using the n-out-of-n threshold ElGamal
key generation explained in Section 3.1.1. One of the characteristics of this scheme
is that, if there is even a single honest user, the secret key cannot be reconstructed.
Another alternative in order to learn the secret key is to maliciously alter the
key generation phase. In this phase, each user generates her share yi = g
ai . She
then broadcasts a commitment to that share using a cryptographic functionH (yi),
and she then sends yi in a new message. A dishonest user may change her choice
of share after receiving the shares of the other participants, before sending her
own. This dishonest user calculates her share y′j = g
aj/∏n−1i=1 yi = g
aj−a1−···−an−1
and broadcasts it. As a result, the group key is computed as y = gaj and, hence, the
dishonest user knows the secret group key. In order for this attack to be successful
and remain undetected, the dishonest user must be able to find collisions in the
hash function. This means that she must find a value y′j for which her previous
commitment is still valid (i.e., H (yi) = H (y
′
i)). Nowadays, the probability of
finding a collision in a reasonable amount of time, using a cryptographic hash
function such as SHA-2, is almost negligible.
Regarding the second condition, the use of OAS-Benes PNs guarantees that the
permutation is random and private. The requirement for this is that there must
be at least one permutation network controlled by honest users. This means that
the quantity of PNs that the scheme needs depends on the minimum number of
honest users required to run the protocol. More specifically, the quantity of PNs
that the scheme needs is the number that satisfies the following condition: in any
possible distribution of stages among the users, the amount of switches controlled
by the t honest users equals, at least, the number of switches composing one OAS-
Benes PN. If this requirement is fulfilled, according to [Soo 02], the permutation
is secure and remains secret to all the participants. Then, it is not possible to
backtrace a permutation to find the original input.
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5.4.2 Dishonest Central Node
This entity only participates in the initial phase of the protocol, before the users
exchange any message. Since it ignores any further communication between the
users, the central node cannot link any query to the source.
However, let us consider the case where a central node is in control of at least
n− 1 machines. Then, this entity could group a single honest user with n− 1 users
in its control. In this case, even if the protocol is thoroughly followed, the privacy
of the honest user is lost. This happens because, at the end of the protocol, the
queries are revealed and the central node can identify which query belongs to the
honest user. Similarly, an attacker could send many requests to the central node
so that it is likely that she controls a large fraction of the group. This situation
can be prevented using a joint coin tossing scheme that uniformly distributes the
parties controlled by the central node among all the groups executing the protocol.
For example, the joint coin tossing scheme proposed in [Lind 10] can be fully
integrated in our protocol. However, it is worth to mention that this solution
has two shortcomings: (i) it requires that the number of peers controlled by the
central node is small in comparison with the number of users ready to execute the
protocol at a certain time; and (ii) executing the joint coin tossing scheme may be
expensive.
5.4.3 Dishonest Web Search Engine
The objective of the WSE is to gather the queries of the users in order to build
their profiles. In the proposed protocol, the WSE only participates in the last
phase where it receives the queries from all the members of the group and returns
the results. Therefore, the WSE can link each query with the user who submit-
ted it and can include that information on her profile. Since a user Ui does not
always submit her own query but also queries of other participants, after several
executions of the protocol, the profile of Ui that the WSE owns is obfuscated.
In order to evaluate the level of privacy obtained by the users of the protocol,
the following test is performed: let us assume that a user that submits her queries
directly to the WSE (without using the proposed protocol) has a profile P. If she
executes the protocol, we denote her resulting profile P′ (the obfuscated profile).
Therefore, in order to evaluate the level of privacy provided by the protocol, this
test measures the difference between P and P′.
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The first step in order to perform this test is to extract a profile from a list of
queries. Several works like [Eick 13] and [Bals 12] characterize a profile as a set of
categories that represent the topics of the user’s submitted queries. For example,
if a user submitted the queries “rheumatoid arthritis” and “basketball drills”, her
profile would contain categories “Health” and “Sports”.
However, in practice, processing textual data and extracting their semantics
is a challenging task. As stated in [Sanc 13], some linguistic analysis preprocess-
ing must be applied. For our test, we have employed the method proposed in
[Sanc 13]. This scheme has two steps:
1. A morpho-syntactical analysis over each query in order to obtain the main
topic of the query. In this step, several Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques based on maximum entropy models are used to syntactically an-
alyze queries. These techiques are: sentence detection, tokenization, part-
of-speech tagging, syntactic parsing, stop word removal, and stemming. A
detailed explanation of each technique can be found in [Mann 99]. As a re-
sult of applying these techniques, we obtain the term (composed by a word
or a set of words) that best represents the query topic.
2. A semantical analysis of the term obtained in the previous step using a knowl-
edge base. For this purpose, the Open Directory Project (ODP) is used. ODP
[ODP 13] is the largest human-edited directory of the Web, constructed and
maintained by a large community of volunteers. The purpose of the ODP
is to list and categorize web sites and for this, manually created categories
are taxonomically structured and associated with web resources. Regarding
semantical analysis, this structure can be exploited to interpret the meaning
of a concept by finding the term in the structure and retrieving the upper
categories of the taxonomy.
The result of applying this two steps is a list of ODP categories that classify
the original query at different degrees. An example of this kind of classification is
represented in Table 5.1. For instance, the query “how elvis prestley died” is found
in the ODP ontology under “Arts : Music : Bands and Artists : P : Presley, Elvis”.
This means that its category at first degree is “Arts”, at second degree is “Music”, etc.
We use this method to transform the queries that the user intended to submit
into P, and the queries that the user finally submitted into P′. Once profiles
are categorized, some metric that quantify the difference between P and P′ is
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Query ODP classification
how elvis prestley died Arts : Music : Bands and Artists : P : Presley, Elvis
barbie doll houses Recreation : Models : Dollhouse Miniatures
sexy swimwear Shopping : Clothing : Swimwear : Women’s : Bikinis
stamp framing Recreation : Collecting : Stamps
weather News : Weather
Table 5.1: Example of query processing to ODP categories.
needed. For this purpose, several approaches exist in the literature, among which
we highlight [Bals 12], [Rebo 10], and [Erol 11b].
The first of them, [Bals 12], defines the average amount of information that
the obfuscated profile reveals about the real profile as H(P) − H(P|P′). Where
H(P) is the entropy of P, and represents the uncertainty on the real profile; and
H(P|P′) is the conditional entropy, i.e., the uncertainty on the real profile when
the obfuscated profile is known.
The second of them, [Rebo 10], employs the Kullback-Leiber divergence
[Cove 12], denoted as D(P||Λ), where Λ represents an average user profile with
the more popular interests. This measure is employed to evaluate the dissimilarity
between the obfuscated and the average population profile.
The problem with both schemes is that they assume that the population profile
is known. In [Bals 12], in order to calculate the entropy, it is assumed some back-
ground on the interests of the user population (e.g., which search topics are more
popular). In [Rebo 10], the metric assumes that Λ, the average population profile,
is known. However, for our tests, this assumption is difficult to accomplish, and a
further analysis on the AOL dataset in order to obtain an approximate population
profile would be necessary.
Consequently, and since it is not affected by the above assumption, we decided
to use the third approach [Erol 11b]. In [Erol 11b], a metric called the Profile
Exposure Level (PEL) [Erol 11b] is used. This metric measures the percentage of
information about a user that can be extracted from her obfuscated profile. It is
computed as equation 5.4 indicates.
PEL =
I(Φ,Φ′)
H(Φ)
· 100 (5.4)
Where Φ is the set of categories from the queries that the user intended to
submit, Φ′ is the set of categories from the queries that the user finally submitted,
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H(Φ) is the entropy of Φ and I(Φ,Φ′) is the mutual information between both
sets (i.e., if Φ′ is known, how much does this reduce the uncertainty about Φ?). As
a result, PEL measures the percentage of user information which is disseminated
when Φ′ is known.
Note that Equation 5.4 cannot be directly applied to all the categories in P and
P′ at the same time, but it is only useful to compare categories at a fixed degree. In
the example of Table 5.1, comparing “barbie doll houses” with “stamp framing”
at first degree (“Recreation” vs. “Recreation”) computes as a maximum exposure,
while comparing them at second level (“Models” vs. “Collecting”) computes as a
null exposure.
Regarding the way that the entropy and the mutual information are calculated
in PEL, [Erol 11b] considers Φ and Φ′ as two random discrete variables that have
sample spaces ΩΦ and ΩΦ′ respectively. Then, the following probability functions
are defined:
1. The probability function of Φ, denoted as p(ϕ). It is defined as, ∀ϕ ∈ ΩΦ,
p(ϕ) = P(Φ = ϕ).
2. The probability function of Φ′, denoted as p(ϕ′). It is defined as, for ∀ϕ′ ∈
ΩΦ′ , p(ϕ
′) = P(Φ′ = ϕ′).
3. The conditional probability function of Φ given Φ′, denoted as p(ϕ/ϕ′). It
is defined as, ∀ϕ ∈ ΩΦ and ∀ϕ
′ ∈ ΩΦ′ , p(ϕ/ϕ
′) = P(Φ = ϕ/Φ′ = ϕ′).
Using these probability functions, [Erol 11b] computes the entropy and the
mutual information as Equations 5.5 and 5.6 indicate:
H(Φ) = −∑
ϕ
p(ϕ) · log2 p(ϕ) (5.5)
I(Φ,Φ′) = ∑
ϕ,ϕ′
p(ϕ/ϕ′) · p(ϕ′) · log2
p(ϕ/ϕ′)
p(ϕ)
(5.6)
In order to solve these equations, the probability functions must be defined.
For this purpose, [Erol 11b] proposes the following notation:
ΩΦ = {ϕi}
v
i=1, is the set containing the elements of Φ without repetitions.
ΩΦ′ = {ϕ
′
i}
w
i=1, is the set containing the elements of Φ
′ without repetitions.
CarΦ = {carϕi}
v
i=1, is the set with the cardinals of each element of Φ.
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CarΦ′ = {carϕ′i}
w
i=1, is the set with the cardinals of each element of Φ
′.
V = ∑vi=1 carϕi , number of elements of the set Φ, counting repetitions.
W = ∑wi=1 carϕ′i , number of elements of the set Φ
′, counting repetitions.
Finally, [Erol 11b] defines the calculation of the probabilities p(ϕ) and p(ϕ′)
as:
• Calculation of p(ϕ) and p(ϕ′)
In this case, the probability of each element of Φ and Φ′ is proportional to its
cardinal. Consequently, p(ϕ) and p(ϕ′) are computed as Equations 5.7 and
5.8 indicate.
P(Φ = ϕi) =
carϕi
V
, 1 ≤ i ≤ v. (5.7)
P(Φ′ = ϕ′i) =
carϕ′i
W
, 1 ≤ i ≤ w. (5.8)
• Calculation of p(ϕ/ϕ′)
P(Φ = ϕi/Φ
′ = ϕ′j) is computed for each pair ϕi, ϕ
′
j where 1 ≤ i ≤ v and
1 ≤ j ≤ w.
Fixing ϕ′j ∈ Φ
′, two situations can arise:
1. ϕ′j /∈ Φ. There is no information, i.e., the probability is randomly as-
signed among the elements of Φ and proportionally to their cardinal,
as it is shown on Equation 5.9.
P(Φ = ϕi/Φ
′ = ϕj) =
carϕi
V
, 1 ≤ i ≤ v. (5.9)
2. ϕ′j ∈ Φ. Then, there is a ϕk ∈ Φ so that ϕk = ϕ
′
j.
(a) If carϕ′j ≤ carϕk , it is assumed that ϕ
′
j corresponds to ϕk (Equation
5.10, and not to any other ϕ ∈ Ωϕ (Equation 5.11).
P(Φ = ϕk/Φ
′ = ϕ′j) = 1 (5.10)
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P(Φ = ϕk′/Φ
′ = ϕ′j) = 0, 1 ≤ k
′ ≤ v, k 6= k′ (5.11)
(b) If carϕ′j > carϕk , it is assumed that: (i) ϕ
′
j corresponds to ϕk and
not to any other ϕ ∈ Ωϕ, with the probability proportional to the
cardinal of ϕk, as Equation 5.12 shows; (ii) there is no information
with probability proportional to the difference of the cardinals, as
Equation 5.13 shows.
P(Φ = ϕk/Φ
′ = ϕ′j) =
carϕk
carϕ′j
+
carϕ′j − carϕk
carϕ′j
·
carϕk
V
(5.12)
P(Φ = ϕk′/Φ
′ = ϕ′j) =
carϕ′j − carϕk
carϕ′j
·
carϕk′
V
, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ v, k 6= k′
(5.13)
Parameter selection
In the proposed protocol, the privacy of the users in front of the WSE increases
with the size of the group. This means that the larger the group is, the more
privacy its members obtain. However, in practice, the size of the group is bounded
by the time that users must wait in order to create the group. In order to minimize
the query delay, the creation of the groupmust be as quick as possible. Simulations
have been performed using three group sizes: n = 3, n = 4, and n = 5, considering
that in each group, the n participants are different users. As explained in [Cast 09],
the number of queries that Google answers per second can be modeled using a
Poisson distribution. This allows to calculate the probability of forming a group
of n users in a certain amount of time. After several tests, the authors of [Cast 09]
conclude that n = 3 is the most realistic group size. However, in order to perform
a more exhaustive analysis of our protocol, the protocol has also been tested for
n = 4 and n = 5.
For the test, the AOL search logs have been used [M Ba 05]. Each entry of the
logs contains five fields: an anonymous ID (AnonID), the query (Query) that she
submitted, the time (day, hour, minute and second) at which the query was sub-
mitted (QueryTime) and, in some cases, the website that the user clicked (ClickURL)
with the position that it filled in the results that AOL returned (ItemRank).
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The test consists in simulating the execution of the protocol using groups of
size n = 3, then n = 4, and finally n = 5, considering all the queries generated by
a subset of 1,000 users during three months. In particular, we want to obtain the
obfuscated profile that each user would have obtained for every group size, and
compare it with her real profile from the AOL logs.
Results
The results obtained for this test are summarized in Table 5.2. The table contains
the average PEL for different ODP categories. These percentages represent the
amount of real profile information leaked by the observance of the obfuscated
profile. As stated in [Bals 12], this is an indicator of the level of privacy provided
by privacy-preserving protocols based on obfuscated profiles. In our case, it shows
the difference between the uncertainty of the WSE before and after obtaining the
obfuscated profile.
Table 5.2 shows the results for the first, second, third and fourth degrees of
ODP categories. As argued in [Eick 13], ODP categories at the second degree
privde a consistent, sufficient level of specificity in order to evaluate a profile.
However, for the sake of exhaustivenes, we also present the results for the first,
third and fourth degree. Additionally, as Table 5.1 shows, not all the queries are
classified into the same number of categories. Consequently, the higher the degree
of the ODP category, the less number of queries can be compared. For example, in
our case 50% of the queries have less than five degrees. Applying PEL to a dataset
where half of the data are missing is not very indicative of the profile exposure
and hence, we decided to show the results only below the fifth degree.
Table 5.2: Average Profile Exposure Level at different degrees using groups of
n = 3, 4, 5 users
Degree 1 Degree 2 Degree 3 Degree 4
n = 3 67.27% 47.00% 40.73% 37.78%
n = 4 64.16% 41.03% 33.62% 29.43%
n = 5 63.91% 39.25% 30.84% 26.18%
The proposed protocol employs a permutation network (OAS Benes) that dis-
tributes the queries randomly between the n users that execute the protocol. For
this reason, in theory, each user should submit her own query once in every n
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executions (1/n of times). Table 5.1 shows that the exposure level of P knowing P′
is higher than 60% at first degree. This means that even if a user submits on av-
erage only 1/n of the queries that she generated, the submitted queries generated
by other users share similar topics for the most general ODP category. At second
degree the categories are more specific and hence, there is a greater diversity of
topics, which lowers the profile exposure. The results for the third and fourth
degrees show that the profile exposure level tends to 1/n for more specific ODP
categories.
Consequently, from the results obtained for this test we can extract that, for
general categories of ODP, the exposure level of P with regard to P′ is high, while
for specific categories of ODP, P and P′ diverge. This means that executing the
proposed protocol preserves the user’s profile at general categories, but protects
its specific contents.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation is divided in two parts. First of all, we analyze the
performance of our proposal comparing the results with the most similar propos-
als in the literature: [Cast 09] and [Lind 10]. Since the work presented in [Lind 10]
does not include simulations nor a query delay estimation in a real environment,
we decided to compare the protocols theoretically. Therefore, the two first tests
are a theoretical analysis of the three protocols, evaluating the cost of computation
time (Test 1, Section 5.5.1) and the number of messages that need to be exchanged
in each case (Test 2, Section 5.5.2) .
Secondly, in order to complete the evaluation of our proposal, we have imple-
mented the protocol of section 5.3. As stated previously, there is usually a tradeoff
between the level of privacy that the user obtains and the performance of the pro-
tocol. For this reason, we have performed two different kinds of tests that evaluate
the performance requirements defined in Section 6.2.1:
1. Time to create a group (Test 3, Section 5.5.3) . In distributed protocols where a
group of users collaborate, the time required to create the group is a critical
point. This period of time starts when the central node receives the first
request from a user interested in executing the protocol, and ends when the
central node has received n requests. Therefore, the third test aims at giving
an approximate measure of the time required to build a group according to
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the total number of users executing the protocol.
2. Query delay (Tests 4 and 5, Section 5.5.4 and Section 5.5.5) . The objective of
the fourth and fifth tests is to evaluate the protocol in terms of performance,
i.e., the delay caused by the cryptographic operations and the messages sent
through the network. In order to do this, the protocol has been implemented
and tested in a controlled environment (Test 4) and a real environment (Test
5). The results of both tests allow to determine if the protocol introduces an
affordable delay.
5.5.1 Test 1: Comparison of the Computation time
Next, we analyze the computation time needed in the execution of [Cast 09],
[Lind 10] and our proposal.
Parameter selection of Test 1
Prior to the comparisons, three parameters of the systemmust be defined: the size
of the group (n), the key length, and the number of OAS-Benes (t).
For the same reasons explained in 5.4.3, the group sizes are again n = 3, n = 4,
and n = 5.
Regarding the key length, according to [Cast 09] and [NIST 07], a 1024-bit key
length is considered computationally safe. In addition, the work presented in
[M Ka 06] argues that a query is formed on average by 2.3 words and 15.5 char-
acters. Assuming that a single Unicode character uses 2 bytes, a query would
require 31 bytes on average. A key of 1024 bits can encrypt up to 128 bytes. This
indicates that a system that employs a 1024-bit key length can accept queries with
approximately 64 characters, a significantly higher value than the average query
size.
The minimum number of OAS-Benes PNs, denoted as (t), is calculated accord-
ing to the formula defined on Section 3.3.1. This formula depends on the size of
the group (n), the number of inputs (N) and the minimum number of honest users
(λ).
The selection of the size of the group (n) is explained above. The number of
inputs equals the size of the group (N = n), because the inputs are the queries
that every user generates. Nevertheless, the minimum number of honest users
requires a further analysis.
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Our scheme must be able to provide privacy in the worst possible conditions.
That is, when the number of dishonest users is large in comparison with the num-
ber of honest users. However, the smaller the parameter λ is, the more OAS-Benes
PNs are required and the higher the query delay grows. Hence, the value of λ
must minimize the query delay without sacrificing the privacy of the users.
The minimum value for the number of honest users is λ = 1. However, this
value does not guarantee the privacy of the users. As stated in Section 5.4.2,
in a scenario with a single honest user and n − 1 dishonest users, even if the
permutation is perfectly secure, the privacy of the honest user is lost. Note that a
coalition of n− 1 dishonest users can easily identify which of the n queries belongs
to the honest user.
The next possible minimum value is λ = 2. This value defines the worst case
scenario in which our scheme can provide privacy. In this case, the n− 2 dishonest
users have a probability of 0.5 of learning the query of the honest users.
In summary, we fix the parameter λ = 2 as the minimum number of honest
users that our protocol requires. According to Formula 3.1, when λ = 2 the test
for n = 3 requires t = 2 OAS-Benes PNs, while the tests for n = 4 and n = 5
require t = 3 OAS-Benes PNs.
Results of Test 1
As a result of this test, we show the amount of modular exponentiations that every
user must perform in each execution of the protocol.
There are some parts of the protocol of [Lind 10] that employ a double encryp-
tion. This means that some modular exponentiations are performed modulus a
2048-bit integer value, instead of using a 1024-bit modulus like [Cast 09] and our
proposal do. In order to compare the time required by a 1024-bit and a 2048-bit
modular exponentiation, we executed a simulation that performed both opera-
tions. The simulation revealed that, in the same conditions, a 1024-bit modular
exponentiation takes 22 ms on average, while a 2048-bit modular exponentiation
takes 172 ms on average.
Table 5.3 shows the theoretical computation time needed by modular exponen-
tiations in each protocol. The τ1024 denotes the time required to make one 1024-bit
modular exponentiation. The τ2048 denotes the time required to make one 2048-bit
modular exponentiation.
Figure 5.2 shows the calculated times for a group size of 3, 4 and 5 users. The
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Table 5.3: Modular exponentiations average time for one user
Castella` et al. [Cast 09] (3n+ 3) · τ1024
Lindell et al. [Lind 10] 6n · τ1024 + 5n · τ2048 − τ1024 + 2 · τ2048
Our Proposal
(
n+ 3+ 25·t·S(n)n
)
· τ1024
results indicate that [Cast 09] obtains the lowest computation time. This happens
because [Cast 09] does not use any mechanism to protect the participants against
dishonest users. Since [Lind 10] uses double encryptions and our proposal uses
zero-knowledge proofs, the computation times are higher. However, the results in-
dicate that, regarding the modular exponentiations cost, our proposal outperforms
the protocol of [Lind 10]. For example, for n = 3 users, our proposal requires ap-
proximately one second more of computation time than [Cast 09], while [Lind 10]
needs 3 more seconds than [Cast 09].
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of modular exponentiations times per user
5.5.2 Test 2: Comparison of the number of messages
In order to analyze the performance of the protocol, another relevant information
is the usage of the network. Table 5.5.2 reflects the number of messages that every
user sends in each execution of the protocol. The parameters employed in this test
are the same as for Test 1 (see Section 5.5.1).
Figure 5.3 represents the number of messages sent when 3, 4 or 5 users jointly
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Table 5.4: Average number of messages sent by each user
Castella` et al. [Cast 09] 3n− 1− 2n
Lindell et al. [Lind 10] 4n− 2− 2n
Our Proposal 4n− 4
execute the protocol. Although the number of messages is similar in the three
proposals, the results indicate that the number of messages sent in [Cast 09] is
lower than in [Lind 10] and in our proposal. The results also indicate that our
proposal requires less message deliveries than [Lind 10].
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of messages sent in each protocol per user
5.5.3 Test 3: Time to create a group
In order to obtain this estimation, we have employed the AOL dataset [M Ba 05]
again. As stated before, these logs contain a field called QueryTime that indicates
the time at which each query was submitted. Therefore, using this field it is
possible to simulate how the users of AOL would have been grouped if they had
executed the protocol described in Section 5.3.
Parameter selection of Test 3
Again, as explained in 5.4.3, the group sizes are n = 3, n = 4, and n = 5. Therefore,
the objective of Test 3 is to determine the time to create a group of 3, 4, and 5 users
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for any total number of users employing the protocol. Instead of using the whole
set of 658,000 users with their twenty million queries, we construct several samples
or subsets of users. More specifically, we consider seven different samples. For
example, the first sample contains the 2,784,908 queries belonging to 65,470 users
during three months. Then, the rest of the samples are increasingly built. The
(i + 1)th sample contains all the users from the ith sample plus some other new
users (always with their queries collected during three months). Consequently, the
last sample contains the whole AOL dataset. Columns Queries and Users of Table
5.5 indicate the number of queries and users that each sample contains.
This division in samples allows to make a regression analysis. With this tech-
nique, we intend to estimate the relationship between two variables: the time
required to create a group and the number of users employing the protocol. The
result of this estimation is the regression function, which allows to predict the
time to create groups of size n = 3, n = 4, and n = 5 for any amount of users that
employ the protocol.
Results of Test 3
The resulting average times for each sample is shown in Table 5.5. Using these
results, the regression function can be estimated as a potential regression. These
estimation functions are shown in Table 5.6, where x is the number of queries
generated by the users and y is the time required to create the group. The data ob-
tained together with the estimation line of the regression is represented in Figure
5.4.
Table 5.5: Average time for creating a group of n = 3, 4, 5 users
Delay
Sample Queries Users n=3 n=4 n=5
1 2,784,908 65,470 6395.96 ms 11536.23 ms 19402.73 ms
2 5,642,551 131,413 2942.95 ms 5087.46 ms 8579.86 ms
3 8,550,962 197,320 1891.75 ms 3192.97 ms 5094.81 ms
4 11,442,732 263,009 1399.07 ms 2220.07 ms 3524.80 ms
5 17,296,788 394,066 1017.90 ms 1420.04 ms 2537.52 ms
6 23,059,188 525,724 709.26 ms 942.17 ms 1854.25 ms
7 28,767,749 656,839 558.09 ms 558.10 ms 1556.03 ms
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Group size Regression function
n = 3 y = 3 · 1010 · x−1.02
n = 4 y = 1012 · x−1.245
n = 5 y = 2 · 1011 · x−1.086
Table 5.6: Regression functions for each group size.
The regression functions allow to estimate the time needed to create a group of
n = 3, n = 4, and n = 5 users given any number of queries. For example, accord-
ing to [Goog 12], Google answered 10,360,000,000 queries in a month. Therefore,
in three months, Google would have answered 31,080,000,000 queries, approxi-
mately. Ideally assuming that all the queries were submitted using the proposed
protocol, the regression function reveals that the time to create a group of n = 3
users would be 0.59 ms, for n = 4 users would be 0.66 ms, and for n = 5 users
would be 0.81 ms. This means that in an ideal scenario where all the Google users
execute the protocol, the time that each user must wait in order to find a group is
insignificant.
5.5.4 Test 4: Query delay in a controlled environment
With the purpose of analyzing its performance, the proposed protocol has been
implemented and tested in a controlled environment. The objective is to analyze
the delay introduced by each phase of the protocol.
Implementation of the protocol
The implementation of the protocol has two independent components: the central
node and the user application.
The central node is implemented as a process that continuously listens to re-
quests from the users. According to the protocol description of Section 5.3, a new
group is formed only after the central node has received n requests. Then, the
central node sends to the users of the new group the information that they need
in order to contact each other. For the sake of efficiency, the message that the
central node sends also contains the large prime p, and the g ∈ Z∗p element. Thus,
the Step 1 described in Section 5.3.3 can be omitted.
The user application is a Java applet with an interface similar to the interface of
any WSE. Users employ this applet to type their query. The whole protocol is ex-
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(c) Time to create a group of 5 users.
Figure 5.4: Time to create a group of size n = 3, n = 4, n = 5. Real results and
estimation.
ecuted automatically and the user receives the results for her query transparently,
as if she had directly employed the WSE.
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Parameter selection of Test 4
Before executing the simulations, three parameters of the system must be defined:
size of the group (n), key length, and number of OAS-Benes (t).
• Size of the Group and Key Length. Firstly, as in previous tests, the selected
group sizes are n = 3, n = 4, and n = 5. Regarding the length of the keys
employed to perform the cryptographic operations, we employ again a key
length of 1024 bits, like in Tests 1 and 2. However, it is worth to mention
that scenarios where the level of security required is critical usually use keys
of 2048 bits. Therefore, for the sake of exhaustiveness, in this test we also
present the results obtained when the protocol is executed with a key length
of 2048 bits.
• Minimum number of OAS-Benes PNs. The minimum number of required OAS-
Benes PNs (t) is calculated as for Test 1 and 2 (t = 3 OAS-Benes PNs).
• Web search engine. For the test, Google was selected as the web search engine
where the users intend to submit their queries. Each user has a list of 1,000
randomly selected queries. The results presented for this test are the average
of the values obtained when each user submits the 1,000 queries to Google
using key lengths of 1024-bit and 2048-bit.
Equipment properties
The protocol has been tested in a controlled environment, where the users are
connected using a Gigabit Ethernet wired local network. All the computers em-
ployed for the tests (including the central node) are Intel Core i5 3.3 GHz with 8GB
of RAM. Each computer executes a single user application in each test.
Time measures
In order to know which parts of the protocol have a higher delay, we have defined
several time intervals that represent the delay of each protocol step. This is the list
that contains the description of each time interval:
• t0: time required by Ui to connect with the central node and to get a response.
This response includes the information needed to contact with the other
members of the group and the parameters to create the group key.
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Figure 5.5: Protocol delays obtained in a controlled environment.
• t1: time required by Ui to create her group key share αi.
• t2: time required by Ui to establish a connection with the other group mem-
bers.
• t3: time required by Ui to send her key share yi = g
αi to the group members.
• t4: time required by Ui to generate the group public key y using the shares
received from all group members.
• t5: time required by Ui to encrypt the query mi using the group public key
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CLIENT-SIDE PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES IN WEB SEARCH. 
Cristina Romero Tris 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1658-2014
5.5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 89
y.
• t6: time required by Ui to send the resulting c
0
i .
• t7: time required by Ui to pass the corresponding ciphertexts through the
switches and generate their zero knowledge proofs (PEP and DISPEP).
• t8: time required by Ui to send the results and the necessary elements of the
zero knowledge proofs which have been obtained in the switches.
• t9: time that Ui waits for the results of the switches of the other members
and to verify the zero knowledge proofs.
• t10: time required by Ui to calculate the shares which are used to decrypt the
ciphertexts and send them to the group members.
• t11: time required by Ui to decrypt the ciphertext ci that she has received.
Note that all the shares sent by the other group users are required.
• t12: time required by the WSE to return the answer to the query m
i which
has been sent by Ui.
• t13: time required by Ui to broadcast the received answer.
Results of Test 4
For the test, the protocol has been executed with two key lengths (1024 and 2048
bits) and it has been repeated 1,000 times for each group size (n = 3, 4, 5). The
graphic of Figure 5.5(a) and Figure 5.5(b) show the average values obtained for
each time interval using a 1024-bit key and a 2048-bit key, respectively.
Results show that certain intervals introduce a significant delay to the system.
For example, a high interval is t7, i.e., passing the ciphertexts through the switches
and generating the zero knowledge proofs. However, the highest time overhead
is t9. This is the time that users have to wait in order to receive the results of the
other members and verify that the zero knowledge proofs are correct. From these
two intervals (t7 and t9) two remarkable facts can be inferred:
• The more the number of users, the higher the delay. This happens because the
number of switches required by an OAS-Benes PN grows with the number
of users. When there are more switches in the OAS-Benes PN, there are more
ZKPs to be generated and verified.
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• The higher the key length, the higher the operation cost. There is a big difference
between the operation cost using 1024-bit keys and 2048-bit keys. The cost
of using a 2048-bit key is not twice the cost of a 1024 key-lenght. Results
show that this cost grows exponentially.
Regarding the global result, Table 5.7 shows the delay that a complete single
protocol execution requires on average. The table shows that the minimum delay
(2.11 s, for 1024-bit keys and n = 3 users) is obviously higher than submitting the
query directly to Google. This is caused by the overhead in the communications
and in the cryptographic operations, and it is the downside for obtaining a higher
level of privacy. Results also show a high delay for the executions with a key of
2048 bits (between 12 and 51 seconds, approximately). Therefore, the recommen-
dation is to use the protocol with 2048-bit key length only in scenarios where the
security is critical.
Table 5.7: Average time for executing the protocol with groups of n = 3, 4, 5 users
n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
1024-bit key 2114.17 ms 4858.58 ms 8032.30 ms
2048-bit key 11920.22 ms 30497.85 ms 50918.57 ms
5.5.5 Test 5: Query delay in a real environment
With the purpose of comparing its performance in a controlled and real envi-
ronment, the proposed protocol has been deployed in a real environment. The
implementation of the protocol is the same as in Test 2.
Parameter selection of Test 5
As in Test 4, three parameters of the system must be defined: size of the group
(n), key length, and number of OAS-Benes (t).
• Size of the Group and Key Length. Unlike previous tests, in this case the test
has only been performed for a group size of n = 3 users. As previously
mentioned, the authors of [Cast 09] conclude that n = 3 is the most realistic
group size. Moreover, we argue that knowing the results for n = 3 in a real
environment, and for n = 3, 4, 5 in a controlled environment (see Section
5.5.4), the results for n = 4, 5 in the real environment can be inferred.
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Regarding the length of the keys employed to perform the cryptographic
operations, the results are again presented for 1024 bits and 2048 bits key
length.
• Minimum number of OAS-Benes PNs. As explained in Section 5.5.4, the num-
ber of OAS-Benes PNs for n = 3 is t = 2. .
• Web search engine. For this test, Google was again the selected search engine.
As in Test 4, the results presented for Test 5 are the average of the values ob-
tained when each user submits the 1,000 queries to Google using key lengths
of 1024-bit and 2048-bit.
Equipment properties
The protocol has been tested in an open environment. The central node is executed
in a server that is continuously listening to requests. The n = 3 computers that
execute the user application are located in different cities and, therefore, connected
between them through the Internet. Regarding the specifications of the computers
involved in the tests: the server is an Intel Pentium 2.8 GHz with a 100Mb/100Mb
Internet connection. The other three machines are standard desktop computers
with Intel Core processors ranging from 2GHz to 2.7GHz and Internet connections
ranging from 3Mb to 10Mb for download and 300Kb to 1Mb for upload. Each
computer executes only a single user application in each test.
Results of Test 5
For the test, the protocol has been executed with two key lengths (1024 and 2048
bits) and it has been repeated 1,000 times for a group size n = 3. The graphic
of Figure 5.6(a) shows the average values obtained for each time interval using
a 1024-bit key. Note that the time intervals t0 to t13 are the same time intervals
defined for Test 4 (see Section 5.5.4).
The results show that certain intervals increase in comparison with the results
obtained in the controlled environment. As opposed to the controlled environ-
ment, all the intervals in the real environment are affected by the network latency.
For example, intervals t0 and t2 (the intervals where the users connect to the cen-
tral node and between them) take approximately one second each one. Addition-
ally, the intervals where the users exchange any message (t3, t6, t8, t9, t13) are also
significantly affected by the network latency.
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Figure 5.6: Protocol delays obtained in an real environment.
However, the highest time overhead is t9. This interval includes the time where
the users have to wait in order to receive the results of the other members and
verify that the zero knowledge proofs are correct. Because of the network latency
users have to wait longer in order to receive the ZKPs and consequently, longer in
order to complete the verification.
Regarding the overall delay, a single protocol execution requires 6.6 seconds
using a 1024-bit key, and 21.4 seconds using a 2048-bit key. As previously men-
tioned, it is only recommended to employ 2048-bit keys in scenarios where the
security is critical. For 1024-bit keys, although the cost is higher than directly sub-
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mitting the query to the WSE, the obtained results are still affordable, specially
since the protocol protects users not only in front of the WSE, but also in front of
internal attackers. These results can be compared with those obtained by the most
similar works in the literature, described in Chapter 2. The UUP protocol [Cast 09]
obtains a 5.2 second delay for n = 3 users and 1024-bit keys, but is vulnerable in
front of internal attackers. On the other hand, [Lind 10] is resilient against these
attacks, but the analysis performed in Tests 1 and 2 indicates that it is 20 times
slower than the UUP protocol. Our protocol is only 1.3 seconds slower than the
UUP protocol and achieves the same level of privacy than the protocol presented
in [Lind 10]. Accordingly, it can be inferred that our protocol obtains the best
trade-off between the level of privacy and the time of response.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter introduces a distributed protocol which protects the privacy of the
users in front of WSEs and dishonest internal users. The proposed scheme has
been compared to similar approaches in the literature. Results show that it out-
performs proposals that provide the same privacy level. Additionally, the protocol
has been implemented and evaluated using real queries from real users in a con-
trolled and real environment. On one hand, the tests which have been performed
give an estimation of the overhead caused by the new protocol when submitting a
query. In its faster configuration, a single protocol execution in a real environment
with n = 3 users and 1024-bit keys requires 6.6 seconds. On the other hand, they
also give a measure of the level of privacy exposure that each user achieves exe-
cuting the proposed protocol. More concretely, after computing the PEL measure,
it can be inferred that executing the proposed protocol preserves the user’s profile
at a general level, but protects its specific contents.
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Chapter 6
Design of a P2P network that
protects users’ privacy in front of
Web Search Engines
This chapter introduces a P2P architecture that groups users according to their interests
in order to protect their privacy in front of a WSEs
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Section 6.1 introduces the main contributions of this chapter. Section 6.2 de-
fines the requirements of the system. Section 6.3 explains the new scheme. Section
6.4 analyses the performance of the proposal. Finally, Section 6.6 outlines the main
conclusions and future work.
6.1 Novelty of the approach
Chapter 5 states on Section 5.4.2 that a dishonest central node is a dangerous
adversary and it can be considered a bottleneck. For this reason, in this chapter we
present another privacy-preserving multi-party protocol where the central node is
no longer needed.
More specifically, we introduce a P2P architecture that organizes users into
groups according to their interests. Then, the architecture is used as an overlay,
and inside each group a privacy preserving multi-party scheme like [Viej 10] is
executed. We have selected this one because it is compatible with our architecture,
and its application in the new scenario solves the shortcommings presented in
Section 2. The overall objective is to achieve a good trade-off between the privacy
level and the quality of the service, while offering robustness, scalability and well-
balanced traffic over the network. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the third
point of improvement (quality of the retrieved results) described in Section 2.3.
The advantages that the proposed scheme offers with respect to previous
works are:
• Human-generated queries. Users inside the network submit queries generated
by other real users. Hence, the scheme does not suffer from the problem of
machine-generated queries detection that single-party schemes used to have.
• Accurate group profile. Users are organized into groups according to their
interests. Within these groups, users execute a multi-party protocol like
[Viej 10]. This ensures that users only submit queries from users that share
the same interests. As a result, users obtain a group profile that WSEs can em-
ploy to improve users’ experience (desambiguation, personalization of the
results, suggestions, etc.).
• Flexibility. The protocols presented in [Viej 10] and [Erol 11b] are designed
to be deployed in social networks. Both protocols assume that (i) users have
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a social network account; (ii) users’ computers are permanently connected
to the Internet. Nevertheless, these assumptions may not always be true.
The special-purpose network that we propose can be employed by any user
without requiring a social netwok account. Additionally, the network man-
ages the joins and leaves of users and hence, we do not require the users’
computers to be permanently connected to the Internet.
• Simulation tests with real data. The proposed P2P architecture has been imple-
mented using a simulator called PlanetSim [Ahul 08]. Then, the simulations
have been performed using real data extracted from the AOL file [M Ba 05].
In this way, the correct behaviour of the proposed system has been tested
with data generated by real users.
6.2 System requirements
In order to guarantee the proper behaviour of the system, two kinds of require-
ments are defined: privacy requirements and performance requirements.
6.2.1 Privacy requirements
Privacy requirements consist in protecting users against three kinds of adversaries:
• Web search engine. It is the main adversary in our scenario. Its objective is to
learn the queries generated by each user in order to build a detailed profile.
• Dishonest user. A dishonest user profits her insider role in the protocol to
learn the queries from other members. She knows which of her neighbours
has forwarded a particular query to her.
• Selfish user. A selfish user does not follow the protocol. She utilizes the
network in order to privately submit her own queries. However, she does
not collaborate to submit the queries of the other members. Several users
acting this way can cause a denial of service and prevent honest users from
obtaining their search results.
Regarding the two first adversaries (WSE and dishonest user), the requirement
is to prevent them from learning the source of any query. Regarding selfish users,
the system is required to penalize this kind of behaviour.
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6.2.2 Performance requirements
As for performance, the following requirements are defined in the system:
• No bottleneck. The system must be P2P, without a central node that creates
and manages the groups.
• Scalability. The system must be able to work with a high number of users,
maintaining an acceptable response time.
• Robustness. The system must support frequent joins and leaves of users,
while preserving the connectivity between nodes (i.e., no user can remain
isolated).
• Accurate grouping. The system must group users with similar profiles. If
users within a group have too different profiles, they will submit queries
that do no match their interests. This may result in a distorted group profile,
which prevents WSEs from providing a good quality of the service.
6.3 Our proposal
In order to match the privacy and performance requirements defined in Section
6.2, we propose a P2P architecture used as an overlay to protect the users’ privacy.
This section describes the details of the proposed architecture.
6.3.1 Entities
There are three different entities that participate in the system: the peers, the
superpeers, and the bootstrap.
• Peers. They are the users of the system. Their objective is to privately submit
their queries to the WSE.
• Superpeers. They are peers that have additional functions. They are in charge
of the organization of the network. Their function is to arrange the users
of the system, redirecting them to their assigned place in the network and
providing the information required to contact other users.
• Bootstrap. It is the input point of the system. It is a node or a set of nodes
that redirects new users to the superpeers. The bootstrap is maintained by
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the owners and/or volunteers of the P2P network. Its physical address is
publicly available.
6.3.2 Architecture design
The three entities that participate in the system are connected inside the network
in a three-layer architecture.
The first layer is composed by the bootstrap. The bootstrap can be a unique
node or a set of nodes, depending on the size of the network. For a large network,
a larger number of nodes may be necessary. Every bootstrap node contains a
cache that stores the physical addresses of some superpeers. A bootstrap node
must know at least one superpeer of the network, but it is not required to know
all the superpeers.
The second layer is formed by the superpeers, which are connected between
them using a P2P overlay. The characteristics of this overlay are later discussed in
Section 6.3.2.
The third layer contains the peers, organized in structures called Profile Clusters.
A Profile Cluster is an unstructured P2P network that contains peers that share
similar interests. Each Profile Cluster is managed by a different superpeer. This
superpeer holds an input queue that keeps the physical addresses of the peers in
the Profile Cluster. A FIFO policy is applied in the queue: every time that a new
peer joins, her address is included in the queue and the address of the oldest peer
is removed.
Inside the Profile Cluster, users are not connected in a complete graph. Instead,
each of them is connected to σ neighbours, where σ is a value that changes over
time, when new peers join and others disconnect. However, for privacy reasons
later described in Section 6.3.4, σ ≥ 2, i.e., there is no peer that has only one
neighbour.
The entities as well as the connections between them are represented in Figure
6.1.
The next two subsections give a detailed explanation of the second and the
third layer, respectively.
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the P2P network
P2P Overlay
Our objective is to group users according to their profile and to hide their real
queries from the WSE. We propose the design of a P2P network of low latency
that supports a huge amount and mobility of users.
In the literature, there are several proposals that provide scalable, self-
organized P2P networks, offering different services such as distributed computing,
message passing, document and file sharing, p2p games, etc. Next we describe the
most recognized P2P overlays.
CAN [Ratn 01] is a topology which uses a multi-dimensional Cartesian coor-
dinate space in form of torus. Each peer has a portion of the Cartesian space
assigned and manages a table with information about neighbours (IP and virtual
coordinates). CAN uses greedy routing strategy, where a message is routed to the
neighbour that is closer to the required location. The CAN algorithm is highly
scalable and self organizing.
Chord [Stoi 01] is a popular and common topology which organizes peers using
a DHT (Distributed Hash Function) and assigns a long key id, originally 160 bits,
to every node. The topology is organized as a circle where each node contains
a successor and predecessor link. In addition, each node manages a neighbour
table with a log2N size, which contains the key and physical address of the 2
i−1
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successor in the ith position. Therefore, a node can reach any other node with a
logarithmic cost.
Tapestry [Zhao 01] is based on the work of Plaxton et al. [Plax 97], which uses
an internal structure of data in order to find the peers, correlating a node ID and
a final key to route a message. It also implements multiple replicas for each object
to prevent a unique point of failure. The routing map is composed by logBN
levels. Each peer manages a routing table of B entries for each level. In the same
way as Pastry, supports replication of data and track of multiple paths. A special
feature of Tapestry is that it supports replicate data across multiple peers and
keeps track of multiple paths to each peer to provide flexibility when sending
messages (surrogate routing). It also addresses the problem of a single point of
failure (when an object has a single peer) by assigning multiple roots to each
object.
Pastry [Rows 01], similarly to Tapestry, implements a Plaxton mesh. However,
in this case, its routing protocol consists in pairing the destination key with the
actual prefix. In the same manner, the neighbour table manages logBN rows, but
only stores B − 1 entries. The maintained relation is that the row n stores the
address of nodes which shares the n first digits of the key, but the n + 1 and
upper positions contain the other B− 1 possible values according to its own key.
Similarly to Tapestry, Pastry supports replication of data and track of multiple
paths.
Kadmelia [Maym 02] implements a routing protocol based on XOR metric to
obtain the distance between two points in the key space. The distance between
two points is defined as d(a, b) = a⊕ b. In order to implement it, each peer has to
manage a double linked list of k nodes, named k− buckets, where in each position i
stores the most recent nodes between the 2i and 2i+1 position with the same prefix.
The value of k is usually 20. XOR is symmetric and therefore, it allows peers to
send and receive queries from the peers of their routing tables. Furthermore, a
peer can send a query to a peer within an interval, while allowing to select routes
based on latency or parallel asynchronous queries.
Viceroy [Malk 02] manages the scheduling and localization of data and re-
sources in an approximation to a Butterfly network. It applies a uniform DHT
function to distribute the set of data. The topology is arranged in log2N lev-
els, where each level is a ring that contains an even number of peers connected
by means of level − ring links. Note that these peers are chosen to long range
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contacts. On the other hand, the interconnection of levels is made up by using
Down− Le f t and Down− Right edges, and they are used to perform short con-
tacts. This topology stands out from the rest because it only requires a constant
number of links, 7 for each peer.
Bruijn [Logu 03, Kaas 03] is a graph of logarithmic diameter logkN used as an
overlay. Each peer contains k incoming and outcomming links. The build of the
links H of each peer consists in producing a shift operation of 1 bit to the left.
The final result is a directed graph where the links are distributed symmetrically
around the network. It has a constant degree, such as Viceroy, but Bruijn is more
flexible because it allows to change the number of connections according to the
specified base k.
N-ari Tree [Cast 11b, Jaga 05] is a hierarchical topology in tree form. The topol-
ogy is based on a N-Ari Balanced Tree structure. It is built starting from the root
peer, where it is connected to B peer nodes, known as son peers, and which are
situated in the immediate lower level. Simultaneously, these nodes can be the par-
ent nodes from other son peers. The final nodes that do not have any son peers are
known as leaves. If the tree is balanced, the number of levels in terms of number
of peers reaches logB(N(B− 1) + 1)− 1 and achieves a constant degree of nodes.
overlay Degree Diameter
CAN 2 · d d · N(
1
d )
Chord log2 N log2 N
Tapestry k logk N logk N
Pastry (2 · k) logk N logk N
Kadmelia k · logk N + k logk N + c
Bruijn k logk N
Viceroy 7 log2 N
Baton (N-ari tree) log2 N 2 log2 N
Table 6.1: Degree-diameter complexities.
Our contribution tries to take advantage of the P2P overlay and the methods
for addressing multi-attribute capabilities of the peers, extracting the computing
trends and redesigning some levels for classifying and optimizing according to
the WSE profile. With this objective, a two-level overlay is proposed. At the
first level Bruijn was chosen from among the most widely used P2P topologies
[Mesh 08, Lua 05] to form the base overlay for connecting the superpeers, mainly
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overlay/k 2 3 4 10 20
CAN 1414 144 45 5 3
Chord 20 - - - -
Tapestry 20 13 10 6 5
Pastry 20 13 10 6 5
Kadmelia 23 15 11 7 5
Bruijn 20 13 10 6 5
Viceroy 31 20 16 10 8
Baton (N-ari tree) - 40 26 13 10
Table 6.2: Diameter (N = 106 nodes).
because it offers the best diameter-degree. Bruijn is employed as a structured
network with the capability of finding attributes efficiently. It provides the perfor-
mance requirements of the underlying framework outlined in Section 6.2.2, that
is, no bottleneck, scalability, dynamism and robustness [Kaas 03]. Table 6.1 shows the
degree-diameter values of the different structured networks discussed earlier. The
high connectivity of Bruijn, with the best pair degree-diameter can be appreciated.
Table 6.2 shows the growth of diameter-overlay for a maximum number of nodes
N = 106. This confirms also the good scalability of Bruijn.
The second level of our overlay is an unstructured network, Profile cluster. The
Profile Cluster groups peers that share similar interests used to implement the
privacy protocol. As it is defined in literature, the unstructured networks are easier
to build because the arrangement of nodes arbitrary. Structured networks (Can,
Chord, Tapestry, Pastry, Kadmelia, Viceroy, Bruijn and N-ari tree) were discarded
because they are not suitable for privacy reasons. As later explained, for the sake
of privacy, it is necessary that the network topology remains unknown. Therefore,
privacy between nodes is better achieved with decentralised and non-structured
overlays.
In previous works, Castella et al. [Cast 10, Cast 11a] proposed a multi-layer
P2P computing overlay (DisCoP) optimized for searching multi-attribute compu-
tational resources, such as CPU, memory and secondary storage, in a completely
distributed and scalable manner. We adapted the idea of DisCoP of having a multi-
layer scheme. We consider that two layers are enough to fulfill our requiremens,
instead of the three layers proposed by the authors of DisCoP.
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Profile Clusters
In order to arrange the peers into a Profile Cluster (the second layer of the P2P
overlay) it is necessary to define their profiles. For this purpose, each user owns a
vector that represents her interests (the Profile Vector).
Consider k categories of interests such as news, sports, shopping, science, etc.
Then, the Profile Vector of a peer, denoted as V, contains k coordinates:
V =
{
C1, ..,Cj, ..,Ck
}
Each component Cj indicates the level of interest, ranged between [0..1], in the j
th
category. For design reasons, the number of bits of each Cj is equal.
In order to define the k categories employed in the system, the Open Directory
Project (ODP) [ODP 13] is used. The ODP is an ontology that organizes the World
Wide Web links. It has a hierarchical structure, where the topics are arranged in
categories which in turn can also include smaller categories. For example, for the
category shopping, some subcategories exist. These can be clothing, health, holidays,
etc.
Due to the large size of ODP, our system only considers the most relevant
k categories of the first level. However, including subcategories in the Profile
Vector V is possible. In doing so, the corresponding bits assigned to encode each
Cj are divided by the number of subcategories. Then, the significance of each
subcategory is weighted and set in one part of Cj. Thus, the format of Profile
Vector V remains intact.
6.3.3 Building the system
Similarly to most P2P systems, the network is built dynamically and ad-hoc. As
new nodes attempt to enter the system, they are gradually connected to the exist-
ing ones. There are two main steps to insert a new peer P in the system:
1. First of all, it is necessary to categorize the Profile Vector of P. For this
purpose, the user selects her level of interest in each category Ci defined
in the system. As a result, the user obtains her Profile Vector V. Then
H, the Hilbert transform of V is obtained. This is H = Hilbert(V). A
Hilbert curve [Moon 96] is a Multi-dimensional Space Filling Curve (SFC)
overlay. A Hilbert transform converts a multi-attribute vector (V) into a uni-
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dimensional vector (H). Unlike other SFC curves, Hilbert assures that the
locality between objects in the multi-dimensional space is also preserved in
the linear space. This feature even increases the classification of peer profiles.
We use this to group peers into Profile clusters, the second level of our P2P
overlay.
2. P contacts Bootstrap and receives the physical address of a superpeer SPa in
the Bruijn network. SPa is chosen randomly from the list of current super-
peers. Three situations can arise next:
(a) There is no Superpeer in the list of current superpeers. Then, P be-
comes the initial superpeer and joins the Bruijn network, as Section
6.3.3 describes.
(b) Superpeer SPa asks to the other superpeers in the first network level
(Bruijn) if a Profile Cluster associated to H exists. Two situations are
possible:
i. ∄ Profile Cluster for H. Similarly to the previous case, P becomes a
new superpeer of the Bruijn network (see Section 6.3.3).
ii. ∃ Profile Cluster for H. SPa redirects P to the superpeer SPb in
charge of the Profile Cluster that best matches its Profile Vector V.
In this case, P is inserted as a regular peer inside the SPb Profile
Cluster. In order to bind to its Profile Cluster’s neighbours, it exe-
cutes the procedure detailed in Section 6.3.3.
Building the Bruijn network
The first level of the P2P overlay, Bruijn, is formed by Superpeers.
A Bruijn graph is characterized by two parameters: (a) the degree k or number
of input and output links of each node (the degree k also designates the numer-
ical basis of the key assigned to each node) and (b) the diameter d. This is the
maximum distance between any pair of nodes (equivalent to the length of the key
nodes). Thus, the maximum number of nodes in the graph is NBruijn = k
d. Fol-
lowing this notation, the nomenclature Bruijn(k,d) is used to describe a graph of
a particular size. Fig. 6.2 shows an example of a complete graph Bruijn(2,3) with
NBruijn = 8 nodes.
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Figure 6.2: Directed graph Bruijn(2,3) with NBruijn = 8 nodes.
Bruijn graphs are uniform, multi-directional and symmetric. These properties
allow the message traffic to be balanced across the topology, avoiding congestion
and bottlenecks. Another advantage of the Bruijn is that a node only has to main-
tain a small and constant number of links, which imples a low construction cost
for the topology and which also means that it is more robust.
Furthermore, in our case, each node has a successor and a predecessor (as a
ring topology). The successor of a node is the closer node in the identifier circle in
clockwise direction. The predecessor is counter-clockwise.
A Bruijn network is at its maximum performance when it is fully completed.
Whenever the Bruijn graph is not complete, the search for a specific Profile Cluster
can suppose a high number of hops. This is due to the fact that the Superpeers in-
volved in the search path do not exist yet. At startup, the Bruijn network is created
as peers with different Profile VectorsV enter the system. Thus, the Bruijn network
is incomplete during this time. In order to improve this, a solution based on vir-
tualization of superpeers is proposed. The objective is to maintain entire connection
in the graph even when some nodes are missing. The virtualization of superpeers
means that, apart from its own key, a physical superpeer (a Bruijn node) can have
a continuous range of Profile Vectors assigned, and these identify non-existent su-
perpeers in the net. Each physical superpeer, identified by the Hilbert transform
P, stores its own Profile and all the k Profiles related to the virtual nodes between
P and its physical predecessor node (P − k), following the Hilbert order. Thus,
as the system grows, fewer virtual keys are assigned to physical superpeers. As
an example, imagine that we have an incomplete Bruijn(2,4). If the graph were
completed, it would be formed by 16 physical superpeers (the subindex indicates
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its order): P0 . . . P15. Let us suppose that the graph is incomplete with for example,
four physical nodes (P4, P7, P11, P15). This means that the rest of superpeers are
virtual (not created yet) and the Profiles should be assigned to the physical ones.
Then, physical node P4 should contain the virtual nodes (P0,P3), P7 (P5, P6), P11
(P8,P10) and P15 (P12,P14).
On the other hand, when a node disappears from the network, the successor
becomes responsible for its keys. For more details on how keys are assigned to
nodes and how can the value for a given key be discovered, see [Cast 10, Cast 11a].
Building the Profile Cluster
A Profile Cluster contains peers that share a similar Profile Vector, V. The node
in charge of its associated Profile cluster, responsible for managing the connection
of their forming peers is its associated superpeer SP. The superpeer holds a FIFO
queue with the information (physical addresses) of 5 peers of the Profile Cluster.
When a new node Pwith a Profile Vector V arrives at the Profile Cluster, it contacts
with the superpeer SP and then, the following steps are performed:
1. The new node P requests the FIFO peer list of physical addresses to SP.
2. SP delivers the FIFO list to P. SP updates its FIFO list. The address of
the oldest peer in the list is removed and the new physical address of P is
inserted.
3. P attempts to connect to σ peers of the Profile Cluster administered by SP.
The σ value is ranged from Kmin to Kmax thresholds. Section 6.4 gives more
details about the most suitable values for these threshold.
4. P waits until it receives the acceptance message from σ peers. Neighbors
with Kmax links will not accept connection.
5. P join the netwok. It can start executing the privacy protocol for submitting
queries to the WSE.
Maintenance of the P2P connectivity
The maintenance of the P2P networks consists in detecting broken links. For this
purpose, the system requires that users exchange messages every T units of time
to know if their neighbours are still “alive”.
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Elapsed a period T, if a peer has not yet received the message notification
“alive” from the expected neighbour, it executes the departure mechanism described
below in the same Section. We must differentiate between departure of peers in
the Bruijn and the Profile Cluster layers.
The value of T must be short enough to act quickly in case of peer disconnec-
tions. At the same time, T should be long enough not to saturate the network with
the maintenance messages. For more details in obtaining the best value for T, see
[Cast 11a].
When a peer leaves the system (voluntarily or involuntarily), it is necessary to
restructure the broken links to maintain its connectivity and functionality. Other-
wise, the performance of the network is critically reduced, increasing the number
of steps required to locate a node, the number of links, and probably, producing
isolated groups of peers. The disconnection of a superpeer and a simple peer af-
fect the system in different manners. Next, the departure policy from each level is
described.
When a superpeer SP leaves the network, the following procedure is per-
formed:
1. As a result of the maintenance policy, after T units of time, a neighbouring
superpeer detects a broken link.
2. As explained in Section 6.3.3, the successor of the superpeer SP (lets say SPb)
in the Bruijn network will be in charge of the Profiles of the leaving node.
3. In order to have the network fully connected, SPb will create links with the
neighbours of the leaving Superpeer.
4. Finally, SPb sends a notify message to her neighbours informing about the
changes.
If a peer of the Profile Cluster level leaves the system, the procedure is slightly
different. The Profile Cluster peers are connected to the system during periods
that we call “sessions”. Every time that a peer ends a session, the σ neighbours
that detect the broken link have to connect to another node, as long as the σ degree
remains below the Kmin threshold. The procedure for finding neighbours works
as follows:
1. Selecting peers from the FIFO queue initially provided by the superpeer SP.
If the list is empty, the second option is used.
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2. Applying an uninformed searching algorithm (e.g. Random Walk [Lua 05,
Sarm 07]) to select a random peer within the Profile Cluster.
6.3.4 Privacy-preserving protocol for submitting a query
This section explains the protocol that users execute inside the Profile Cluster in
order to privately submit their queries. As previously mentioned, the protocol is
based on the approach presented in [Viej 10]. However, some modifications are
necessary in order to adapt it to a more dynamic scenario. More specifically, the
modifications are mainly applied to the protection against selfish users, and the
criteria to accept a query from a neighbour. The resulting protocol is divided into
three different phases: the initializations, the transfer of a query, and the return of
the results.
Initializations
We assume that the peers are already organized in their Profile Clusters after
executing the steps described in Section 6.3.3. However, during this process, every
time that P creates a link with a new neighbour Q, the next steps are executed:
1. P generates a random value rp and keeps it secret.
2. P employs a cryptographic hash function H() and obtains β + 1 different
values as follows:
H(rp) = h
p
β
H(h
p
β) = h
p
β−1
H(h
p
β−1) = h
p
β−2
...
H(h
p
1) = h
p
0
3. Similarly, Q executes steps 1 and 2 with a random value rq and the same
cryptographic hash function H(). After this, Q obtains β different values{
h
q
β, h
q
β−1, . . . , h
q
0
}
.
4. P sends h
p
0 to Q.
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5. Q sends h
q
0 to P.
P repeats this process for each one of her σ neighbours: Q1,Q2, . . . ,Qσ. As a
result of that, she obtains h
q1
0 , h
q2
0 , . . . , h
qσ
0 .
In addition to this, P creates an array of records called pending queries. Each
record has three fields: the text of the query, the address of the peer that sent the
query to P, and the address of the peer to which P forwarded the query.
Transferring a query
When a peer P wants to submit a query, the following steps are executed:
1. P uses a random function to select the neighbour to which she will forward
the query. The outcome of the function is one element at random Q f ∈
Q1,Q2, ...,Qσ. Then, P forwards the query and h
p
i+1 to Q f , where i is the
number of queries that P and Q f have already exchanged.
2. In order to decide whether Q f should accept the query, the following steps
are executed:
(a) Q f calculates H(h
p
i+1) and checks that the result equals h
p
i .
• If (H(h
p
i+1)
?
= h
p
i ):
i. Q f calculates s = H(h
p
i+1||h
q f
i ), where || denotes the concatena-
tion operator.
ii. Q f employs s as a seed for a pseudorandom generator a =
Rand(s), where a ∈ [0, . . . , 1] is the probability of accepting the
query.
– If a < λ, Q f rejects the query and sends (NO, h
q f
i+1) to P.
– If a ≥ λ, Q f accepts the query and sends (OK, h
q f
i+1) to P.
Where λ is a parameter of the system that represents the query
acceptance ratio.
• Otherwise, Q f detects a misbehaviour and ends the connection
with P. The protocol finalizes at this point.
(b) If P receives NO from Q f , she must check if the rejection is justified or
ir Q f is behaving selfishly. For this purpose, P calculates H(h
q f
i+1) and
checks that the result equals h
q f
i .
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CLIENT-SIDE PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES IN WEB SEARCH. 
Cristina Romero Tris 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1658-2014
6.3. OUR PROPOSAL 111
• If (H(h
n f
i+1)
?
= h
n f
i ),
P calculates s = H(h
p
i+1||h
q f
i+1) and a = Rand(s) in the same way
that Q f did it.
– If a ≥ λ, P realizes that Q f should have accepted her query
and that Q f is behaving in a selfish manner. Then, she ends the
connection with Q f and the protocol finalizes at this point.
– If a < λ, P realizes that the rejection was justified. Then, P may
try to send her query to one of her other neighbours.
• Otherwise, P detects a misbehaviour and ends the connection with
Q f . The protocol finalizes at this point.
(c) If P receives OK from Q f , she saves in the pending queries array the text
of the query, her own address to indicate that the query was generated
by her, and the address of Q f .
3. Assuming that P has found a neighbour Qg that accepts her query, Qg must
determine if she submits the query of forwards it to one of her neighbours
Q′1,Q
′
2, ...,Q
′
σ. Note that since Qg is not the user who generated the query,
she is also a potential submitter. The decision of submitting of forwarding
the query is again based on a random function. In this case, the outcome
of the function is one element at random inside the set Qg,Q
′
1,Q
′
2, ...,Q
′
σ. If
the function returns Qg, the query is submitted by Qg and this phase of the
protocol ends.
Otherwise, the query is forwarded to the neighbour Q′g ∈ Q
′
1,Q
′
2, ...,Q
′
σ that
the function returns. Then, Q′g must again execute Step 2 to decide if she
accepts the query.
4. Previous steps are repeated until eventually any peer submits the query to
the WSE.
Note that this protocol allows each pair of peers to exchange a maximum of
β queries. For the (β + 1)-th query, a peer P and her neighbour Q must exe-
cute again the initialization steps and obtain new values
{
h
p
β, h
p
β−1, . . . , h
p
0
}
and{
h
q
β, h
q
β−1, . . . , h
q
0
}
, respectively.
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Return of the results
After the query is submitted by a peer inside the Profile Cluster, the results must be
sent back to the user who generated the query. However, the user who submitted
the query does not know the peer who generated it. For this reason, she employs
the pending queries array to know the address of the peer that sends that query to
her. She sends the results to that peer, who sends it to the user that forwarded it
to her, and that user to the previous one, etc. Everytime that a peer forwards the
search results from a query, she removes the corresponding record in the pending
queries array.
The result of this process is that, in order to reach the origin, the search results
follow the inverse path that the query employed. However, let us consider that
one of the nodes in this path fails. This would prevent the peer who generated the
query from obtaining the search results.
In order to avoid this problem, a resilience against failures protocol is executed.
This protocol is a simple solution that profits the maintenance protocol of the
P2P network described in Section 6.3.3. In this protocol, the users receive “alive”
messages from their neighbours every period T. If after a period T, a peer does
not receives a message from a neighbour, she concludes that the node has left the
system.
In this case, she must check her pending queries array to know if she had a
pending query pendq forwarded to the node that failed. If this is the case, the peer
P has two options:
1. Executing again the second phase of the protocol (see Section 6.3.4), and
forwarding pendq to another of her remaining neighbours. This also implies
updating the pending queries array.
2. Consulting the pending queries array to know who was the neighbour Qi that
forwarded pendq to her. Then, she sends a message to Qi indicating that the
path for pendq has been truncated.
In the second case, the receiving node has again the two previous options. At
the end, the query would be submitted following a different path or the originator
would receive a message of path truncated.
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6.3.5 Protocol behavior in front of the considered adversaries
This section analyzes the behavior of the proposed protocol in front of the adver-
saries defined in Section 6.2.
Against the WSE
As explained before, the peers are organized in Profile Clusters where they are
connected to other peers that share the same interests. Inside a Profile Cluster,
they exchange their queries executing the proposed privacy protocol. Regarding
the WSE, this has two consequences:
1. Since a peer submits queries on behalf of other users, the WSE cannot distin-
guish which query belongs to each user. Therefore, the privacy of the peer
is protected. The privacy level that peers obtain is comparable to the use of
k-anonymity [Swee 02] (in our case, σ-anonymity).
2. Since a peer submits queries that belong to users with similar interests, the
profile that the WSE owns is still reliable. This allows the peers to obtain
personalized search results, i.e., results that match their interests.
Against a dishonest user
Dishonest users try to learn the queries that belong to other users. The only
information that they have for this purpose is the query associated to the peer that
forwarded it. However, a dishonest user who receives a query cannot discern if
the query was generated by that peer or if that peer was forwarding it on behalf of
another user. The dishonest user knows neither the topology of the Profile Cluster
nor the number of hops from the legitimate owner of the query to the final node.
Additionally, the system is dynamic, with users constantly joining and leaving the
system. All this prevents her from finding the real source of a query.
Against a selfish user
As explained in Section 6.2.1, the systemmust penalize users that behave in a self-
ish way. Since the connections between users are dynamic, the protection against
selfish users is limited and it can only be applied to a current connection. This
means that the proposed method can protect a peer P that is connected to a selfish
neighbour Q. However, if Q leaves and re-joins the system, it can no longer be
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identified as a previously selfish user. The new peers that are connected to Q will
have to re-identify it as a selfish user. The method proposed for this purpose is
described in Step 2 from Section 6.3.4.
6.4 Performance evaluation
In order to analyze the performance of the proposed architecture, the system has
been implemented and simulated. This section explains the results obtained in
these simulations.
6.4.1 Methodology and test environment
First of all, we describe the points of the system that are going to be evaluated in
this section:
• Time to join the system In a P2P protocol where a group of users are connected
between them, the time required to join the system is an important point.
For a new peer, this period of time starts when she contacts the bootstrap,
and ends when she is in the Profile Cluster that best matches her profile,
connected to a minimum number of neighbours.
• Degree distribution This point analyzes the degree of the peers in the profile
clusters (i.e., the number of neighbours that each node has). The peers in the
network execute the privacy preserving protocol described in Section 6.3.4.
The higher the degree of a peer, the more privacy she obtains, but the higher
overload she gets. Additionally, having peers with very different degrees
prevent dishonest users from knowing the topology of the network. On the
other hand, it is not desirable to leave any peer isolated.
Prior to the simulations, there are three parameters that must be configured in
the system:
• The size of the Bruijn network. This parameter refers to the number of Bruijn
superpeers in the network. It also represents the maximum number of dif-
ferent profiles that the architecture supports. As it is defined in [Kaas 03],
in a d-dimensional Bruijn graph, there are 2d nodes. This means that the
number of nodes is always a power of 2. For the tests, we have evaluated
different dimensions of Bruijn, with 4, 8, 16, and 32 nodes (d = 2, 3, 4, 5).
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• Kmin. This parameter is the minimum number of neighbours that a peer
must have in any moment. If one or more of her neighbours disconnect, and
the peer detects that she has less than Kmin connexions, she must contact
her superpeer in order to create new links. The peer will repeat this process
until her degree is at least Kmin. Note that the privacy preserving protocol
described in Section 6.3.4 requires that Kmin ≥ 2. Otherwise, a peer P who
has a single neighbour Q would lose her privacy. In such scenario, P would
be forced to send all her queries to Q, and Q would know that all the queries
received from P were generated by her. Therefore, the higher the degree of
a peer, the more privacy she obtains. On the other hand, forcing the peers
to have a high number of minimum neighbours may increase the load of the
network. For the tests, we have evaluated different values of Kmin = 2, 3, 10.
• Kmax. This parameter is the maximum number of neighbours that a peer
can have. If a peer already has Kmax neighbours, she cannot accept new
connections. For most of the tests, we have employed a Kmax = ∞ (i.e.,
we have not limited the maximum degree of the peers). Then, we have
performed a test with Kmin = 2,Kmax = 4, in order to evaluate how limiting
Kmax affects the system.
In order to perform the simulations, a tool called PlanetSim [Ahul 08] has
been employed. PlanetSim is a simulation framework for overlay networks and
services that allows developers to evaluate their own protocols. By using the
API that PlanetSim provides, the P2P architecture defined in Section 6.3 has been
implemented. Additionally, to simulate users’ behaviours in the network, real data
generated by AOL users have been used. These data have been extracted from the
AOL dataset [M Ba 05]. As previously described, the AOL dataset contains the
queries submitted by each AOL user during three months, and the time at which
each query was submitted. Figure 6.3 shows an example of the volume of queries
submitted to AOL per second, during a period of 3 days. The graph presents three
peaks corresponding to a similar number of queries each day at the same time. It
can be observed that the behaviour of AOL users during one day recurs the other
days.
For our simulations, a one-week period file from the AOL dataset has been
extracted and tested, as if the users had been using the P2P architecture. Therefore,
the system is tested using real delays obtained from real users. Note that since the
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AOL dataset does not contain specific information about user profiles, we have
assigned random profiles to each AOL user.
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of submitted queries to AOL during 3 days
6.4.2 Time to join the system
As explained above, the first test evaluates the time required to join the system.
We simulated one week of real data, using an application implemented with Plan-
etSim. The results obtained reflect the number of tics that each user needs in order
to find her place in the network, and create the links with her neighbours.
From the results obtained, we initially detected the presence of outliers, i.e.,
observations that appear to deviate markedly from other members of the sample
in which it occurs [Grub 69]. Outliers can significantly affect the estimation of
statistical parameters such as the mean or the standard deviation in a dataset.
These outliers must be eliminated in order to obtain reliable estimators. There
are several methods for detecting outliers [Barn 94], but the simplest ones are
those that employ (i) the interquartile range (difference between quartile 3 and
quartile 1) or (ii) the variability of the data from its mean. In our case, it was not
possible to employ the first criteria, since in the result set quartile 1 and quartile
3 were frequently equal. On the other hand, the results do not follow a normal
distribution: data are not symmetrically distributed, and they have a strong bias.
As a result, we decided to apply the Chebyshev’s inequality to detect and remove
outliers, since this method does not assume that the data follow any particular
distribution.
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Chebyshev’s inequality guarantees that no more than 100/k2 % of the distribu-
tion’s values can be more than k standard deviations away from the mean. In our
case, we fix k = 8 and we consider any observation that has more than 5 standard
deviations of the mean to be an outlier. According to Chebyshev’s inequality, this
process affects 1.56% of the observations at most.
The method has been executed iteratively until all observations have less than
5 standard deviations of the mean. Accordingly, we have obtained the results
presented in Table 6.3, which contains the average number of tics that the peers
employ to join the system and their standard deviation. The results are presented
for different sizes of Bruijn and different Kmin, while Kmax = ∞ in all the cases.
Table 6.3: Average tics and standard deviation for joining the system for Kmax =
∞
Kmin = 2 Kmin = 3 Kmin = 10
mean dev. mean dev. mean dev.
4 Bruijn nodes 11.324 1.501 12.826 1.357 20.260 1.326
8 Bruijn nodes 11.957 1.739 13.463 1.632 21.260 1.692
16 Bruijn nodes 12.553 2.060 14.058 2.021 22.228 2.299
32 Bruijn nodes 12.326 1.920 13.827 1.880 21.978 2.188
From the results presented in Table 6.3, two statements can be inferred:
1. The system is scalable with respect to the number of Bruijn nodes. The
time to join the system is maintained when the number of Bruijn nodes (and
therefore, the number of different supported profiles) increases. Table 6.3
reflects that for the same value of Kmin, the average number of tics to join
the system is maintained, regardless of the number of Bruijn nodes.
2. The time to join the system increases when Kmin is augmented. This hap-
pens because in order to join the system, a peer is forced to initially find
Kmin neighbours. Then, the higher the Kmin, the longer the peer spends
looking for neighbours. Applying a linear regression to the results of Ta-
ble 6.3 reveals that each peer requires on average 1.15 tics more per extra
neighbour.
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Table 6.4: Average tics and standard deviation for joining the system for Kmin = 2,
Kmax = 4
Kmin = 2. Kmax = 4
mean dev.
4 Bruijn nodes 20.073 23.581
8 Bruijn nodes 30.633 50.777
16 Bruijn nodes 53.230 108.180
32 Bruijn nodes 52.942 107.853
Time to join the system with a bounded Kmax
Results for previous experiments were calculated for a Kmax = ∞. However, it is
also interesting to analyze what happens when Kmax is fixed to a particular value.
Table 6.4 shows the average number of tics to join the system and their standard
deviation, for Kmin = 2 and Kmax = 4.
A comparison between the results for Kmin = 2, Kmax = ∞ (Table 6.3) and the
results for Kmin = 2, Kmax = 4 (Table 6.4), reveals that:
1. Limiting Kmax significantly increases the average number of tics to join the
system. When the peers that are already in the system are not allowed to
accept more than Kmax = 4 connections, it is more difficult for the new
peers to find Kmin = 2 neighbours.
2. The standard deviation is higher for Kmax = 4 than for Kmax = ∞. This is
due to some situations that happen in the network when Kmax is limited.
For example, when several peers join or leave at the same time, there are
many peers looking for new connections simultaneously. On the other hand,
some Profile Cluster may have users with a small number of connections
in a particular moment, so the peers are more susceptible to aacept new
connections. As a consequence of these situations, the peers obtain delays to
join the system which significantly deviates from the average value.
3. When Kmax is limited, the number of Bruijn nodes affects the average num-
ber of tics to join the system. Increasing the number of Bruijn nodes means
to increase the number of Profile Clusters, so the peers are more dispersed
in the network. With fewer peers per Profile Cluster, when these peers can
only accept Kmax = 4 connexions, it is more difficult for new peers to find
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Table 6.5: Average degree and standard deviation of the peers
Kmin = 2 Kmin = 3 Kmin = 10
mean dev. mean dev. mean dev.
4 Bruijn nodes 4.013 1.984 5.866 2.510 15.262 4.002
8 Bruijn nodes 3.943 1.859 5.748 2.370 14.940 3.610
16 Bruijn nodes 3.813 1.709 5.579 2.208 14.062 3.137
32 Bruijn nodes 3.811 1.708 5.560 2.207 14.161 3.124
Kmin = 2 neighbours. However, this is not a problem when Kmax is not
limited, since the peers, dispersed or not, can accept ∞ connexions.
6.4.3 Degree distribution
In order to evaluate the degree distribution of the network, the degree of each
node at each moment has been calculated. Table 6.5 shows the average num-
ber of neighbours per node and the standard deviation. As in the previous test,
the results are presented for different sizes of Bruijn and different Kmin, while
Kmax = ∞ in all the cases.
Table 6.5 reflects that, as expected, the higher Kmin is, the more average con-
nexions each peer has. Regarding the number of Bruijn nodes, they slightly affect
the average degree. Having more Bruijn nodes means that there are fewer peers
inside each Profile Cluster and consequently, the peers have fewer neighbours.
Degree distribution with a bounded Kmax
Results presented in Table 6.5 are calculated for Kmax = ∞. However, when
analyzing the degree distribution, a comparison between the average number of
neighbours when Kmax is limited and when it is not is necessary. Table 6.6 shows
the average number of links per user and the standard deviation, for Kmin = 2
and Kmax = 4.
From the results for Kmin = 2, Kmax = ∞ (Table 6.5) and the results for
Kmin = 2, Kmax = 4 (Table 6.6), we can observe that:
1. Limiting Kmax = 4 reduces the average number of links that each peer has.
With this restriction, peers are not allowed to have more than Kmax = 4
neighbours. Therefore, the mean does not have a bias towards the right, as
it happens when Kmax = ∞.
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Table 6.6: Average degree and standard deviation for Kmin = 2, Kmax = 4
Kmin = 2. Kmax = 4
mean dev.
4 Bruijn nodes 2.964 0.836
8 Bruijn nodes 2.935 0.833
16 Bruijn nodes 2.874 0.835
32 Bruijn nodes 2.878 0.834
(a) Degree distribution for Kmin = 2,
Kmax = ∞
(b) Degree distribution for Kmin = 2,
Kmax = 4
Figure 6.4: Histograms for the degree distribution
2. Limiting Kmax = 4 reduces the standard deviation from the average number
of links that each peer has. Fixing Kmin = 2, Kmax = 4 forces the peers to
have 2, 3, or 4 neighbours. On the other hand, with Kmin = 2, Kmax = ∞
peers are allowed to have any number of neighbours in the range [2, . . . ,∞].
Consequently, there are many peers with a degree that significantly differs
from the average value (i.e., a higher standard deviation).
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the degree distribution for
Kmin = 2, Kmax = ∞ and for Kmin = 2, Kmax = 4. Figure 6.4(a) shows a
degree distribution among several different values. The most frequent val-
ues correspond to 2 and 3 links per peer. Then, the higher the degree is, the
lower frequency it has. On the other hand, Figure 6.4(b) shows a more dense
degree distribution, with many peers that share the same number of links.
3. Regarding the privacy-preserving protocol from Section 6.3.4, Kmax = 4 of-
fers a better load balance while Kmax = ∞ offers a higher level of privacy. As
explained in Section 6.3.4, peers that execute the privacy-preserving proto-
col forward queries to their neighbours. When Kmax = ∞ peers with higher
degree may be overloaded, while peers with lower degree may have long
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periods of inactivity. When Kmax = 4, all the peers have a similar number
of neighbours and hence, the load is balanced. However, the problem when
Kmax = 4 is that a peer knows that each of her neighbours has 1, 2, or
3 other neighbours. As stated in Section 6.3.5, dishonest users cannot find
the source of a query because they ignore the topology. Giving information
about the topology may threaten the privacy of honest users.
6.5 Privacy Evaluation
While Section 6.4 focuses on the performance analysis of the Bruijn architecture,
this section presents a privacy evaluation of the protocol described on Section
6.3.4. In this case, the objective of the simulations is to show that:
• The protocol can successfully preserve honest users’ privacy in front of the
WSE.
• The protocol penalizes selfish users by exposing them to the WSE.
• Employing the proposed special-purpose network with dynamic groups out-
performs the results obtained in [Viej 10], which executes a similar privacy-
preserving protocol but deployed in a social network.
First of all, we present the conditions that determine if a user is exposed in
front of the WSE. For this purpose, we adapt the definition of an exposed user
presented in [Viej 10] to our scenario:
Definition 6.1. (Exposed user) Let:
• G = {U1,U2, . . . ,Un} be the group of users of a WSE.
• q be a certain query.
• zi be the number of times that a certain user U has submitted the same query qi.
• LU = {(q1, z1), (q2, z2), . . . , (qr, zr)} be the list of queries submitted by U.
A user U is exposed if the WSE can use zi to detect with a high probability that a
certain query qi has been generated by U , where (qi, zi) ∈ LU.
Therefore, there are two requirements in order to guarantee that a certain user U
is not exposed:
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• Requirement 1. Given a certain query q, the WSE can group all the users Ui who
satisfy (q, zi) ∈ LUi . Then, the WSE orders that group depending on the number
of times zi that each user has submitted q. This is Y = {U1,U2, . . . ,Uk}, where
(q, zi) ∈ LUi , (q, zi−1) ∈ LUi−1, and zi > zi−1 for ∀i ∈ Y. Let us consider
that Uj was the user who initially generated q, i.e., (q, zj) ∈ LUj . The maximal
uncertainty for the WSE happens when all the users Ui ∈ Y have submitted
q the same number of times. This is zi = zj when i 6= j, for ∀i, j ∈ Y. This
is a very strict requirement, and it can be difficult to achieve. Therefore, we
relax it and we only require zj to be a value in the range z1 ≤ zj ≤ zk . This
requirement prevents zj from being the only value out of range. If zj is out of
range, the WSE can easily identify Uj and hence, she is exposed.
• Requirement 2. Even if zi fulfills the first requirement (zj is in the range),
the WSE can identify Uj if her position in the ordered group Y is always the
same. According to that, Uj should ideally be situated in the middle of Y but
the deviation of this position should be high. A high deviation implies that it is
difficult for the WSE to ascertain the exact position of Uj in Y. Thus, the WSE
cannot identify Uj.
A user U that fulfills the requirements above is concealed into a group of k users
and achieves a level of privacy comparable to k-anonymity. This implies that the
probability of correctly identifying U is at most 1/k. Note that, theoretically, any user
who submits q to the WSE is considered in the group of k users. In our scenario, these
are the peers inside a profile cluster that have ever submitted a query generated by U.
Next, we describe the performed simulation tests:
• The network inside a profile cluster was modeled using a random distribu-
tion. Initially, each user is connected to a number of neighbours ranging
between 2 and 10, but the number of connections may vary during the sim-
ulation. This is one of the differences with respect to [Viej 10], which em-
ployed a power-law distribution (followed by typical social networks) with
static connections between users.
• Similarly to [Viej 10], and in order to compare the obtained results in both
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systems, we have performed simulations considering networks of 50, 100,
200 and 400 users.
• Another difference with respect to [Viej 10] is that our system considers users
that join and leave the system. In order to accurately simulate this behaviour,
we have employed real data from the AOL dataset. First, we have extracted
four data subsets where only 50, 100, 200 and 400 users submit their queries.
Then, we have divided the data in sessions. A session is defined as a group of
queries made by a single user for a single navigation purpose [Huan 04]. The
most commonly used session identification method is called timeout [He 00],
in which a user session is usually defined as a sequence of queries from the
same user such that two consecutive queries are separated by an interval less
than a predefined threshold. In our case, the sessions are divided using a
threshold set arbitrarily to 3600 seconds. After that, we have calculated the
percentage of time in which each user has an open session with respect to
the duration of its data subset. These percentages have been employed as
the probability of being online in a particular moment. For each step of the
simulation, each node has been marked as online or offline based on this
probability.
• A user U that has a 100% probability of being online, generates 1656 queries
(in December 2012, each European user submitted, on average, 138 queries
to a search engine [Stat 13], i.e., 1656 queries per year approximately). Users
with lower online probability proportionally decrease their number of gen-
erated queries. All the queries generated by the same user have the same
content. This is the worst case scenario, since it is easier to identify a certain
user who continually submits the same query.
• Tests have been performed with different values for the acceptance ratio
parameter. This parameter, employed at Step 2(a)ii in the protocol of Section
6.3.4, determines the probability of accepting or rejecting the query received
from a neighbour.
• As in [Viej 10], we have run two kinds of simulations with two different
kinds of users: honest users and selfish users. Dishonest users have not been
considered because they follow the protocol in the same way that honest
users do. The only difference is that dishonest users try to profile other
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users during the process.
6.5.1 Tests without selfish users.
The first kind of tests is run in a scenario where all the users are honest users. The
objective of the tests is to analyze the average number of hops that a certain query
does before being submitted to the WSE, and the percentage of exposed users.
For this purpose, we have simulated four different networks consisting of,
respectively, 50, 100, 200, and 400 users. For each network, 1000 simulations have
been run and the average of these results has been computed. Results show that:
• Figure 6.5 shows the average number of hops for each of the networks, em-
ploying different acceptance ratios (probabilities 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9 for a
user to accept the query from a neighbour). The results shows that the num-
ber of hops increases with the number of users and with the acceptance ratio.
This means that the bigger the network is and the more likely the neighbours
are to accept a query, the further the query arrives.
However, in comparison with [Viej 10], the average number of hops that the
authors obtained (2.4 hops for a social network of 400 users) has significantly
increased. This is caused by the more dynamic nature of our network as op-
posed to the static nature of a social network. In our scenario, users with
high online probability tend to be connected to a higher number of neigh-
bours, specially to neighbours who also have a high online probability. As
Step 3 of the protocol presented in Section 6.3.4 establishes, the probability
of submitting the query to the WSE is 1/(σ + 1). Therefore, users with many
neighbours (i.e., higher σ) are more likely to forward the query, and hence,
this increases the average number of hops of the overall network.
A higher number of hops has its advantages and disadvantages. On one
hand, it increases the response time, since the user needs to wait longer for
the results. On the other hand, it provides a higher anonymity, since it is
harder for an external observer to track back the query to its initial source.
One simple solution for scenarios where response time is critical would be
to increase the probability of submitting the query to the WSE to ρ/(σ + 1),
where ρ is a configurable parameter of the system.
• Another result obtained from the tests without selfish users is a 0% of ex-
posed users in all the networks. This significantly outperforms the 58% of
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Figure 6.5: Average number of hops for different acceptance ratio
exposed users in a social network of 50 users, or the 43.5% of exposed users
in a social network of 400 users obtained in [Viej 10]. There are two reasons
that explain these results. The main one is that the dynamic nature of the
network induces users to have different neighbours in different moments of
the simulations, which causes a more even and sparse distribution of any
query among the users of the network. Another reason for the lack of ex-
posed users is that the privacy-preserving protocol, by default, prevents any
user from submitting her own query (unless she finds no neighbour that ac-
cepts it or if the query follows a cycle). This significantly reduces the number
of times that a user submits her own query with respect to the protocol of
[Viej 10], improving the compliance with the first requirement in the defini-
tion of an exposed user.
6.5.2 Tests with selfish users.
This kind of tests are meant to analyze the behaviour of the system in presence
of selfish users. More specifically, the objective is to show how the percentage
of exposed users changes when selfish users participate in the protocol. For the
sake of simplicity, the simulations have only been performed using a network of
400 users and an acceptance ratio paccept = 0.7. The same four different scenarios
considered in [Viej 10] and in our tests are:
• Scenario 1: 90% honest users, 10% selfish users.
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• Scenario 2: 80% honest users, 20% selfish users.
• Scenario 3: 60% honest users, 40% selfish users.
• Scenario 4: 20% honest users, 80% selfish users.
Table 6.7 reflects the behaviour of the protocol in the four scenarios. Results
show that, for all the configurations, no honest user has been exposed. Regarding
selfish users, between 65% and 70% of them have been exposed. Additionally, the
third and the fourth columns show that, for a selfish user, the exposition depends
on the amount of time that they have remained online. It can be observed that
selfish users who frequently employ the system are exposed, while selfish users
who rarely submit queries remain unexposed. Consequently, these results show
that the system correctly penalizes selfish users who regularly employ the system
to submit their queries.
In comparison with [Viej 10], results show that their scheme obtains a higher
number of exposed honest users, specially for users that have fewer connections.
For example, in Scenario 1, honest users with 7, 8, 9, and 10 neighbours are never
exposed, while honest users with 1 or 2 neighbours have a percentage of exposed
users higher than 90%. For Scenarios 2, 3, and 4, the percentages of exposure
increase for all the honest users.
Table 6.7: Percentages of exposed users and average online time for selfish users.
Exposed Exposed Average online time Average online time
honest selfish for exposed for non-exposed
users users selfish users selfish users
Scenario 1 0% 70% 49.31% 1.25%
Scenario 2 0% 67.25% 47.40% 0.66%
Scenario 3 0% 65.63% 42.84% 0.44%
Scenario 4 0% 64.94% 39.51% 0.24%
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a system that protects the privacy of WSE users,
while maintaining the quality of service that the WSE can offer. For this purpose,
we have designed a P2P architecture that supports a privacy-preserving protocol
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for WSE users. Basically, the system classifies users into groups according to their
interests, and the privacy-preserving protocol allows them to obtain a group profile.
As a result, the WSE can employ the group profile to improve the user’s experience,
but it ignores detailed person-specific data.
The privacy-preserving protocol protects users’ privacy in front of the WSE
and of dishonest users, and it also penalizes users that behave selfishly. The P2P
architecture has been implemented and simulated. Results regarding the time to
join the system and degree distribution have been presented for several network
configurations. The simulations have been performed using real data belonging
to a large number of users, which shows that the system works even with a high
load of users. Additionally, results show that the network manages the joins and
leaves of users and hence, (i) users can join the network and find Kmin neighbours
with a reasonable delay, and (ii) when a user leaves the system, the connectivity
of her neighbours is maintained, and no node remains isolated. Regarding the
degree distribution, results show that if Kmax is not bounded, users have dif-
ferent number of neighbours. As a consequence, the topology of the network is
unpredictable, protecting users’ privacy in front of dishonest internal users.
As for future work, it might be interesting to simulate how the protocol be-
haves in terms of performance for different sizes of Kmin and Kmax. Additionally,
it might be interesting to observe how the group profiles evolve and how they differ
from the profiles that the users would have obtained if they had not executed the
protocol.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the contributions, the related publications and describes possible
future research lines.
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7.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we have focused on providing client-side solutions for private web
search. On one hand, we have performed a survey of the current literature, classi-
fying the proposals, describing their advantages and disadvantages, and compar-
ing them according to some properties.
On the other hand, we have contributed with three proposals that protect users’
privacy in front of WSEs. These three proposals have been analyzed in terms of
privacy achieved and performance. More specifically, the contributions regarding
these three proposals are:
1. First of all, we have presented a protocol that reduces the query delay re-
garding similar proposals in the literature. Additionally, another novelty of
the protocol is that it incentivizes every user to follow the protocol in order
to obtain privacy. The scheme has been tested in an open environment and
results show that it achieves the lowest query delay which has been reported
in multi-party private web search protocols.
2. Despite the high performance of the previous protocol, it is not prepared
to prevent malicious internal attacks. For this reason, our second proposed
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protocol is adapted to work in a more hostile scenario, addressing the prob-
lem of dishonest users. The scheme has been implemented, compared with
similar proposals, and evaluated using real queries in a controlled and real
environment. Results show that it outperforms proposals with a similar pri-
vacy level, and that it preserves users’ profiles at general categories, while
protecting its specific contents.
3. Although this second protocol is resilient against dishonest internal users, it
does not protect users from a dishonest central entity responsible for group-
ing users (the central node). For this reason, the third proposed protocol
is a peer-to-peer solution that does not require the use of a central node
in order to create the groups. Basically, this proposal classifies users into
groups according to their interests. Then, a privacy-preserving protocol is
executed and users obtain a group profile. This group profile allows WSEs
to personalize the results of each user, but ignoring detailed person-specific
data.
The P2P protocol has been implemented and simulated for several network
configurations using real data. Results show that the delays to join or leave
the network are affordable, and that the system behaves properly even with
a high load of users. Additionally, results show that the protocol protects
users’ privacy in front of the WSE and of dishonest users, and it also penal-
izes users that behave selfishly.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
CLIENT-SIDE PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES IN WEB SEARCH. 
Cristina Romero Tris 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1658-2014
7.2. PUBLICATIONS 131
7.2 Publications
The publications supporting the content of this thesis are stated below:
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Jordi Castella`-Roca; Alexandre Viejo “Distributed Sys-
tem for Private Web Search with Untrusted Partners” In International Journal
of Computer and Telecommunications Networking (Computer Networks) Vol. 67,
pp. 26–42. 2014.
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Alexandre Viejo; Jordi Castella`-Roca “Client-Side Pri-
vacy Enhancing Technologies for Web Search” In International Journal for the
Computer and Telecommunications Industry (Computer Communications) 2013.
Under review.
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Damia` Castella` Martı´nez; Alexandre Viejo; Jordi
Castella` Roca; Francesc Solsona Tehas; Josep Maria Mateo-Sanz “Design of
a P2P network that protects users’ privacy in front of Web Search Engines”
Special Issue on Recent Advances in Security and Privacy in Distributed
Communications In International Journal of Computer and Electrical Engineer-
ing 2013. Under review.
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Alexandre Viejo; Jordi Castella` Roca “Multi-party
methods for privacy-preserving web search: survey and contributions” In
Advanced research in data privacy. Springer, in press, 2014.
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Alexandre Viejo; Jordi Castella` Roca; Youssef Benkary-
ouh “Sistema P2P de proteccio´n de la privacidad en motores de bu´squeda
basado en perfiles de usuario” In XIII Reunio´n Espanola de Criptografı´a y Se-
guridad de la Informacio´n (RECSI’14). (XIII Spanish Meeting on Cryptography
and Information Security). 2014. To appear.
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Jordi Castella`-Roca; Alexandre Viejo “Privacidad en
Motores de Bu´squeda con un Protocolo Multi-usuario con Atacantes Inter-
nos” In XII Reunio´n Espanola de Criptografı´a y Seguridad de la Informacio´n
(RECSI’12). (XII Spanish Meeting on Cryptography and Information Security).
2012.
• Damia` Castella` Martı´nez; Cristina Romero-Tris; Alexandre Viejo; Jordi
Castella` Roca; Francesc Solsona Tehas; Francesc Gine´ de Sola “Disen˜o de
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una red P2P optimizada para la privatizacio´n de consultas en WSEs” In XII
Reunio´n Espanola de Criptografı´a y Seguridad de la Informacio´n (RECSI’12). (XII
Spanish Meeting on Cryptography and Information Security). 2012.
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Jordi Castella`-Roca; Alexandre Viejo “Multi-party
private web search with untrusted partners”. In Security and Privacy in
Communication Networks, 7th International Conference on Security and Privacy
in Communication Networks (SecureComm) Lecture Notes of the Institute for
Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineer-
ing. Volume 96, pp. 261-280. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 2012. Core
A.
• Cristina Romero-Tris; Alexandre Viejo; Jordi Castella`-Roca “Improving
Query Delay in Private Web Search” In International Conference on P2P,
Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet Computing (3PGCIC), 2011. IEEE Com-
puter Society, Washington, DC, USA, 200-206. DOI=10.1109/3PGCIC.2011.61
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/3PGCIC.2011.61 . 2011.
7.3 Future work
In this section, we outline some of the possible new projects or open problems in
order to make contributions in the area.
The work presented in this thesis is an ongoing effort where each proposal
is improved upon over time. The proposal presented in Chapter 5 improves the
proposal of Chapter 4 by making it resilient against internal attackers. The pro-
posal presented in Chapter 6 improves the proposal of Chapter 5 by removing the
central node, which may be a bottleneck and a dangerous adversary. However,
there is still room for improvement and some points of this latter proposal must
be addressed:
• It is required to study an efficient way of grouping users according to their
interests. This is necessary in order to find their best position in the network.
• Another objective regarding this proposal is the simulation of the protocol
in terms of performance for different sizes of Kmin and Kmax.
• Additionally, it might be interesting to observe how the group profiles evolve
and how they differ from the profiles that users would have obtained if they
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had not executed the protocol.
Regarding this last point, another line of future work is the study of efficient
metrics to evaluate the level of privacy achieved when using a privacy-preserving
web search scheme.
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